Strategy Beyond Markets.

Front Cover -- Strategy Beyond Markets -- Copyright page -- Contents -- List of Contributors -- Introduction -- Public Politics Articles -- Private Politics Articles -- Integrated Political Strategy Articles -- Notes -- References -- Strategy beyond Markets: A Step Back and a Look Forward -- Introduction -- A Stylized (U.S.) History of the Demand for Nonmarket Strategy -- Nonmarket Strategy -- Roles of Nonmarket Strategy -- Levels of Nonmarket Strategy Research -- The Political Economy Approach -- The Firm Level -- Applying the Approach -- Public Politics Example: Uber -- Private Politics: Rainforest Action Network and Citigroup -- Integrated Strategy and Private and Public Politics: The Fast Food Campaign -- Market and Nonmarket Strategy -- Strategic Management -- Nonmarket Strategy -- Self-Regulation -- Research -- Theory -- Empirical -- Data and Methods -- Public Politics -- Private Politics -- Normative -- Notes -- References -- Part I: Public Politics -- Political Risk as a Hold-Up Problem: Implications for Integrated Strategy -- Introduction -- The Model -- Analysis of Model -- Strategies to Mitigate Political Risk -- Government Commitment -- Voluntary Concessions -- Political Strategies -- Integrated Strategy: HR, Operations, and Value Chain Management -- Integrated Strategy: Ownership and Contracts -- Integrated Strategy: Timing of Profits -- Conclusion -- Notes -- Acknowledgments -- References -- Incorporating Legislative Effectiveness into Nonmarket Strategy: The Case of Financial Services Reform and the Great Recession -- Pivotal Politics Theories -- A Theory of Legislative Effectiveness with Pivotal Politics -- Who Are the Most Effective Legislators? -- An Illustration: Banking and Finance in the Great Recession -- Conclusion -- Notes -- Acknowledgments -- References -- Appendix -- A Unified Model of Political Risk -- Introduction.

Theory: A Unified Model of Political Risk -- Disaggregating Political Risk -- Modeling Each Risk -- Theoretical Model: An Extensive-Form Game with War, Transfer Restrictions, and Expropriation -- Structure of the Game -- Investor Incentives -- Government Incentives -- Dynamic Intuitions from the Static Model -- Capabilities of Investors -- Ability to Resist -- Level of Information -- Ease of Exit -- Mapping Capabilities to Risks -- War versus Expropriation and Transfer Restriction -- Transfer Risk versus Expropriation -- Conclusion -- Notes -- Acknowledgments -- References -- Appendix -- Proof of Proposition 1 -- Motivations for Corporate Political Activity -- Introduction -- Transactional Nature of Campaign Contributions -- Motivations for Corporate Political Activity: Strategy or Agency -- Strategic Behavior of Executives -- Agency Behavior of PACs -- Empirical Approach -- Data -- Dependent Variables -- Independent Variables -- Statistical Models and Their Interpretation -- Empirical Results -- Discussion -- Simultaneous Presence of Strategic and Agency-Motivated Behavior -- Interorganizational Dynamics in Public Politics -- Managerial Implications -- Highly versus Less Regulated Industries -- Limitations -- Implications for Future Research Design -- Conclusion -- Notes -- References -- The Market for Legislative Influence over Regulatory Policy -- Introduction -- Research Design -- Theory and Hypotheses -- Econometric Specification, Data and Measures -- Results -- Discussion and Conclusion -- Notes -- Acknowledgments -- References -- Part II: Private Politics -- Corporate Reputational Dynamics, Private Regulation, and Activist Pressure -- Introduction -- The Model -- Model Structure -- The Firm -- The Activist -- Comments on the Model Specification -- Equilibrium Conditions -- Firm's Bellman Equation and Kuhn Tucker Conditions.

Activist's Bellman Equation and Kuhn Tucker Conditions -- Equilibrium Conditions -- Computational Approach -- Baseline Parameterization -- Computational Analysis -- Analysis -- Equilibrium Behavior with no Activist -- Equilibrium Behavior with an Activist -- The Role and Impact of the Activist: A Preliminary Cut -- Computational Results: Baseline Parameterization -- Computational Results: Grid Search Over G -- Comparative Statics of Long-Run Outcomes -- Activist Efficacy: Variations in α and ω -- Activist and Firm Patience: Variations in βA and βF -- Returns to Reputation for Corporate Citizenship: Variations in θ -- Activist Passion: Variations in ψ -- Summary and Conclusions -- Notes -- References -- Appendix -- Second-Order Conditions -- Firm's Problem -- Activist's Problem -- Computational Method -- Proofs of Propositions -- Proofs of Propositions 1 -- Proof of Proposition 2 -- Proof of Lemma 1 -- Proof of Proposition 4 -- Proof of Proposition 6 -- Self-Regulation and Regulatory Discretion: Why Firms May Be Reluctant to Signal Green -- Introduction -- The Model -- Regulatory Flexibility and Firm Compliance -- Legislative Stage -- Self-Regulation -- Uninformed Regulator Offers Flexibility (λ&lt -- λ.) -- Uninformed Regulator Does Not Offer Flexibility (λ&gt -- λ.) -- Numerical Example -- Discussion -- Conclusions -- Notes -- Acknowledgments -- References -- Private Politics Daily: What Makes Firms the Target of Internet/Media Criticism? An Empirical Investigation of Firm, Indust... -- Introduction -- Internet/Media Criticism and Activist Campaigns -- Internet/Media Criticism and Campaigns as Different Aspects of Private Politics -- Internet/Media Criticism as Early Stage of Activist Campaigns -- Hypotheses -- Firm-Specific Factors -- Industry Factors -- Country-Specific and Institutional Factors -- Data and Methods -- Dependent Variable(s).

Independent Variables -- Firm-Level Variables -- Industry-Level Variables -- Country-Level Variables -- Results -- Results for Model 1 - General Criticism Sample -- Model 2: Likelihood of Being Severely Criticized -- Model 3: Determinants of Criticism Intensity -- Discussion - Conclusion -- Limitations -- Notes -- References -- Part III: Integrated Political Strategy -- Navigating Natural Monopolies: Market Strategy and Nonmarket Challenges in Radio and Television Audience Measurement Markets -- Introduction -- Market Structures of the Radio and Television Ratings Markets -- Radio and Television Audience Ratings -- Overview of the Evolution of Audience Measurement Markets in the United States -- Economic Characteristics of the Radio and Television Ratings Markets -- Economies of Scale -- Value of Comparability -- Information Imperfections -- Partially Conflicting Buyer Preferences -- Summary -- Firm Strategies, Nonmarket Constraints, and Industry Dynamics -- Competition for the Market -- Positioning -- Pricing and Deep Pockets -- Acquisitions and Alliances -- Exploiting Monopoly -- Maintaining Monopoly -- Business Practices to Limit Available Customers or Increase Switching Costs -- Innovation Competition and Displacement of the Incumbent -- Summary -- Threats of Governmental Intervention, Self-Regulation, and Negotiation -- The 1963 Harris Hearings -- Switching to Local People Meters in the United States, 2002-2009 -- Summary -- Alternative Models of Television Audience Measurement Markets -- Television Audience Measurement in the United Kingdom -- Television Audience Measurement in Australia -- Television Audience Measurement in India, 2008-2014 -- Discussion: No Exit and the Political Economy of Complaints -- Notes -- Acknowledgment -- References -- The Organization of Nonmarket Strategy -- Introduction -- A Typology of Nonmarket Organization.

Model -- Integration -- Specialization -- Optimal Organizational Form -- Economy of Scope β -- Importance of CSR for Output α -- Manager Valuation of CSR δ -- Firm Valuation of CSR -- Non-CSR Nonmarket Functions -- Relating Theory to Organizational Form in Practice -- Conclusion -- Notes -- Acknowledgments -- References -- Appendix A: Proofs -- Appendix B: Organizational form Typology Coding -- Complementarity in Firms' Market and Political Capabilities: An Integrated Theoretical Perspective -- Introduction -- Political Tactics and Market Capabilities -- Common Political Tactics and Underlying Political Capabilities -- Building Political Capabilities from Market Capabilities -- Information Provision -- Constituency Building -- Sustainability of Political Advantage -- Internal Alignment -- External Alignment -- Consistency of Internal and External Alignments -- Discussion -- Can Firms Entirely Replace Political Capabilities with Outsourcing? -- How Far Can Capabilities Travel within the Firm? -- Theoretical Contributions -- Limitations and Future Research -- Conclusion -- Notes -- Acknowledgments -- References -- How Patent Strategy Affects the Timing and Method of Patent Litigation Resolution -- Literature Review and Hypotheses -- Generic Patent Strategies and the Timing of Patent Litigation Resolution -- Proprietary Patent Strategy -- Defensive Patent Strategy -- Leveraging Patent Strategy -- Data and Methods -- Dependent Variable -- Independent Variables -- Proprietary Strategy: Patentee Stakes and Patent Age -- Defensive Strategy: Portfolio Citations and Counter-Suit -- Leveraging Strategy: Size Ratio -- Control Variables -- Empirical Model -- Results -- Discussion -- Notes -- Acknowledgments -- References -- About the Authors.

Strategy Beyond Markets is organized around three themes: Public Politics, Private Politics, and Integrated Political Strategy. The book explores the way these strategies influence political environments, firms and corporations.

Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources.

Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, Michigan : ProQuest Ebook Central, 2024. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest Ebook Central affiliated libraries.