000			03733nam a22005173i 4500
001			EBC3414959
003			MiAaPQ
005			20240729125641.0
006			m o d |
007			cr cnu||||||||
008			240724s1998 xx o ||||0 eng d
020			_a9780472022465 _q(electronic bk.)
020			_z9780472087211
035			_a(MiAaPQ)EBC3414959
035			_a(Au-PeEL)EBL3414959
035			_a(CaPaEBR)ebr10424701
035			_a(CaONFJC)MIL288292
035			_a(OCoLC)923503734
040			_aMiAaPQ _beng _erda _epn _cMiAaPQ _dMiAaPQ
050		4	_aJA71
082	0		_a320.011
100	1		_aAusten-Smith, David.
245	1	0	_aPositive Political Theory I : _bCollective Preference.
250			_a1st ed.
264		1	_aAnn Arbor : _bUniversity of Michigan Press, _c1998.
264		4	_c©2000.
300			_a1 online resource (225 pages)
336			_atext _btxt _2rdacontent
337			_acomputer _bc _2rdamedia
338			_aonline resource _bcr _2rdacarrier
490	1		_aMichigan Studies in Political Analysis Series
505	0		_aIntro -- Contents -- Acknowledgments -- Preface -- 1. Choice and Preference -- 1.1 Preference-driven choice -- 1.2 Rationalizable choice -- 1.3 Application: The unitary actor assumption -- 1.4 Transitive rationalizability -- 1.5 Application: Choice of coalitional partners -- 1.6 Discussion -- 1.7 Exercises -- 1.8 Further reading -- 2. Power and Collective Rationality -- 2.1 Aggregation and Arrow's Theorem -- 2.2 Application: Choosing a representative -- 2.3 Quasi-transitive and acyclic rules -- 2.4 Decisive sets and filters -- 2.5 Collective choice rules -- 2.6 Discussion -- 2.7 Exercises -- 2.8 Further reading -- 3. Restricting Outcomes -- 3.1 Decisive coalitions and simple rules -- 3.2 Acyclic simple rules -- 3.3 Application: A comparison of simple rules -- 3.4 Voting rules -- 3.5 Counting rules -- 3.6 Discussion -- 3.7 Exercises -- 3.8 Further reading -- 4. Restricting Preferences -- 4.1 Single-peaked preferences -- 4.2 Core characterization -- 4.3 One-dimensional outcome space -- 4.4 Application: Public goods provision -- 4.5 Order-restricted preferences -- 4.6 Application: Collective choice of tax-rates -- 4.7 Discussion -- 4.8 Exercises -- 4.9 Further reading -- 5. The Spatial Model -- 5.1 Choosing from a continuum -- 5.2 Core existence -- 5.3 Application: Distributive politics -- 5.4 Characterizing core points -- 5.5 Discussion -- 5.6 Exercises -- 5.7 Further reading -- 6. Instability and Chaos -- 6.1 Generic nonexistence of core points -- 6.2 Application: Distributive politics revisited -- 6.3 Cycles -- 6.4 Discussion -- 6.5 Exercises -- 6.6 Further reading -- 7. Summary and Conclusions -- 7.1 Social choice -- 7.2 Game theory -- Bibliography -- Index.
520			_aA definitive, comprehensive, and analytically sophisticated treatment of the theory of collective preference.
588			_aDescription based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources.
590			_aElectronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, Michigan : ProQuest Ebook Central, 2024. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest Ebook Central affiliated libraries.
650		0	_aPolitical science -- Methodology.
650		0	_aPolitical science -- Decision making.
650		0	_aRational choice theory.
650		0	_aSocial choice.
655		4	_aElectronic books.
700	1		_aBanks, Jeffrey S.
776	0	8	_iPrint version: _aAusten-Smith, David _tPositive Political Theory I _dAnn Arbor : University of Michigan Press,c1998 _z9780472087211
797	2		_aProQuest (Firm)
830		0	_aMichigan Studies in Political Analysis Series
856	4	0	_uhttps://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/orpp/detail.action?docID=3414959 _zClick to View
999			_c92640 _d92640