The Ideology of the Offensive : Military Decision Making and the Disasters Of 1914.
Material type:
- text
- computer
- online resource
- 9780801468629
- 355.4/3/09034
- U162
The Ideology of the Offensive -- Contents -- Preface -- 1. Military Bias and Offensive Strategy -- Rationality and Bias in Strategic Analysis -- Offense and Defense: A Rational Calculus -- Offensive Bias: Motivations and Interests -- Offensive Bias: The Need to Simplify -- The Synthesis: Organizational Ideology -- Method of Analysis -- Limitations and Qualifications -- 2. France: Offensive Strategy as an Institutional Defense -- Plan 17 -- Explaining the Intensity of French Bias -- 3. France: Du Picq, Dreyfus, and the Errors of Plan -- Ardant du Picq as Military Ideologist -- The Predominance of the Defensive in the 1870s -- Institutional Threat and Doctrinal Response in the 1880s -- Realism and Self-interest in the 1890s -- Subjugation and Reassertion, 1898-1911 -- Grandmaison, Joffre, and the Reassertive Reaction -- The Joffre Revival -- The Intelligence Failure of 1914 -- Conclusions -- 4. Germany: The Elusive Formula for Decisive Victory -- Premises and Risks of the Schlieffen Plan -- Explaining the General Staff's Bias -- 5. Germany: The "Necessary" Is Possible -- Moltke's Encirclement Doctrine -- Schlieffen's Strategic Doctrine -- Schlieffen's Planning for a Two-front War -- War Planning under the Younger Moltke -- Conclusions -- 6. Russia: Bureaucratic Politics and Strategic Priorities -- The Overcommitted Offenses of 1914 -- Explaining the Overcommitment -- 7· Russia: The Politics and Psychology of Overcommitment -- Danilov's Defensive Plan of 1910 -- Alekseev's Offensive Plan of 1912 -- The Response to Alekseev's Plan -- The Hasty Attack Strategy, 1913-1914 -- Creating a Third Front: August 1914 -- Conclusions -- 8. The Determinants of Military Strategy -- Determinants of Strategy: Five Patterns -- Determinants of Strategy: Comparisons -- Offense and the Security Dilemma -- Notes -- Selected Bibliography -- Index.
Jack Snyder's analysis of the attitudes of military planners in the years prior to the Great War demonstrates that it is not only rational analysis that determines strategic doctrine, but also the attitudes of military planners.
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Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, Michigan : ProQuest Ebook Central, 2024. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest Ebook Central affiliated libraries.
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