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A New Nuclear Century : Strategic Stability and Arms Control.

By: Contributor(s): Material type: TextTextPublisher: New York : Bloomsbury Publishing USA, 2002Copyright date: ©2002Edition: 1st edDescription: 1 online resource (206 pages)Content type:
  • text
Media type:
  • computer
Carrier type:
  • online resource
ISBN:
  • 9780313012020
Subject(s): Genre/Form: Additional physical formats: Print version:: A New Nuclear CenturyDDC classification:
  • 327.1/747
LOC classification:
  • U162.6.C58 2002
Online resources:
Contents:
Cover -- A New Nuclear Century -- CONTENTS -- ACKNOWLEDGMENTS -- INTRODUCTION -- 1 FIRST-STRIKE STABILITY MODELING: THE CRAZY MATHEMATICS OF THE COLD WAR -- THE KENT/THALER FIRST-STRIKE STABILITY METHODOLGY -- OVERVIEW -- STEP 1. DEVELOP DRAWDOWN CURVES -- STEP 2. DETERMINE TARGET DAMAGE CURVES -- STEP 3. DETERMINE COSTS OF ALTERNATIVE NUCLEAR WARS -- STEP 4. DEVELOP U.S. AND RUSSIAN DECISION TREES -- STEP 5. CALCULATE THE INDEX OF STABILITY -- STEP 6. INTERPRET RESULTS -- CONCLUSIONS -- NOTES -- 2 REDEFINING STRATEGIC STABILITY -- IS STRATEGIC STABILITY STILL RELEVANT? -- DEFINING STRATEGIC STABILITY -- Generation Stability -- Prompt Launch Stability -- Deterrence Stability -- MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS -- STRATEGIC FORCES -- TOTAL STRATEGIC WEAPONS -- STRATEGIC WEAPON SYSTEM PLANNING FACTORS -- DETERRENCE STABILITY -- GENERATION STABILITY AND PROMPT LAUNCH STABILITY -- CONCLUSIONS -- NOTES -- 3 FRICTION AND NUCLEAR DETERRENCE -- TYPES OF DETERRENCE -- FRICTION IN POLICY AND OPERATIONS -- War Plans -- Crisis Management -- Offensive Force Operations -- Defenses -- CONCLUSION -- NOTES -- 4 TRIAD AND TRIBULATION: U.S. AND RUSSIAN START OPTIONS -- FORCE STRUCTURES AND MODERNIZATION -- U.S. AND RUSSIAN OPTIONS: DATA ANALYSIS -- BEYOND NUMBER CRUNCHING: ISSUES OF STRATEGY AND POLICY -- CONCLUSIONS -- NOTES -- 5 PROLIFERATION IN AN UNSTABLE WORLD -- PROLIFERATION AND REALISM -- THE LIMITS OF NUCLEAR REALISM -- Exceptional Cases -- Economics and International Politics -- General and Immediate Deterrence -- Rational Decision-Making -- NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE NOT ALONE -- CONFLICT TERMINATION AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS SPREAD -- CONCLUSIONS -- NOTES -- CONCLUSION -- THE BROADER CONTEXT -- SPECIFIC CONCLUSIONS AND ARGUMENTS -- HYPOTHESES AND SPECULATIONS -- The Russian Enigma -- Defenses and Proliferation -- NOTES -- FURTHER READING -- INDEX -- About the Authors.
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Cover -- A New Nuclear Century -- CONTENTS -- ACKNOWLEDGMENTS -- INTRODUCTION -- 1 FIRST-STRIKE STABILITY MODELING: THE CRAZY MATHEMATICS OF THE COLD WAR -- THE KENT/THALER FIRST-STRIKE STABILITY METHODOLGY -- OVERVIEW -- STEP 1. DEVELOP DRAWDOWN CURVES -- STEP 2. DETERMINE TARGET DAMAGE CURVES -- STEP 3. DETERMINE COSTS OF ALTERNATIVE NUCLEAR WARS -- STEP 4. DEVELOP U.S. AND RUSSIAN DECISION TREES -- STEP 5. CALCULATE THE INDEX OF STABILITY -- STEP 6. INTERPRET RESULTS -- CONCLUSIONS -- NOTES -- 2 REDEFINING STRATEGIC STABILITY -- IS STRATEGIC STABILITY STILL RELEVANT? -- DEFINING STRATEGIC STABILITY -- Generation Stability -- Prompt Launch Stability -- Deterrence Stability -- MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS -- STRATEGIC FORCES -- TOTAL STRATEGIC WEAPONS -- STRATEGIC WEAPON SYSTEM PLANNING FACTORS -- DETERRENCE STABILITY -- GENERATION STABILITY AND PROMPT LAUNCH STABILITY -- CONCLUSIONS -- NOTES -- 3 FRICTION AND NUCLEAR DETERRENCE -- TYPES OF DETERRENCE -- FRICTION IN POLICY AND OPERATIONS -- War Plans -- Crisis Management -- Offensive Force Operations -- Defenses -- CONCLUSION -- NOTES -- 4 TRIAD AND TRIBULATION: U.S. AND RUSSIAN START OPTIONS -- FORCE STRUCTURES AND MODERNIZATION -- U.S. AND RUSSIAN OPTIONS: DATA ANALYSIS -- BEYOND NUMBER CRUNCHING: ISSUES OF STRATEGY AND POLICY -- CONCLUSIONS -- NOTES -- 5 PROLIFERATION IN AN UNSTABLE WORLD -- PROLIFERATION AND REALISM -- THE LIMITS OF NUCLEAR REALISM -- Exceptional Cases -- Economics and International Politics -- General and Immediate Deterrence -- Rational Decision-Making -- NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE NOT ALONE -- CONFLICT TERMINATION AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS SPREAD -- CONCLUSIONS -- NOTES -- CONCLUSION -- THE BROADER CONTEXT -- SPECIFIC CONCLUSIONS AND ARGUMENTS -- HYPOTHESES AND SPECULATIONS -- The Russian Enigma -- Defenses and Proliferation -- NOTES -- FURTHER READING -- INDEX -- About the Authors.

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Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, Michigan : ProQuest Ebook Central, 2024. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest Ebook Central affiliated libraries.

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