The Theory of Mixed Oligopoly : Privatization, Transboundary Activities, and Their Applications.

Intro -- Preface -- Contents -- Part I: Basic Frameworks -- Chapter 1: Basic Properties of a Mixed Oligopoly Model -- 1.1 Introduction -- 1.2 Basic Mixed Oligopoly Model -- 1.3 Partial Privatization -- 1.4 Free-Entry Equilibrium and the Privatization Problem -- 1.5 Entry Restriction and Partial Privatization -- 1.6 Concluding Remarks -- References -- Chapter 2: Equilibrium and the Adjustment Process in a Mixed Oligopoly: A Graphical Explanation -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.2 The Model -- 2.3 Graphical Explanation -- 2.3.1 From the First to the Third Periods -- 2.3.2 From the Period to Equilibrium -- 2.3.3 n Firms Case -- 2.4 Concluding Remarks -- References -- Chapter 3: Privatization in a Stackelberg Mixed Oligopoly -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 The Model -- 3.3 When a Public Firm Acts as a Stackelberg Leader -- 3.3.1 Before Privatization -- 3.3.2 After Privatization -- 3.3.3 Social Welfare Comparison When a Public Firm Acts as a Leader -- 3.4 When a Public Firm Acts as a Stackelberg Follower -- 3.4.1 Before Privatization -- 3.4.2 After Privatization -- 3.4.3 Social Welfare Comparison When a Public Firm Acts as a Follower -- 3.5 Social Welfare Comparison Before Privatization -- 3.6 Concluding Remarks -- Appendix -- A.3.1 Proof of Proposition 3.1 -- A.3.2 Proof of Proposition 3.2 -- A.3.3 Proof of Proposition 3.3 -- References -- Chapter 4: Physical Capital Accumulation and Partial Privatization -- 4.1 Introduction -- 4.2 The Model -- 4.3 Dynamic Optimization -- 4.3.1 The Maximization Problem of the Private Firm -- 4.3.2 The Maximization Problem of the Public Firm -- 4.3.3 Local Stability -- 4.4 Dynamic Optimal Privatization Ratio -- 4.4.1 Demand-Driven Equilibrium -- 4.4.2 The Ramsey Output of the Public Firm -- 4.4.3 Ramsey Output of the Private Firm -- 4.5 Discussion and Remaining Issues -- Appendix.

A.4.1 Derivation of the Reaction Function of Private Firms -- A.4.2 Derivation of the Reaction Function of the Public Firm -- References -- Chapter 5: International Mixed Oligopoly -- 5.1 Introduction -- 5.2 The Model -- 5.2.1 Partial Privatization in a Regulated Market -- 5.2.2 Partial Privatization in a Free-Entry Equilibrium -- 5.2.3 Excess Entry and Privatization -- 5.2.4 Optimal Entry Tax -- 5.3 Strategic Trade Policy and Privatization -- 5.4 Harmonization Problem -- 5.4.1 Segmented Market -- 5.4.2 Integrated Market -- 5.5 Conclusion -- References -- Part II: Policies -- Chapter 6: Optimal Partial Privatization in an International Mixed Oligopoly Under Various Tax Principles -- 6.1 Introduction -- 6.2 The Model and Preliminary Results -- 6.3 Optimal Partial Privatization Under Various Tax Principles -- 6.4 Welfare Comparisons -- 6.5 Concluding Remarks -- Appendix -- A.6.1 Stability Condition -- A.6.2 Proof of Lemma 6.2 -- A.6.3 Proof of Proposition 6.3 -- A.6.4 Proof of Proposition 6.6 -- References -- Chapter 7: Privatization Neutrality Theorem When a Public Firm Maximizes Objectives Other than Social Welfare -- 7.1 Introduction -- 7.2 The Model -- 7.3 Previous Results for the Privatization Neutrality Theorem -- 7.3.1 Before Privatization -- 7.3.2 After Privatization -- 7.3.3 The Privatization Neutrality Theorem -- 7.4 When a Public Firm Maximizes Objectives Other than Social Welfare -- 7.4.1 The Second Stage -- 7.4.2 The First Stage -- 7.4.2.1 When a Public Firm Correctly Recognizes the Effect of the Subsidy -- 7.4.2.2 When a Public Firm Incorrectly Recognizes the Effect of Subsidy -- 7.4.3 The Generalized Privatization Neutrality Theorem -- 7.5 Concluding Remarks -- Appendix -- Derivation of the Optimal Subsidy Levels (s0*,s1*) when -- References -- Chapter 8: Political Economic Analysis of Privatization -- 8.1 Introduction.

8.2 Closed Economy -- 8.2.1 Basic Setting in a Closed Economy -- 8.2.2 Political Economic Model in a Closed Economy -- 8.2.3 Optimal Privatization Policy and Lobbying Activity in a Closed Economy -- 8.3 Two-Country Model -- 8.3.1 Basic Setting of a Two-Country Model -- 8.3.2 Optimal Privatization Policy in a Two-Country Political Economic Model -- 8.3.3 Inference of Lobbying Activity into the Privatization Policy in a Two-Country Model -- 8.4 Discussion and Remaining Issues -- 8.4.1 Implications of Lobbying Activity in a Closed Economy -- 8.4.2 Implications of Lobbying Activity in an Open Economy -- 8.4.3 Other Types of Lobbying -- References -- Chapter 9: Government Preference and Merger -- 9.1 Introduction -- 9.2 The Model -- 9.3 Equilibrium Outcomes -- 9.3.1 Mixed Duopoly -- 9.3.2 Merger -- 9.4 Comparison -- 9.5 Conclusion -- Appendix -- References -- Part III: Further Applications -- Chapter 10: Regional Differences and Privatization -- 10.1 Introduction -- 10.2 The Model -- 10.3 Equilibrium Outcomes -- 10.3.1 Local Ownership -- 10.3.2 State Ownership -- 10.3.3 Private Ownership -- 10.4 Comparisons -- 10.4.1 Comparison of Equilibrium Outcomes in Case L and Case S -- 10.4.2 Comparison of Equilibrium Outcomes in Case S and Case P -- 10.5 Optimal Market Size -- 10.6 Conclusion -- References -- Chapter 11: Competition and Quality in a Mixed Duopolistic Long-Term Care Market -- 11.1 Introduction -- 11.2 The Model -- 11.2.1 Setting and Patients -- 11.2.2 Long-Term Care Providers -- 11.2.3 Reimbursement -- 11.3 Equilibrium -- 11.3.1 Objectives and Reaction Function -- 11.3.2 Equilibrium Levels of Quality in the Three Cases -- 11.4 The Effect of Improving Information -- 11.5 Concluding Remarks -- Appendix -- References -- Chapter 12: Privatization with a CSR Private Firm -- 12.1 Introduction -- 12.2 The Model.

12.3 Basic CSR Private Firm and the Privatization of a Public Firm -- 12.4 Strategic CSR Private Firm and the Privatization of a Public Firm -- 12.5 Conclusion -- References -- Chapter 13: Market Expansion by Advertising and a Mixed Oligopoly -- 13.1 Introduction -- 13.2 Mixed Oligopoly Model -- 13.2.1 Setting -- 13.2.2 Mixed Oligopoly -- 13.3 Privatization -- 13.3.1 Pure Private Oligopoly -- 13.3.2 Comparison -- 13.4 Concluding Remarks -- References -- Index.

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Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, Michigan : ProQuest Ebook Central, 2024. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest Ebook Central affiliated libraries.