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|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | EBC3019422 | ||
| 003 | MiAaPQ | ||
| 005 | 20240729124119.0 | ||
| 006 | m o d | | ||
| 007 | cr cnu|||||||| | ||
| 008 | 240724s2010 xx o ||||0 eng d | ||
| 020 |
_a9781613243374 _q(electronic bk.) |
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| 020 | _z9781607415121 | ||
| 035 | _a(MiAaPQ)EBC3019422 | ||
| 035 | _a(Au-PeEL)EBL3019422 | ||
| 035 | _a(CaPaEBR)ebr10670987 | ||
| 035 | _a(OCoLC)739712851 | ||
| 040 |
_aMiAaPQ _beng _erda _epn _cMiAaPQ _dMiAaPQ |
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| 050 | 4 | _aTK9185 -- .D48 2010eb | |
| 082 | 0 | _a363.325/563 | |
| 100 | 1 | _aEgidi, Pietro. | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | _aDetection of Nuclear Weapons and Materials. |
| 250 | _a1st ed. | ||
| 264 | 1 |
_aHauppauge : _bNova Science Publishers, Incorporated, _c2010. |
|
| 264 | 4 | _c©2010. | |
| 300 | _a1 online resource (167 pages) | ||
| 336 |
_atext _btxt _2rdacontent |
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| 337 |
_acomputer _bc _2rdamedia |
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| 338 |
_aonline resource _bcr _2rdacarrier |
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| 490 | 1 | _aWeapons of Mass Destruction | |
| 505 | 0 | _aIntro -- DETECTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND MATERIALS -- DETECTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND MATERIALS -- CONTENTS -- PREFACE -- Chapter 1 COMBATING NUCLEAR SMUGGLING: DHS'S PHASE 3 TEST REPORT ON ADVANCED PORTAL MONITORS DOES NOT FULLY DISCLOSE THE LIMITATIONS OF THE TEST RESULTS -- WHY GAO DID THIS STUDY -- WHAT GAO RECOMMENDS -- WHAT GAO FOUND -- ABBREVIATIONS -- RESULTS IN BRIEF -- BACKGROUND -- DNDO'S PHASE 3 TEST REPORT FREQUENTLY OVERLOOKS THE LIMITATIONS ASSOCIATED WITH THE TESTS' SMALL SAMPLE SIZES -- The Phase 3 Test Report Largely Overlooks the Limiting Effects of Performing a Small Number of Tests -- Report Text Often Omits the Range of Values Surrounding Each Test Result -- DNDO's Phase 3 Test Report Omits Important Details that Affect the Interpretation of the Test Results -- PHASE 3 TEST RESULTS PROVIDE LITTLE EVIDENCE AS TO WHETHER ASPS REPRESENT AN IMPROVEMENT OVER CURRENTLY DEPLOYED TECHNOLOGY -- SNL'S SPECIAL TESTS WERE DESIGNED TO IMPROVE ASP PERFORMANCE -- CONCLUSIONS -- RECOMMENDATIONS FOR EXECUTIVE ACTION -- COMMENTS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY AND OUR EVALUATION -- APPENDIX I. COMMENTS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY -- End Notes -- Chapter 2 DETECTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND MATERIALS: SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGIES, OBSERVATIONS -- SUMMARY -- 1. NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND MATERIALS: SIGNATURES AND DETECTION -- What Is to Be Detected? -- Photons 101 -- What Signatures show the presence of nuclear weapons and SNM? -- Atomic number and density -- Opacity to photons -- Radioactivity -- How Does Detection Work? -- How are signatures gathered, processed, and used? -- Principles of detection -- Means of detection -- Detecting gamma rays -- Detecting neutrons -- Detecting dense material -- Evasion of detection technologies -- Current Detection Technologies -- Radiation "pagers -- Radiation portal monitors. | |
| 505 | 8 | _aRadioactive isotope identification devices -- Radiographic imaging systems -- 2. ADVANCED TECHNOLOGIES -- Nanocomposite Scintillators13 -- The problem -- Background -- Technology description -- Potential Advantages -- Status, schedule, and funding -- Risks and concerns -- Scientific risks and concerns -- Engineering risks and concerns -- Cost and schedule risks and concerns -- Operational risks and concerns -- Potential gains by increased funding -- Potential synergisms and related applications -- GADRAS: A Gamma-Ray Spectrum Analysis Algorithm18 -- The problem -- Background -- Technology description -- Potential advantages -- Status, schedule, and funding -- Risks and concerns -- Scientific risks and concerns -- Engineering risks and concerns -- Cost and schedule risks and concerns -- Operational risks and concerns -- Potential gains by increased funding -- Potential synergisms and related applications -- Computer Modeling to Evaluate Detection Capability27 -- The problem -- Background -- Technology description -- Potential advantages -- Status, schedule, and funding -- Risks and concerns -- Scientific risks and concerns -- Engineering risks and concerns -- Cost risks and concerns -- Schedule risks and concerns -- Operational risks and concerns -- Potential gains by increased funding -- Potential synergisms and related applications -- L-3 CAARS: A Low-Risk Dual-Energy Radiography System33 -- The problem -- Background -- Technology description -- Potential benefits -- Status, schedule, and funding -- Risks and concerns -- Scientific risks and concerns -- Engineering risks and concerns -- Cost and schedule risks and concerns -- Operational risks and concerns -- Potential gains by increased funding -- Potential synergisms and related applications -- SAIC CAARS: A Higher-Risk, Higher-Benefit Dual-Energy Radiography System53 -- Technology description. | |
| 505 | 8 | _aPotential benefits -- Status, schedule, and funding -- Risks and concerns -- Scientific risks and concerns -- Engineering risks and concerns -- Cost and schedule risks and concerns -- Operational risks and concerns -- Potential gains by increased funding -- Potential Synergisms and Related Applications -- AS& -- E CAARS: Using Backscattered X-Rays to Detect Dense Material58 -- Background -- Technology description -- Potential benefits -- Status, schedule, and funding -- Risks and concerns -- Scientific risks and concerns -- Engineering risks and concerns -- Cost and schedule risks and concerns -- Operational risks and concerns -- Potential gains by increased funding -- Potential synergisms and related applications -- Muon Tomography67 -- The problem -- Background -- Technology description -- Potential benefits -- Status, schedule, and funding -- Risks and concerns -- Scientific risks and concerns -- Engineering risks and concerns -- Cost and schedule risks and concerns -- Operational risks and concerns -- Potential gains by increased funding -- Potential synergisms and other applications -- Scanning Cargo or Analyzing a Terrorist Nuclear Weapon with Nuclear Resonance Fluorescence89 -- Two problems -- Background -- Technology description -- Potential benefits -- Status, schedule, and funding -- Risks and concerns -- Scientific risks and concerns -- Engineering risks and concerns -- Cost and schedule risks and concerns -- Operational risks and concerns -- Potential gains by increased funding -- Potential synergisms and related applications -- Detecting SNM at a Distance105 -- The problem -- Background -- Technology description -- Potential benefits -- Status, schedule, and funding -- Risks and concerns -- Scientific risks and concerns -- Engineering risks and concerns -- Cost and schedule risks and concerns -- Operational risks and concerns. | |
| 505 | 8 | _aPotential gains by increased funding -- Potential synergisms and related applications -- 3. OBSERVATIONS -- Observations on Progress in Detection Technology -- Observations on Technical Progress and Congress -- Observations on Technical Progress and Terrorism -- APPENDIX. THE PHYSICS OF NUCLEAR DETECTION121 -- What Is to Be Detected? -- Background -- Photons -- Radioactivity -- Fissile material -- Detection -- Shielding and background radiation -- Signatures of Plutonium, Highly Enriched Uranium, and Nuclear Weapons -- Atomic number and density -- Opacity to photons -- Presence of gamma rays beyond background levels -- Presence of neutrons beyond background levels -- Gamma ray spectra -- Time pattern of neutrons and gamma rays -- Prompt gamma rays and neutrons -- Delayed gamma rays and neutrons -- Differential die-away -- Fission chain time signature -- Detecting Signatures of a Nuclear Weapon or SNM -- Overview: How are signatures gathered, processed, and used? -- How detectors work -- Detecting gamma rays -- Detecting neutrons -- Detecting absorption or scattering of high-energy photons -- Evasion of Detection Technologies -- End Notes -- Chapter 3 THE GLOBAL NUCLEAR DETECTION ARCHITECTURE: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS -- SUMMARY -- INTRODUCTION -- Domestic Nuclear Detection Office -- WHAT IS THE GLOBAL NUCLEAR DETECTION ARCHITECTURE? -- Layered Defense -- Methodology and Metrics for Evaluation -- Priority Setting -- Interagency Coordination -- ISSUES FOR CONGRESS -- Priority Setting and Appropriateness of Funding Levels Within the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture -- Balance between Incremental and Transformational Changes to the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture -- Long-Term Maintenance of the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture -- Research and Development Coordination -- End Notes. | |
| 505 | 8 | _aChapter 4 NUCLEAR DETECTION: PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS ON THE DOMESTIC NUCLEAR DETECTION OFFICE'S EFFORTS TO DEVELOP A GLOBAL NUCLEAR DETECTION ARCHITECTURE -- WHY GAO DID THIS STUDY -- WHAT GAO RECOMMENDS -- WHAT GAO FOUND -- SUMMARY -- BACKGROUND -- DNDO HAS BEGUN TO DEVELOP PROGRAMS TO ENHANCE THE INITIAL ARCHITECTURE, BUT IT LACKS AN OVERARCHING STRATEGIC PLAN FOR ACHIEVING FUTURE ARCHITECTURE IMPROVEMENTS -- DNDO AND OTHER AGENCIES FACE COORDINATION, TECHNOLOGICAL, AND MANAGEMENT CHALLENGES -- Federal Agencies Have Experienced Difficulties Coordinating Radiation Detection Efforts -- Limitations in Detection Technology Hamper the Architecture's Effectiveness -- DNDO Faces Challenges in Managing the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture -- APPROXIMATELY 2.8 BILLION IN FISCAL YEAR 2007 FUNDED PROGRAMS ASSOCIATED WITH DETECTING THE TRANSPORT OF RADIOLOGICAL AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS OR MATERIALS -- CONCLUSIONS -- RECOMMENDATIONS FOR EXECUTIVE ACTION -- End Notes -- CHAPTER SOURCES -- INDEX -- Blank Page. | |
| 588 | _aDescription based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources. | ||
| 590 | _aElectronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, Michigan : ProQuest Ebook Central, 2024. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest Ebook Central affiliated libraries. | ||
| 650 | 0 | _aRadioactive substances -- Detection. | |
| 650 | 0 | _aNuclear weapons. | |
| 650 | 0 | _aNuclear terrorism -- United States -- Prevention. | |
| 650 | 0 | _aRadiation warning systems. | |
| 650 | 0 | _aNuclear nonproliferation -- Government policy -- United States. | |
| 650 | 0 | _aNuclear arms control -- Verification. | |
| 650 | 0 | _aSmuggling -- Prevention. | |
| 655 | 4 | _aElectronic books. | |
| 776 | 0 | 8 |
_iPrint version: _aEgidi, Pietro _tDetection of Nuclear Weapons and Materials _dHauppauge : Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated,c2010 _z9781607415121 |
| 797 | 2 | _aProQuest (Firm) | |
| 830 | 0 | _aWeapons of Mass Destruction | |
| 856 | 4 | 0 |
_uhttps://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/orpp/detail.action?docID=3019422 _zClick to View |
| 999 |
_c60262 _d60262 |
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