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001			EBC3138485
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006			m o d |
007			cr cnu||||||||
008			240724s1984 xx o ||||0 eng d
020			_a9780801468629 _q(electronic bk.)
020			_z9780801482441
035			_a(MiAaPQ)EBC3138485
035			_a(Au-PeEL)EBL3138485
035			_a(CaPaEBR)ebr10715673
035			_a(CaONFJC)MIL681750
035			_a(OCoLC)922998408
040			_aMiAaPQ _beng _erda _epn _cMiAaPQ _dMiAaPQ
050		4	_aU162
082	0		_a355.4/3/09034
100	1		_aSnyder, Jack L.
245	1	4	_aThe Ideology of the Offensive : _bMilitary Decision Making and the Disasters Of 1914.
250			_a1st ed.
264		1	_aIthaca : _bCornell University Press, _c1984.
264		4	_c©2013.
300			_a1 online resource (270 pages)
336			_atext _btxt _2rdacontent
337			_acomputer _bc _2rdamedia
338			_aonline resource _bcr _2rdacarrier
490	1		_aCornell Studies in Security Affairs Series
505	0		_aThe Ideology of the Offensive -- Contents -- Preface -- 1. Military Bias and Offensive Strategy -- Rationality and Bias in Strategic Analysis -- Offense and Defense: A Rational Calculus -- Offensive Bias: Motivations and Interests -- Offensive Bias: The Need to Simplify -- The Synthesis: Organizational Ideology -- Method of Analysis -- Limitations and Qualifications -- 2. France: Offensive Strategy as an Institutional Defense -- Plan 17 -- Explaining the Intensity of French Bias -- 3. France: Du Picq, Dreyfus, and the Errors of Plan -- Ardant du Picq as Military Ideologist -- The Predominance of the Defensive in the 1870s -- Institutional Threat and Doctrinal Response in the 1880s -- Realism and Self-interest in the 1890s -- Subjugation and Reassertion, 1898-1911 -- Grandmaison, Joffre, and the Reassertive Reaction -- The Joffre Revival -- The Intelligence Failure of 1914 -- Conclusions -- 4. Germany: The Elusive Formula for Decisive Victory -- Premises and Risks of the Schlieffen Plan -- Explaining the General Staff's Bias -- 5. Germany: The "Necessary" Is Possible -- Moltke's Encirclement Doctrine -- Schlieffen's Strategic Doctrine -- Schlieffen's Planning for a Two-front War -- War Planning under the Younger Moltke -- Conclusions -- 6. Russia: Bureaucratic Politics and Strategic Priorities -- The Overcommitted Offenses of 1914 -- Explaining the Overcommitment -- 7· Russia: The Politics and Psychology of Overcommitment -- Danilov's Defensive Plan of 1910 -- Alekseev's Offensive Plan of 1912 -- The Response to Alekseev's Plan -- The Hasty Attack Strategy, 1913-1914 -- Creating a Third Front: August 1914 -- Conclusions -- 8. The Determinants of Military Strategy -- Determinants of Strategy: Five Patterns -- Determinants of Strategy: Comparisons -- Offense and the Security Dilemma -- Notes -- Selected Bibliography -- Index.
520			_aJack Snyder's analysis of the attitudes of military planners in the years prior to the Great War demonstrates that it is not only rational analysis that determines strategic doctrine, but also the attitudes of military planners.
588			_aDescription based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources.
590			_aElectronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, Michigan : ProQuest Ebook Central, 2024. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest Ebook Central affiliated libraries.
650		0	_aOffensive (Military science) -- History -- 20th century.
650		0	_aMilitary planning -- France -- History -- 20th century.
650		0	_aMilitary planning -- Germany -- History -- 20th century.
650		0	_aMilitary planning -- Soviet Union -- History -- 20th century.
650		0	_aWorld War, 1914-1918 -- Campaigns.
655		4	_aElectronic books.
776	0	8	_iPrint version: _aSnyder, Jack L. _tThe Ideology of the Offensive _dIthaca : Cornell University Press,c1984 _z9780801482441
797	2		_aProQuest (Firm)
830		0	_aCornell Studies in Security Affairs Series
856	4	0	_uhttps://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/orpp/detail.action?docID=3138485 _zClick to View
999			_c72779 _d72779