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International Double Taxation and the Right to Property.

By: Material type: TextTextSeries: IBFD Doctoral SeriesPublisher: Amsterdam : IBFD Publications USA, Incorporated, 2019Copyright date: ©2019Edition: 1st edDescription: 1 online resource (582 pages)Content type:
  • text
Media type:
  • computer
Carrier type:
  • online resource
ISBN:
  • 9789087225797
Subject(s): Genre/Form: Additional physical formats: Print version:: International Double Taxation and the Right to PropertyDDC classification:
  • 343.40526
LOC classification:
  • KJC7114 .D434 2019
Online resources:
Contents:
Cover -- IBFD Doctoral Series -- Title -- Copyright -- Abstract -- Acknowledgements -- List of Abbreviations -- Chapter 1: Introduction: Overview of Research Project -- 1.1. An alternative approach to a classic problem -- 1.2. Research questions -- 1.3. Methodology -- 1.3.1. Selection of relevant sources -- 1.3.2. Comparative aspects -- 1.3.2.1. Introduction -- 1.3.2.2. Legal coherence by comparative and systemic interpretation -- 1.4. Innovative and cross-boundary character -- Part I: International Double Taxation -- Chapter 2: Terminology -- 2.1. Excessive taxation -- 2.2. Confiscatory taxation -- 2.3. Double taxation -- 2.4. Interaction and overlap between notions -- Chapter 3: Reasons for International Double Taxation -- 3.1. Justification for taxation by individual states -- 3.1.1. Introduction: The forgotten question -- 3.1.2. The benefit theory -- 3.1.3. The sacrifice theory -- 3.1.4. Realistic or empirical theory -- 3.1.5. The sovereignty theory -- 3.2. Justification for taxation by multiple states -- 3.2.1. Introduction -- 3.2.2. The meaning of sovereignty -- 3.2.3. The jurisdiction to tax -- 3.2.4. Limitations to sovereignty and jurisdiction -- 3.2.4.1. Two conflicting concepts? -- 3.2.4.2. Analysis under international law -- 3.2.4.2.1. The classical model: The prohibitive approach -- 3.2.4.2.2. In search for reasonableness: The permissive approach -- 3.2.4.3. Analysis under tax law -- 3.3. Connecting factors and the nexus requirement -- 3.3.1. Introduction -- 3.3.2. General: Connecting factors -- 3.3.2.1. Analysis under international law -- 3.3.2.2. Analysis under tax law -- 3.3.3. Nature of the requirement: International custom? -- 3.4. Limited and unlimited tax liability -- 3.4.1. Introduction -- 3.4.2. Rationale behind the approach -- 3.4.3. The OECD Model and (un)limited tax liability.
3.5. Lawful and unlawful international double taxation -- 3.5.1. Introduction -- 3.5.2. Traditional types of lawful international double taxation -- 3.5.2.1. Residence-source conflicts -- 3.5.2.2. Dual residence conflicts -- 3.5.2.3. Dual source conflicts -- 3.5.3. (Un)intended effects of the fight against double non-taxation -- 3.6. Interim conclusion - Reasons for international double taxation -- Chapter 4: International Double Taxation: Harmful and Unsolved -- 4.1. Incompatibility with the international tax system -- 4.2. Bilateral solutions: Double tax treaties -- 4.3. Multilateral solutions: Realization of an internal market within the European Union -- 4.3.1. Negative integration -- 4.3.2. Attempts at positive integration -- 4.3.2.1. Article 293 of the EC Treaty -- 4.3.2.2. Difficulties in reaching substantive harmonization -- 4.3.2.3. Taking the procedural route -- Conclusion Part I -- Part II: The Right to Property -- Chapter 5: The Right to Property: General Introduction -- 5.1. A contested right -- 5.2. The right to property under positive law -- 5.2.1. Overview of regional and global instruments -- 5.2.2. Comparison -- 5.3. Article 1 of protocol 1 to the ECHR -- 5.3.1. Introduction -- 5.3.2. The drafting process of the Convention -- 5.3.3. Lessons from the preparatory works -- 5.4. Relevance of the EU Charter -- 5.4.1. EU constitutional framework -- 5.4.2. The right to property and article 17 of the EU Charter -- Chapter 6: The ECtHR's General Testing Scheme -- 6.1. Interpretation of the convention -- 6.1.1. General interpretative rules -- 6.1.2. Interpretative methods and principles -- 6.1.2.1. Margin of appreciation, principle of subsidiarity and fair balance -- 6.1.2.2. Dynamic interpretation, progressive interpretation and the consensus principle.
6.1.2.3. Effectiveness (effet utile), autonomous treaty terms and teleological interpretation -- 6.2. A possession within the scope of article 1 of Protocol 1 to the ECHR -- 6.3. An interference with possessions -- 6.3.1. The "three rules" doctrine -- 6.3.2. Rule 1: Peaceful enjoyment -- 6.3.3. Rule 2: Deprivation -- 6.3.4. Rule 3: Control of use -- 6.3.5. Interaction between the rules and their evolution -- 6.3.6. An interference by the state -- 6.3.7. Interim conclusion -- 6.4. Justification -- 6.4.1. Introduction -- 6.4.2. Lawfulness -- 6.4.3. Public or general interest -- 6.4.4. Proportionality -- 6.4.4.1. Application by the ECtHR -- 6.4.4.2. The compensation requirement -- Conclusion Part II -- Part III: The Right to Property and Taxes -- Chapter 7: The Right to Property and Taxes: ECtHR Case Law -- 7.1. Introduction: (Re)shaping the power to tax through the right to property -- 7.2. Early case law (1959-1982) -- 7.2.1. Article 1 of Protocol 1 -- 7.2.1.1. X. v. Germany: Taxes as exception to peaceful enjoyment of possessions -- 7.2.1.2. Gudmundsson v. Iceland: Public interest requirement -- 7.2.1.3. X. v. The Netherlands: 90% tax rate -- 7.2.2. Article 1 of Protocol 1 in conjunction with article 14 of the ECHR -- 7.2.2.1. Territoriality of tax measures -- 7.2.2.2. Selective scope of taxes -- 7.2.2.3. Anti-avoidance rules -- 7.2.3. Assessment of early case law -- 7.3. Construction of assessment framework -- 7.3.1. The existence of (pre-tax) possessions -- 7.3.2. The measure must be lawful -- 7.3.2.1. Lawfulness criterion: General considerations -- 7.3.2.2. (Difficult) application to tax measures -- 7.3.3. The measure must be in the public interest -- 7.3.3.1. Public interest criterion: General considerations -- 7.3.3.2. Application to tax measures -- 7.3.4. The measure must strike a "fair balance".
7.3.4.1. Fair balance test: General considerations -- 7.3.4.2. Evolution in tax cases: from exception to proportionality analysis -- 7.3.4.2.1. X. v. France (1983): Exception only for tax avoidance or fraud -- 7.3.4.2.2. Svenska Managementgruppen AB v. Sweden (1985): Excessive burden -- 7.3.4.2.3. J.Z. v. France: Proportionality test even in the case of tax avoidance -- 7.3.4.2.4. Wasa Liv v. Sweden (1988): Fair balance -- 7.3.4.3. Overview of assessment criteria used in tax cases -- 7.3.4.3.1. The applicable tax rate -- 7.3.4.3.2. Oppressive enforcement measures -- 7.3.4.3.3. Changes to the applicable tax rules and legal certainty -- 7.3.4.3.4. Procedural safeguards -- 7.3.4.3.5. Non-discrimination and selective scope of tax measures -- Chapter 8: The Right to Property and Social Security -- 8.1. Introduction -- 8.2. General guidelines for dealing with social security cases -- 8.3. Justifying interferences -- 8.4. Cases involving cross-border pensions -- Chapter 9: Expropriation under Bilateral Investment Treaties -- 9.1. Introduction -- 9.2. Customary international law and the emergence of the BIT network -- 9.3. Scope of protection -- 9.3.1. General scope of BITs -- 9.3.2. Tax coverage in BITs -- 9.4. The expropriation clause -- 9.4.1. Taxonomy of measures amounting to expropriations -- 9.4.2. Justifiable expropriations -- 9.4.3. Distinguishing regulatory measures from indirect expropriation -- 9.4.3.1. Sole-effect doctrine: A quantitative test -- 9.4.3.2. Police powers doctrine: A purpose test -- 9.4.3.3. Contextual approach: A qualitative test -- 9.5. Application to tax measures -- 9.5.1. Can tax measures amount to expropriation? -- 9.5.2. Distinguishing normal taxes from expropriatory taxes -- 9.5.2.1. Effect of the measure -- 9.5.2.2. Intent of the state -- 9.5.2.3. Legitimate expectations -- 9.5.2.4. Due process.
9.5.2.5. Discriminatory character of the measure -- Conclusion Part III: The Right to Property and Taxes from a Comparative Perspective -- Chapter 10: Assessment of International Double Taxation -- 10.1. Overview -- 10.2. Typology -- 10.2.1. Type I: Unlawful international double taxation -- 10.2.1.1. Situations that are covered -- 10.2.1.2. Direct violation and simplified execution -- 10.2.2. Type II: Lawful international double taxation -- 10.2.2.1. A multitude of actors -- 10.2.2.2. A multitude of acts -- 10.2.2.3. Proportionality analysis -- 10.3. Consequences of a violation -- 10.3.1. Binding effect -- 10.3.2. Just satisfaction -- 10.3.3. Shared responsibility -- 10.3.3.1. Qualification under international law -- 10.3.3.2. Reparation of injury: Restitution, compensation and satisfaction -- 10.3.3.3. Application by the ECtHR -- 10.3.3.4. Proposal for cases of lawful international double taxation -- General Conclusion -- Cases Cited -- Selected Bibliography -- Index -- Other Titles in the IBFD Doctoral Series.
Summary: This book examines whether a taxpayer can rely on the right to property to relieve situations of international double taxation.
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Cover -- IBFD Doctoral Series -- Title -- Copyright -- Abstract -- Acknowledgements -- List of Abbreviations -- Chapter 1: Introduction: Overview of Research Project -- 1.1. An alternative approach to a classic problem -- 1.2. Research questions -- 1.3. Methodology -- 1.3.1. Selection of relevant sources -- 1.3.2. Comparative aspects -- 1.3.2.1. Introduction -- 1.3.2.2. Legal coherence by comparative and systemic interpretation -- 1.4. Innovative and cross-boundary character -- Part I: International Double Taxation -- Chapter 2: Terminology -- 2.1. Excessive taxation -- 2.2. Confiscatory taxation -- 2.3. Double taxation -- 2.4. Interaction and overlap between notions -- Chapter 3: Reasons for International Double Taxation -- 3.1. Justification for taxation by individual states -- 3.1.1. Introduction: The forgotten question -- 3.1.2. The benefit theory -- 3.1.3. The sacrifice theory -- 3.1.4. Realistic or empirical theory -- 3.1.5. The sovereignty theory -- 3.2. Justification for taxation by multiple states -- 3.2.1. Introduction -- 3.2.2. The meaning of sovereignty -- 3.2.3. The jurisdiction to tax -- 3.2.4. Limitations to sovereignty and jurisdiction -- 3.2.4.1. Two conflicting concepts? -- 3.2.4.2. Analysis under international law -- 3.2.4.2.1. The classical model: The prohibitive approach -- 3.2.4.2.2. In search for reasonableness: The permissive approach -- 3.2.4.3. Analysis under tax law -- 3.3. Connecting factors and the nexus requirement -- 3.3.1. Introduction -- 3.3.2. General: Connecting factors -- 3.3.2.1. Analysis under international law -- 3.3.2.2. Analysis under tax law -- 3.3.3. Nature of the requirement: International custom? -- 3.4. Limited and unlimited tax liability -- 3.4.1. Introduction -- 3.4.2. Rationale behind the approach -- 3.4.3. The OECD Model and (un)limited tax liability.

3.5. Lawful and unlawful international double taxation -- 3.5.1. Introduction -- 3.5.2. Traditional types of lawful international double taxation -- 3.5.2.1. Residence-source conflicts -- 3.5.2.2. Dual residence conflicts -- 3.5.2.3. Dual source conflicts -- 3.5.3. (Un)intended effects of the fight against double non-taxation -- 3.6. Interim conclusion - Reasons for international double taxation -- Chapter 4: International Double Taxation: Harmful and Unsolved -- 4.1. Incompatibility with the international tax system -- 4.2. Bilateral solutions: Double tax treaties -- 4.3. Multilateral solutions: Realization of an internal market within the European Union -- 4.3.1. Negative integration -- 4.3.2. Attempts at positive integration -- 4.3.2.1. Article 293 of the EC Treaty -- 4.3.2.2. Difficulties in reaching substantive harmonization -- 4.3.2.3. Taking the procedural route -- Conclusion Part I -- Part II: The Right to Property -- Chapter 5: The Right to Property: General Introduction -- 5.1. A contested right -- 5.2. The right to property under positive law -- 5.2.1. Overview of regional and global instruments -- 5.2.2. Comparison -- 5.3. Article 1 of protocol 1 to the ECHR -- 5.3.1. Introduction -- 5.3.2. The drafting process of the Convention -- 5.3.3. Lessons from the preparatory works -- 5.4. Relevance of the EU Charter -- 5.4.1. EU constitutional framework -- 5.4.2. The right to property and article 17 of the EU Charter -- Chapter 6: The ECtHR's General Testing Scheme -- 6.1. Interpretation of the convention -- 6.1.1. General interpretative rules -- 6.1.2. Interpretative methods and principles -- 6.1.2.1. Margin of appreciation, principle of subsidiarity and fair balance -- 6.1.2.2. Dynamic interpretation, progressive interpretation and the consensus principle.

6.1.2.3. Effectiveness (effet utile), autonomous treaty terms and teleological interpretation -- 6.2. A possession within the scope of article 1 of Protocol 1 to the ECHR -- 6.3. An interference with possessions -- 6.3.1. The "three rules" doctrine -- 6.3.2. Rule 1: Peaceful enjoyment -- 6.3.3. Rule 2: Deprivation -- 6.3.4. Rule 3: Control of use -- 6.3.5. Interaction between the rules and their evolution -- 6.3.6. An interference by the state -- 6.3.7. Interim conclusion -- 6.4. Justification -- 6.4.1. Introduction -- 6.4.2. Lawfulness -- 6.4.3. Public or general interest -- 6.4.4. Proportionality -- 6.4.4.1. Application by the ECtHR -- 6.4.4.2. The compensation requirement -- Conclusion Part II -- Part III: The Right to Property and Taxes -- Chapter 7: The Right to Property and Taxes: ECtHR Case Law -- 7.1. Introduction: (Re)shaping the power to tax through the right to property -- 7.2. Early case law (1959-1982) -- 7.2.1. Article 1 of Protocol 1 -- 7.2.1.1. X. v. Germany: Taxes as exception to peaceful enjoyment of possessions -- 7.2.1.2. Gudmundsson v. Iceland: Public interest requirement -- 7.2.1.3. X. v. The Netherlands: 90% tax rate -- 7.2.2. Article 1 of Protocol 1 in conjunction with article 14 of the ECHR -- 7.2.2.1. Territoriality of tax measures -- 7.2.2.2. Selective scope of taxes -- 7.2.2.3. Anti-avoidance rules -- 7.2.3. Assessment of early case law -- 7.3. Construction of assessment framework -- 7.3.1. The existence of (pre-tax) possessions -- 7.3.2. The measure must be lawful -- 7.3.2.1. Lawfulness criterion: General considerations -- 7.3.2.2. (Difficult) application to tax measures -- 7.3.3. The measure must be in the public interest -- 7.3.3.1. Public interest criterion: General considerations -- 7.3.3.2. Application to tax measures -- 7.3.4. The measure must strike a "fair balance".

7.3.4.1. Fair balance test: General considerations -- 7.3.4.2. Evolution in tax cases: from exception to proportionality analysis -- 7.3.4.2.1. X. v. France (1983): Exception only for tax avoidance or fraud -- 7.3.4.2.2. Svenska Managementgruppen AB v. Sweden (1985): Excessive burden -- 7.3.4.2.3. J.Z. v. France: Proportionality test even in the case of tax avoidance -- 7.3.4.2.4. Wasa Liv v. Sweden (1988): Fair balance -- 7.3.4.3. Overview of assessment criteria used in tax cases -- 7.3.4.3.1. The applicable tax rate -- 7.3.4.3.2. Oppressive enforcement measures -- 7.3.4.3.3. Changes to the applicable tax rules and legal certainty -- 7.3.4.3.4. Procedural safeguards -- 7.3.4.3.5. Non-discrimination and selective scope of tax measures -- Chapter 8: The Right to Property and Social Security -- 8.1. Introduction -- 8.2. General guidelines for dealing with social security cases -- 8.3. Justifying interferences -- 8.4. Cases involving cross-border pensions -- Chapter 9: Expropriation under Bilateral Investment Treaties -- 9.1. Introduction -- 9.2. Customary international law and the emergence of the BIT network -- 9.3. Scope of protection -- 9.3.1. General scope of BITs -- 9.3.2. Tax coverage in BITs -- 9.4. The expropriation clause -- 9.4.1. Taxonomy of measures amounting to expropriations -- 9.4.2. Justifiable expropriations -- 9.4.3. Distinguishing regulatory measures from indirect expropriation -- 9.4.3.1. Sole-effect doctrine: A quantitative test -- 9.4.3.2. Police powers doctrine: A purpose test -- 9.4.3.3. Contextual approach: A qualitative test -- 9.5. Application to tax measures -- 9.5.1. Can tax measures amount to expropriation? -- 9.5.2. Distinguishing normal taxes from expropriatory taxes -- 9.5.2.1. Effect of the measure -- 9.5.2.2. Intent of the state -- 9.5.2.3. Legitimate expectations -- 9.5.2.4. Due process.

9.5.2.5. Discriminatory character of the measure -- Conclusion Part III: The Right to Property and Taxes from a Comparative Perspective -- Chapter 10: Assessment of International Double Taxation -- 10.1. Overview -- 10.2. Typology -- 10.2.1. Type I: Unlawful international double taxation -- 10.2.1.1. Situations that are covered -- 10.2.1.2. Direct violation and simplified execution -- 10.2.2. Type II: Lawful international double taxation -- 10.2.2.1. A multitude of actors -- 10.2.2.2. A multitude of acts -- 10.2.2.3. Proportionality analysis -- 10.3. Consequences of a violation -- 10.3.1. Binding effect -- 10.3.2. Just satisfaction -- 10.3.3. Shared responsibility -- 10.3.3.1. Qualification under international law -- 10.3.3.2. Reparation of injury: Restitution, compensation and satisfaction -- 10.3.3.3. Application by the ECtHR -- 10.3.3.4. Proposal for cases of lawful international double taxation -- General Conclusion -- Cases Cited -- Selected Bibliography -- Index -- Other Titles in the IBFD Doctoral Series.

This book examines whether a taxpayer can rely on the right to property to relieve situations of international double taxation.

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Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, Michigan : ProQuest Ebook Central, 2024. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest Ebook Central affiliated libraries.

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