The Bloomsbury Companion to the Philosophy of Consciousness.

Intro -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Contents -- Contributors -- Preface -- Chapter 1 Introduction: Philosophy of Consciousness -- Part I Historical Development -- Chapter 2 The Hard Problem of Understanding Descartes on Consciousness -- 1 Conscientia and the operations of the senses and imagination -- 2 Conscientia and the operations of the will -- 3 Some concluding remarks -- 4 References -- Chapter 3 Brentano's Aristotelian Concept of Consciousness -- 1 Introduction -- 2 The externalism/internalism divide -- 3 The Aristotelian legacy -- 4 The psychophysical watershed of consciousness -- 5 Psychic and physical phenomena -- 6 Inner perception: What does it mean? -- 7 Presentations are not representations -- 8 Psychic dimensions -- 9 Conclusions -- References -- Chapter 4 Wittgenstein and the Concept of Consciousness -- 1 The dualist-introspectionist picture -- 2 The behaviourist antithesis -- 3 Wittgenstein's mode of inquiry -- 4 The observational model of consciousness (and its insoluble problems) -- 5 The linguistic approach -- 6 Recasting introspection, understanding privacy -- Notes -- References -- Chapter 5 'Ordinary' Consciousness -- Notes -- References -- Part II Groundbreaking Concepts of Consciousness -- Chapter 6 Consciousness, Representation and the Hard Problem -- 1 The hard problem -- 2 Sensations and consciousness: Reid, Ferrier and Sartre -- 3 Knowledge of consciousness: Self-presentation -- 4 Self-representation: Exemplarization and reflexivity -- 5 Disquotational representation: Sellars -- 6 Solution to the hard problem: Why is matter conscious? -- 7 Truth explained by reflexive representation of consciousness -- 8 Consciousness as evidence of the external world -- 9 Conscious exemplars as freedom of representation -- References -- Chapter 7 The Knowledge Argument and Two Interpretations of 'Knowing What it's Like'.

1 Introduction -- 2 Interrogative versus free relative readings of 'Knowing What it's Like' -- 3 The knowing-what-it's-like response -- 4 Two cul-de-sacs -- 5 Two versions of Mary -- 6 Mention-all versus mention-some -- 7 Overall assessment -- 8 Lewis's view -- 9 Tye's view -- 10 Conclusion -- Acknowledgement -- Notes -- References -- Chapter 8 Conscious and Unconscious Mental States -- 1 Mental states -- 2 Occurrent and dispositional mental states -- 3 Are there unconscious occurrent mental states? -- 4 Dualism and the unconscious -- Notes -- References -- Chapter 9 Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness -- 1 Representationalism -- 2 Higher-order representationalism -- 3 Objections and replies -- 4 HOT theory and conceptualism -- 5 Hybrid higher-order and self-representational accounts -- 6 HOT theory and the prefrontal cortex -- Notes -- References -- Chapter 10 Kripke on Mind-Body Identity -- 1 Contingency, aposteriority and mind-body identity -- 2 Rigidity, necessity and identity -- 3 Kripke's main argument against identifying pain with C-fibre stimulation -- 4 The weakness of the argument -- 5 A second Kripkean argument against pain - brain-state identity -- 6 Reassessing rigidity and essentiality -- 7 But is Kripke's conclusion false? -- 8 Addendum: Necessary a posteriori identities -- Notes -- References -- Part III Metaphilosophy of Consciousness Studies -- Chapter 11 Understanding Consciousness by Building It -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Objective awareness -- 3 Cognitive access -- 4 Self-knowledge -- 5 The attention schema -- 6 Possible misconception: Higher cognition and the attention schema -- 7 Possible misconception: What generates actual awareness? -- 8 The parable of the Heliocentric theory -- 9 Uses of the attention schema -- 10 The attention schema is useful for the control of attention.

11 The attention schema is useful for the integration of information -- 12 The attention schema is useful for social perception -- 13 Summary -- References -- Chapter 12 The Illusion of Conscious Thought -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Interpretive self-knowledge -- 3 Sensory-based broadcasting -- 4 Whence the illusion? -- 5 Conclusion -- Notes -- References -- Chapter 13 Actualism About Consciousness Affirmed -- 1 Need for adequate initial clarification of consciousness? Five leading ideas -- 2 Something's being actual - A database -- 3 Functionalisms, dualisms and other theories -- 4 The objective physical world -- 5 Perceptual consciousness - What is and isn't actual -- 6 Perceptual consciousness - Something's being actual is its being subjectively physical in a way -- 7 Cognitive and affective consciousness - Theories and What is and isn't actual -- 8 Cognitive and affective consciousness - Representations being actual is their being subjectively physical in a way -- 9 Zombie objection, changing tune, individuality, truism -- Bibliography -- Chapter 14 Cracking the Hard Problem of Consciousness -- 1 Hard versus tractable Explicanda -- 2 Supervenience of consciousness on neurophysiology -- 3 Dynamic attribution (DA), perception and time -- 4 Scientific brain research in understanding consciousness -- 5 Time as the hard problem of the hard problem of consciousness -- 6 Reductive explanations of unconscious brain processing -- 7 Cinematic phenomenology of internal time consciousness -- 8 Attributions of properties to times -- 9 Time as property, not object of predication -- 10 Pain and consciousness of pain -- 11 Understanding time as the persistently hard part of understanding consciousness -- Notes -- References -- Part IV Mental Causation, Natural Law and Intentionality of Conscious States -- Chapter 15 Toward Axiomatizing Consciousness -- 1 Introduction.

2 Our approach in more detail, its presuppositions -- 3 Prior work of others, partitioned -- 4 Our own prior, relevant work, selected and in brief -- 5 The 10 axioms of -- 6 Next steps -- Acknowledgements -- Notes -- References -- Chapter 16 Intentionality and Consciousness -- 1 Brentano's conception of intentionality and consciousness -- 2 Intentional objects and the Brentano-Bolzano Paradox -- 3 Searle's unphenomenological intentionality -- 4 Mental and intentional -- 5 Consciousness or intentionality? -- 6 Intentionality without objects -- 7 Concluding remarks -- Notes -- References -- Chapter 17 Cognitive Approaches to Phenomenal Consciousness -- 1 Introduction: Cognition and cognitive approaches to phenomenal consciousness -- 2 David Rosenthal's higher-order thought theory of consciousness -- 3 Daniel Dennett's fame in the brain theory of consciousness -- 4 A challenge to cognitive approaches and a possible solution -- 5 Conclusion -- References -- Chapter 18 Free Will and Consciousness -- Précis -- 1 Background -- 2 Decision times -- 3 Generalizing -- 4 Another unsuccessful sceptical argument -- 5 Parting remarks -- Notes -- References -- Chapter 19 Notes Towards a Metaphysics of Mind -- Notes -- Part V Resources -- Chapter 20 Annotated Bibliography -- The Problem and Nature of Consciousness -- Special Problems or Aspects of Consciousness -- Introductions -- Chapter 21 Research Resources -- Journals -- Societies -- Research Centres and Institutes -- Encyclopedias and Dictionaries -- Bibliographies -- Blogs and other websites -- Chapter 22 A-Z Key Terms and Concepts -- Access versus phenomenal concsiousness -- Animal consciousness -- Attention and awareness -- Artificial intelligence -- Chinese room argument -- Creature vs state consciousness -- Eliminativism (eliminative materialism) -- Emergence -- Epiphenominalism -- Explanatory gap.

Free will -- Functionalism -- Global workspace -- Hard problem of consciouness -- Higher-order mental states -- Information integration theory -- Intentionality -- Introspection -- Knowledge argument -- Modal arguments against physicalism -- Multiple drafts model -- Neural correlates of consciousness -- Phenomenology -- Physicalism -- Property dualism -- Qualia -- Reduction -- Representationalism -- Self -- Self-consciousness -- Self-knowledge -- Substance dualism -- Supervenience -- Turing test -- Unity of consciousness -- Zombies -- Index.

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Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, Michigan : ProQuest Ebook Central, 2024. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest Ebook Central affiliated libraries.