Gödel, Putnam, and Functionalism : A New Reading of 'Representation and Reality'.
Material type:
- text
- computer
- online resource
- 9780262269513
- 152.4
- B835.B865 2008
Intro -- Contents -- Preface -- Introduction -- 1 Putnam's Use of Gödel's Incompleteness Theorems to Refute Computational Functionalism -- 2 Putnam's Bombshell: The Gödelian Argument in ''Reflexive Reflections'' -- 3 Universal Realization of Computation: Putnam's Triviality Argument -- 4 Putnam's Triviality Theorem and Universal Physical Computation -- 5 Searle on Triviality and the Subjective Nature of Computation -- 6 There Are Infinitely Many Computational Realizations of an Arbitrary Intentional State -- 7 Against Local Computational Reduction: The EQUIVALENCE Argument -- 8 Rational Interpretation, Synonymy Determination, and EQUIVALENCE -- 9 The Question of the Nonformalizability of SD, Coreferentiality Decisions, and the Family of Notions: Rational Interpretation1, General Intelligence, and Reasonable Reasoning -- Notes -- Index.
The first systematic examination of Hilary Putnam's arguments against computational functionalism challenges each of Putnam's main arguments.
Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources.
Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, Michigan : ProQuest Ebook Central, 2024. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest Ebook Central affiliated libraries.
There are no comments on this title.