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008 240724s1984 xx o ||||0 eng d
020 _a9781483294575
_q(electronic bk.)
020 _z9780444851277
035 _a(MiAaPQ)EBC1877078
035 _a(Au-PeEL)EBL1877078
035 _a(CaPaEBR)ebr10996345
035 _a(CaONFJC)MIL678504
035 _a(OCoLC)907100092
040 _aMiAaPQ
_beng
_erda
_epn
_cMiAaPQ
_dMiAaPQ
050 4 _aHB99.3.S45 1995eb
100 1 _aSen, A.K.
245 1 0 _aCollective Choice and Social Welfare.
250 _a1st ed.
264 1 _aSan Diego :
_bElsevier Science & Technology,
_c1984.
264 4 _c©1970.
300 _a1 online resource (238 pages)
336 _atext
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _acomputer
_bc
_2rdamedia
338 _aonline resource
_bcr
_2rdacarrier
490 1 _aIssn Series ;
_vv.Volume 11
505 0 _aFront Cover -- Collective Choice and social Welfare -- Copyright Page -- Table of Contents -- Dedication -- Introduction to The Series -- Preface -- Chapter 1. INTRODUCTION -- 1.1. Preliminary Remarks -- 1.2. Ingredients of Collective Choice -- 1.3. The Nature of Individual Preferences -- Chapter 1*. PREFERENCE RELATIONS -- 1*1. Binary Relations -- 1*2 Maximal Elements and Choice Sets -- 1*3. A Set of Results for Quasi-Orderings -- 1*4. Subrelations and Compatibility -- 1*5. Choice Functions and Quasi-Transiiivity -- 1*6. Preference and Rational Choice -- Chapter 2. UNANIMITY -- 2.1. The Pareto Criterion -- 2.2. Pareto-Inclusive Choice Rules -- 2.3. Consensus as a Basis of Collective Action -- Chapter 2*. COLLECTIVE CHOICE RULES ANDPARETO COMPARISONS -- 2*1. Choice and Pareto Relation -- 2*2. Compensation Tests -- Chapter 3. COLLECTIVE RATIONALITY -- 3.1. The Bergson-Samuelson Welfare Function -- 3.2. Arrowian Social Welfare Function -- 3.3. The General Possibility Theorem -- 3.4. A Comment on the Significance of Arrow's Results -- Chapter 3*. SOCIAL WELFARE FUNCTIONS -- 3*1. The Impossibility Theorem -- Chapter 4. CHOICE VERSUS ORDERINGS -- 4.1. Transitivity, Quasi-Transitivity, and Acyclicity -- 4.2. Collective Choice and Arrow's Conditions -- 4.3. Rationality and Collective Choice -- Chapter 4*. SOCIAL DECISION FUNCTIONS -- 4*1. Possibility Theorems -- Chapter 5. VALUES AND CHOICE -- 5.1. Welfare Economics and Value Judgments -- 5.2. Content of Welfare Economics: A Dilemma -- 5.3. Basic and Nonbasic Judgments -- 5.4. Facts and Values -- 5.5. Individual Orderings and Choice Rules -- 5.6. Conditions on Choice Rules -- Chapter 5*. ANONYMITY, NEUTRALITY AND RESPONSIVENESS -- 5*1. Conditions for Majority Rule -- 5*2. Pareto-Extension Rules -- Chapter 6. CONFLICTS AND DILEMMAS -- 6.1. Critique of Anonymity and Neutrality.
505 8 _a6.2. Liberal Values and an Impossibility Result -- 6.3. Critique of Acyclicity -- 6.4. Critique of Liberal Values -- 6.5. Critique of the Pareto Principle -- 6.6. Critique of Unrestricted Domain -- Chapter 6*. THE LIBERAL PARADOX -- 6*1. Liberalism versus the Pareto Principle -- 6*2. Extensions -- Chapter 7. INTERPERSONAL AGGREGATION AND COMPARABILITY -- 7.1. Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives -- 7.2. Comparability, Cardinality and Discrimination -- 7.3. Uses of von Neumann-Morgenstern Cardinalization -- 7.4. Partial Comparability -- 7.5. Adding Ordinal-Type Welfare -- Chapter 7*. AGGREGATION QUASI-ORDERINGS1 -- 7*1. Comparability and Aggregation -- 7*2. Partial Comparability -- 7*3. Regularity and Symmetry -- 7*4. Addition of Noncardinal Welfare -- Chapter 8. CARDINALITY WITH OR WITHOUT COMPARABILITY -- 8.1. Bargaining Advantages and Collective Choice -- 8.2. Cardinality and Impossibility -- Chapter 8*. BARGAINS AND SOCIAL WELFAREFUNCTIONALS -- 8*1. The Bargaining Problem of Nash -- 8*2. Social Welfare Functional -- Chapter 9. EQUITY AND JUSTICE -- 9.1. Universalization and Equity -- 9.2. Fairness and Maximin Justice -- 9.3. Impersonality and Expected Utility Maximization -- 9.4. Grading Principles of Justice -- 9.5. Grading Principle, Maximin, and Utilitari -- Chapter 9*. IMPERSONALITY AND COLLECTIVE QUASI-ORDERINGS -- 9*1. Grading Principles of Justice -- 9*2. Suppes and Pareto -- 9*3. Identity Axioms and the Grading Principles -- 9*4. The Maximin Relation of Justice -- 9*5. Justice and Aggregation -- Chapter 10. MAJORITY CHOICE AND RELATED SYSTEMS -- 10.1. The Method of Majority Decision -- 10.2. Probability of Cyclical Majorities -- 10.3. Restricted Preferences -- 10.4. Conditions on Collective Choice Rules and Restricted Preferences -- Chapter 10*. RESTRICTED PREFERENCES AND RATIONAL CHOICE -- 10*1. Restricted Domain.
505 8 _a10*2. Value Restriction and Limited Agreement -- 10*3. Extremal Restriction -- 10*4. Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Rational Choice -- 10*5. The Special Case of Anti-Symmetric Preferences -- Chapter 11. THEORY AND PRACTICE -- 11.1. Systems of Collective Choice -- 11.2. Institutions and Framework -- 11.3. Expression of Individual Preferences -- 11.4. Efficiency and Pareto Optimality -- 11.5. Concluding Observations -- BIBLIOGRAPHY -- NAME INDEX -- SUBJECT INDEX.
588 _aDescription based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources.
590 _aElectronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, Michigan : ProQuest Ebook Central, 2024. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest Ebook Central affiliated libraries.
650 0 _aWelfare economics.
650 0 _aSocial choice.
655 4 _aElectronic books.
776 0 8 _iPrint version:
_aSen, A.K.
_tCollective Choice and Social Welfare
_dSan Diego : Elsevier Science & Technology,c1984
_z9780444851277
797 2 _aProQuest (Firm)
830 0 _aIssn Series
856 4 0 _uhttps://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/orpp/detail.action?docID=1877078
_zClick to View
999 _c43842
_d43842