000			04120nam a22004213i 4500
001			EBC6194007
003			MiAaPQ
005			20240724114244.0
006			m o d |
007			cr cnu||||||||
008			240724s2020 xx o ||||0 eng d
020			_a9781925835441 _q(electronic bk.)
020			_z9781925835427
035			_a(MiAaPQ)EBC6194007
035			_a(Au-PeEL)EBL6194007
035			_a(OCoLC)1154550530
040			_aMiAaPQ _beng _erda _epn _cMiAaPQ _dMiAaPQ
050		4	_aHD2930 _b.E393 2020
082	0		_a338.60151949999999
100	1		_aEdwards, Lindy.
245	1	0	_aCorporate Power in Australia : _bDo the 1% Rule?
250			_a1st ed.
264		1	_aMelbourne : _bMonash University Publishing, _c2020.
264		4	_c©2020.
300			_a1 online resource (240 pages)
336			_atext _btxt _2rdacontent
337			_acomputer _bc _2rdamedia
338			_aonline resource _bcr _2rdacarrier
505	0		_aFront Cover -- Title Page -- About the Author -- About this Book -- Imprint and Copyright Information -- Contents -- List of Figures and Tables -- Table 1.1: Proportion of Big Three Miners' Preferences Achieved -- Table 1.2: Public-interest Case for Big Three Miners' Preferences Achieved -- Table 1.3: Democratic Momentum Miners' Preferences Achieved -- Table 1.4: Evidence of Instrumental Power -- Table 2.1: Proportion of Banks' Preferences Achieved -- Table 2.2: Public-interest Case for Bank Preferences Achieved -- Table 2.3: Democratic Momentum for Banks' Preferences Achieved -- Table 2.4: Evidence of Instrumental Power -- Table 3.1: Proportion of Telstra's Preferences Achieved -- Table 3.2: Public-interest Case for Telstra's Preferences Achieved -- Table 3.3: Democratic Momentum for Telstra's Preferences Achieved -- Table 3.4: Evidence of Instrumental Power -- Table 4.1: Proportion of News Corp Australia's Preferences Achieved -- Table 4.2: Public-interest Case for News Corp Australia' Preferences Achieved -- Table 4.3: Democratic Momentum for News Corp Preferences Achieved -- Table 4.4: Evidence of Instrumental Power -- Table 5.1: Proportion of Coles and Woolworths Preferences Achieved -- Table 5.2: Public-interest Case for Coles and Woolworths Preferences Achieved -- Table 5.3: Democratic Momentum for Coles and Woolworths Preferences Achieved -- Table 5.4: Evidence of Instrumental Power -- Table 6.1: Proportion of Big Business Preferences Achieved -- Table 6.2: Public-interest Case for Big Business Preferences Achieved -- Table 6.3: Democratic Momentum for Big Business Preferences Achieved -- Table 6.4: Evidence of Instrumental Power -- Table 7.1: Proportion of Big Business Preferences Achieved -- Table 7.2: Public-interest Case for Big Business Preferences Achieved -- Table 7.3: Democratic Momentum for Big Business Preferences Achieved.
505	8		_aTable 7.4: Evidence of Instrumental Power -- Figure 2.1: Indicative Map of Future of Financial Advice Stakeholders -- Figure 4.1: Indicative Map of Media Stakeholders -- Acknowledgements -- Introduction -- Part 1: A Fiercely Contested Battleground -- Chapter 1. The Big Miners and the Mining Tax: The Benchmark Case -- Chapter 2. Banks and the Financial Advice Reforms -- Chapter 3. Telstra and the National Broadband Network -- Chapter 4. News Corp and Media Reform -- Part 2: An Unexpected Turn -- Chapter 5. Supermarkets versus the Farmers -- Chapter 6. Unfair Contracts -- Chapter 7. Abuse of Market Power and the Culpability of Neoliberalism -- Conclusion.
588			_aDescription based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources.
590			_aElectronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, Michigan : ProQuest Ebook Central, 2024. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest Ebook Central affiliated libraries.
650		0	_aCorporate power-Australia.
655		4	_aElectronic books.
776	0	8	_iPrint version: _aEdwards, Lindy _tCorporate Power in Australia _dMelbourne : Monash University Publishing,c2020 _z9781925835427
797	2		_aProQuest (Firm)
856	4	0	_uhttps://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/orpp/detail.action?docID=6194007 _zClick to View
999			_c18092 _d18092