000			03757nam a22005053i 4500
001			EBC3004331
003			MiAaPQ
005			20240729123938.0
006			m o d |
007			cr cnu||||||||
008			240724s2001 xx o ||||0 eng d
020			_a9780815798774 _q(electronic bk.)
020			_z9780815700869
035			_a(MiAaPQ)EBC3004331
035			_a(Au-PeEL)EBL3004331
035			_a(CaPaEBR)ebr10026263
035			_a(OCoLC)53482724
040			_aMiAaPQ _beng _erda _epn _cMiAaPQ _dMiAaPQ
050		4	_aDT450.435.K86 2001
082	0		_a967.57104
100	1		_aKuperman, Alan J.
245	1	4	_aThe Limits of Humanitarian Intervention : _bGenocide in Rwanda.
250			_a1st ed.
264		1	_aBlue Ridge Summit : _bBrookings Institution Press, _c2001.
264		4	_c©2001.
300			_a1 online resource (177 pages)
336			_atext _btxt _2rdacontent
337			_acomputer _bc _2rdamedia
338			_aonline resource _bcr _2rdacarrier
505	0		_aIntro -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Table of Contents -- Preface -- Acknowledgments -- Chapter One: The Common Wisdom -- Chapter Two: Roots of the Rwandan Tragedy -- Chapter Three: Mechanics of the Genocide -- Chapter Four: When Did We Know? -- Chapter Five: The Military Scene -- Chapter Six: Transporting Intervention Forces -- Chapter Seven: Plausible Interventions -- Chapter Eight: Contending Claims -- Chapter Nine: Early Warning and Preventive Intervention -- Chapter Ten: Lessons -- Appendix A: A Model of the Genocide's Progression -- Appendix B: Airlift in Some Previous U.S. Military Interventions -- Appendix C: Theater Airfield Capacity Based on Operation Support Hope -- Notes -- Index.
520			_aIn 1994 genocide in Rwanda claimed the lives of at least 500,000 Tutsi--some three-quarters of their population--while UN peacekeepers were withdrawn and the rest of the world stood aside. Ever since, it has been argued that a small military intervention could have prevented most of the killing. In The Limits of Humanitarian Intervention, Alan J. Kuperman exposes such conventional wisdom as myth. Combining unprecedented analyses of the genocide's progression and the logistical limitations of humanitarian military intervention, Kuperman reaches a startling conclusion: even if Western leaders had ordered an intervention as soon as they became aware of a nationwide genocide in Rwanda, the intervention forces would have arrived too late to save more than a quarter of the 500,000 Tutsi ultimately killed. Serving as a cautionary message about the limits of humanitarian intervention, the book's concluding chapters address lessons for the future.
588			_aDescription based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources.
590			_aElectronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, Michigan : ProQuest Ebook Central, 2024. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest Ebook Central affiliated libraries.
650		0	_aUnited Nations -- Rwanda.
650		0	_aGenocide -- Rwanda -- History -- 20th century.
650		0	_aTutsi (African people) -- Crimes against -- Rwanda -- History -- 20th century.
650		0	_aHutu (African people) -- Rwanda -- Politics and government -- 20th century.
650		0	_aHumanitarian intervention -- Rwanda -- History -- 20th century.
650		0	_aRwanda -- History -- Civil War, 1994 -- Atrocities.
650		0	_aRwanda -- Ethnic relations.
655		4	_aElectronic books.
776	0	8	_iPrint version: _aKuperman, Alan J. _tThe Limits of Humanitarian Intervention _dBlue Ridge Summit : Brookings Institution Press,c2001 _z9780815700869
797	2		_aProQuest (Firm)
856	4	0	_uhttps://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/orpp/detail.action?docID=3004331 _zClick to View
999			_c56920 _d56920