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007			cr cnu||||||||
008			240724s2003 xx o ||||0 eng d
020			_a9780791487365 _q(electronic bk.)
020			_z9780791456255
035			_a(MiAaPQ)EBC3408419
035			_a(Au-PeEL)EBL3408419
035			_a(CaPaEBR)ebr10594746
035			_a(OCoLC)55676247
040			_aMiAaPQ _beng _erda _epn _cMiAaPQ _dMiAaPQ
050		4	_aB3376.W56 -- E52 2003eb
082	0		_a121/.091
100	1		_aEllenbogen, Sara.
245	1	0	_aWittgenstein's Account of Truth.
250			_a1st ed.
264		1	_aAlbany : _bState University of New York Press, _c2003.
264		4	_c©2012.
300			_a1 online resource (165 pages)
336			_atext _btxt _2rdacontent
337			_acomputer _bc _2rdamedia
338			_aonline resource _bcr _2rdacarrier
490	1		_aSUNY Series in Philosophy Series
505	0		_aIntro -- Wittgenstein's Account of Truth -- Contents -- Abbreviations -- Preface -- Acknowledgments -- PART I: From "Meaning is Use" to the Rejection of Transcendent Truth -- 1. Wittgenstein's Rejection of Realism versus Semantic Antirealism -- 2. The Positive Account of Truth -- 3. Antirealism Revisited -- PART II: From "Meaning is Use" to Semantic Antirealism -- 4. The Acquisition Argument and the Manifestation Criterion -- 5. Antirealism Presupposes Realism -- 6. Tensions between Wittgenstein and Dummett -- 7. Semantic Antirealism Is Inconsistent -- PART III: Why a Revisionist Account of Truth? -- 8. Criteria and Justification Conditions -- 9. Criteria and Realist Truth Conditions -- 10. Why Criteria Are Not Defeasible -- 11. Criterial Change, Conceptual Change, and Their Implications for the Concept of Truth -- 12. Why a Revisionist Account of Truth? -- Notes -- 1. Wittgenstein's Rejection of Realism versus Semantic Antirealism -- 2. The Positive Account of Truth -- 3. Antirealism Revisited -- Part II. From "Meaning is Use" to Semantic Antirealism -- 4. The Acquisition Argument and the Manifestation Criterion -- 5. Antirealism Presupposes Realism -- 6. Tensions between Wittgenstein and Dummett -- 7. Semantic Antirealism Is Inconsistent -- Part III. Why a Revisionist Account of Truth? -- 8. Criteria and Justification Conditions -- 9. Criteria and Realist Truth Conditions -- 10. Why Criteria Are Not Defeasible -- 11. Criterial Change, Conceptual Change, and Their Implications for the Concept of Truth -- 12. Why a Revisionist Account of Truth? -- Bibliography -- Index -- A -- B -- C -- D -- E -- F -- G -- H -- I -- J -- K -- L -- M -- N -- O -- P -- Q -- R -- S -- T -- U -- V -- W.
520			_aExplores the complex nature of truth in Wittgenstein's philosophy.
588			_aDescription based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources.
590			_aElectronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, Michigan : ProQuest Ebook Central, 2024. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest Ebook Central affiliated libraries.
655		4	_aElectronic books.
776	0	8	_iPrint version: _aEllenbogen, Sara _tWittgenstein's Account of Truth _dAlbany : State University of New York Press,c2003 _z9780791456255
797	2		_aProQuest (Firm)
830		0	_aSUNY Series in Philosophy Series
856	4	0	_uhttps://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/orpp/detail.action?docID=3408419 _zClick to View
999			_c90004 _d90004