000 | 08059nam a22004693i 4500 | ||
---|---|---|---|
001 | EBC3408408 | ||
003 | MiAaPQ | ||
005 | 20240729125531.0 | ||
006 | m o d | | ||
007 | cr cnu|||||||| | ||
008 | 240724s2003 xx o ||||0 eng d | ||
020 |
_a9780791486375 _q(electronic bk.) |
||
020 | _z9780791458112 | ||
035 | _a(MiAaPQ)EBC3408408 | ||
035 | _a(Au-PeEL)EBL3408408 | ||
035 | _a(CaPaEBR)ebr10594735 | ||
035 | _a(OCoLC)56408585 | ||
040 |
_aMiAaPQ _beng _erda _epn _cMiAaPQ _dMiAaPQ |
||
050 | 4 | _aBD161 -- .R477 2003eb | |
100 | 1 | _aRescher, Nicholas. | |
245 | 1 | 0 |
_aEpistemology : _bAn Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge. |
250 | _a1st ed. | ||
264 | 1 |
_aAlbany : _bState University of New York Press, _c2003. |
|
264 | 4 | _c©2012. | |
300 | _a1 online resource (425 pages) | ||
336 |
_atext _btxt _2rdacontent |
||
337 |
_acomputer _bc _2rdamedia |
||
338 |
_aonline resource _bcr _2rdacarrier |
||
490 | 1 | _aSUNY Series in Philosophy Series | |
505 | 0 | _aIntro -- Epistemology -- Contents -- PREFACE -- Introduction -- Part I: Knowledge and Its Problems -- 1. Modes of Knowledge -- IS KNOWLEDGE TRUE JUSTIFIED BELIEF? -- MODES OF (PROPOSITIONAL) KNOWLEDGE -- OTHER BASIC PRINCIPLES -- 2. Fallibilism and Truth Estimation -- PROBLEMS OF METAKNOWLEDGE -- THE PREFACE PARADOX -- THE DIALLELUS -- AN APORY AND ITS RECONCILIATION: K-DESTABILIZATION -- COSTS AND BENEFITS -- MORE ON FALLIBILISM -- THE COMPARATIVE FRAGILITY OF SCIENCE: SCIENTIFIC CLAIMS AS MERE ESTIMATES -- FALLIBILISM AND THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN OUR (PUTATIVE) TRUTH AND THE REAL TRUTH -- 3. Skepticism and Its Deficits -- THE SKEPTICS "NO CERTAINTY" ARGUMENT -- THE ROLE OF CERTAINTY -- THE CERTAINTY OF LOGIC VERSUS THE CERTAINLY OF LIFE -- PRAGMATIC INCONSISTENCY -- SKEPTICISM AND RISK -- RATIONALITY AND COGNITIVE RISK -- THE ECONOMIC DIMENSION: COSTS AND BENEFITS -- THE DEFICIENCY OF SKEPTICISM -- 4. Epistemic Justification in a Functionalistic and Naturalistic Perspective -- EXPERIENCE AND FACT -- PROBLEMS OF COMMON-CAUSE EPISTEMOLOGY -- MODES OF JUSTIFICATION -- THE EVOLUTIONARY ASPECT OF SENSORY EPISTEMOLOGY -- RATIONAL VERSUS NATURAL SELECTION -- AGAINST "PURE" INTELLECTUALISM -- THE PROBLEM OF ERROR -- CONCLUSION -- 5. Plausibility and Presumption -- THE NEED FOR PRESUMPTIONS -- THE ROLE OF PRESUMPTION -- PLAUSIBILITY AND PRESUMPTION -- PRESUMPTION AND PROBABILITY -- PRESUMPTION AND SKEPTICISM -- HOW PRESUMPTION WORKS: WHAT JUSTIFIES PRESUMPTIONS -- 6. Trust and Cooperation in Pragmatic Perspective -- THE COST EFFECTIVENESS OF SHARING AND COOPERATING IN INFORMATION ACQUISITION AND MANAGEMENT -- THE ADVANTAGES OF COOPERATION -- BUILDING UP TRUST: AN ECONOMIC APPROACH -- TRUST AND PRESUMPTION -- A COMMUNITY OF INQUIRERS -- Part II: Rational Inquiry and the Quest for Truth -- 7. Foundationalism versus Coherentism. | |
505 | 8 | _aHIERARCHICAL SYSTEMIZATION: THE EUCLIDEAN MODEL OF KNOWLEDGE -- CYCLIC SYSTEMATIZATION: THE NETWORK- AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE EUCLIDEAN MODEL -- THE CONTRAST BETWEEN FOUNDATIONALISM AND COHERENTISM -- PROBLEMS OF FOUNDATIONALISM -- 8. The Pursuit of Truth: Coherentist Criteriology -- THE COHERENTIST APPROACH TO INQUIRY -- THE CENTRAL ROLE OF DATA FOR A COHERENTIST TRUTH-CRITERIOLOGY -- ON VALIDATING THE COHERENCE APPROACH -- IDEAL COHERENCE -- TRUTH AS AN IDEALIZATION -- 9. Cognitive Relativism and Contextualism -- COGNITIVE REALISM -- WHAT'SWRONG WITH RELATIVISM -- THE CIRCUMSTANTIAL CONTEXTUALISM OF REASON -- A FOOTHOLD OF ONE'S OWN: THE PRIMACY OF OUR OWN POSITION -- THE ARBITRAMENT OF EXPERIENCE -- AGAINST RELATIVISM -- CONTEXTUALISTIC PLURALISM IS COMPATIBLE WITH COMMITMENT ON PURSUING "THE TRUTH" -- THE ACHILLES' HEEL OF RELATIVISM -- 10. The Pragmatic Rationale of Cognitive Objectivity -- OBJECTIVITY AND THE CIRCUMSTANTIAL UNIVERSALITY OF REASON -- THE BASIS OF OBJECTIVITY -- THE PROBLEM OF VALIDATING OBJECTIVITY -- WHAT IS RIGHT WITH OBJECTIVISM -- ABANDONING OBJECTIVITY IS PRAGMATICALLY SELF-DEFEATING -- 11. Rationality -- STAGE-SETTING FOR THE PROBLEM -- OPTIMUM-INSTABILITY -- IDEAL VERSUS PRACTICAL RATIONALITY: THE PREDICAMENT OF REASON -- THE PROBLEM OF VALIDATING RATIONALITY -- THE PRAGMATIC TURN: EVEN COGNITIVE RATIONALITY HAS A PRAGMATIC RATIONALE -- ALTERNATIVE MODES OF RATIONALITY? -- THE SELF-RELIANCE OF RATIONALITY IS NOT VICIOUSLY CIRCULAR -- Part III: Cognitive Progress -- 12. Scientific Progress -- THE EXPLORATION MODEL OF SCIENTIFIC INQUIRY -- THE DEMAND FOR DATA ENHANCEMENT -- TECHNOLOGICAL ESCALATION: AN ARMS RACE AGAINST NATURE -- THEORIZING AS INDUCTIVE PROJECTION -- LATER NEED NOT BE LESSER -- COGNITIVE COPERNICANISM -- THE PROBLEM OF PROGRESS -- 13. The Law of Logarithmic Returns and the Complexification of Natural Science. | |
505 | 8 | _aTHE PRINCIPLE OF LEAST EFFORT AND THE METHODOLOGICAL STATUS OF SIMPLICITY-PREFERENCE IN SCIENCE -- COMPLEXIFICATION -- THE EXPANSION OF SCIENCE -- THE LAW OF LOGARITHMIC RETURNS -- THE RATIONALE AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE LAW OF LOGARITHMIC RETURNS -- THE GROWTH OF KNOWLEDGE -- THE DECELERATION OF SCIENTIFIC PROGRESS -- PREDICTIVE IMPLICATIONS OF THE INFORMATION/KNOWLEDGE RELATIONSHIP -- THE CENTRALITY OF QUALITY AND ITS IMPLICATIONS -- 14. The Imperfectability of Knowledge (Knowledge as Boundless) -- CONDITIONS OF PERFECTED SCIENCE -- THEORETICAL ADEQUACY: ISSUES OF EROTETIC COMPLETENESS -- PRAGMATIC COMPLETENESS -- PREDICTIVE COMPLETENESS -- TEMPORAL FINALITY -- "PERFECTED SCIENCE" AS AN IDEALIZATION THAT AFFORDS A USEFUL CONTRAST CONCEPTION -- THE DISPENSABILITY OF PERFECTION -- Part IV: Cognitive Limits and the Quest for Truth -- 15. The Rational Intelligibility of Nature -- EXPLAINING THE POSSIBILITY OF NATURAL SCIENCE -- "OUR" SIDE -- NATURE'S SIDE -- SYNTHESIS -- IMPLICATIONS -- 16. Human Science as Characteristically Human -- THE POTENTIAL DIVERSITY OF "SCIENCE" -- THE ONE WORLD, ONE SCIENCE ARGUMENT -- A QUANTITATIVE PERSPECTIVE -- COMPARABILITY AND JUDGMENTS OF RELATIVE ADVANCEMENT OR BACKWARDNESS -- BASIC PRINCIPLES -- 17. On Ignorance, Insolubilia, and the Limits of Knowledge -- CONCRETE VERSUS GENERIC KNOWLEDGE AND IGNORANCE -- EROTETIC INCAPACITY -- DIVINE VERSUS MUNDANE KNOWLEDGE -- ISSUES OF TEMPORALIZED KNOWLEDGE -- KANT'S PRINCIPLE OF QUESTION EXFOLIATION -- COGNITIVE INCAPACITY -- INSOLUBILIA THEN AND NOW -- COGNITIVE LIMITS -- IDENTIFYING INSOLUBILIA -- RELATING KNOWLEDGE TO IGNORANCE -- POSTSCRIPT: A COGNITIVELY INDETERMINATE UNIVERSE -- 18. Cognitive Realism -- EXISTENCE -- HOMO MENSURA? -- REALISM AND INCAPACITY -- THE COGNITIVE OPACITY OF REAL THINGS -- THE COGNITIVE INEXHAUSTIBILITY OF THINGS -- THE CORRIGIBILITY OF CONCEPTIONS. | |
505 | 8 | _aCOGNITIVE PROGRESS -- COGNITIVE DYNAMICS -- CONCEPTUAL BASIS OF REALISM AS A POSTULATE -- HIDDEN DEPTHS: THE IMPETUS TO REALISM -- THE PRAGMATIC FOUNDATION OF REALISM AS A BASIS FOR COMMUNICATION AND DISCOURSE -- THE IDEALISTIC ASPECT OF METAPHYSICAL REALISM -- SCIENCE AND REALITY -- Notes -- INTRODUCTION -- CHAPTER 1 -- CHAPTER 2 -- CHAPTER 3 -- CHAPTER 4 -- CHAPTER 5 -- CHAPTER 6 -- CHAPTER 7 -- CHAPTER 8 -- CHAPTER 9 -- CHAPTER 10 -- CHAPTER 11 -- CHAPTER 12 -- CHAPTER 13 -- CHAPTER 14 -- CHAPTER 15 -- CHAPTER 16 -- CHAPTER 17 -- CHAPTER 18 -- Index of Names -- A -- B -- C -- D -- E -- F -- G -- H -- I -- J -- K -- L -- M -- N -- O -- P -- Q -- R -- S -- T -- U -- V -- W -- Z. | |
520 | _aA comprehensive introduction to the theory of knowledge. | ||
588 | _aDescription based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources. | ||
590 | _aElectronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, Michigan : ProQuest Ebook Central, 2024. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest Ebook Central affiliated libraries. | ||
655 | 4 | _aElectronic books. | |
776 | 0 | 8 |
_iPrint version: _aRescher, Nicholas _tEpistemology _dAlbany : State University of New York Press,c2003 _z9780791458112 |
797 | 2 | _aProQuest (Firm) | |
830 | 0 | _aSUNY Series in Philosophy Series | |
856 | 4 | 0 |
_uhttps://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/orpp/detail.action?docID=3408408 _zClick to View |
999 |
_c89993 _d89993 |