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The Natural Resources Trap : Private Investment Without Public Commitment.

By: Contributor(s): Material type: TextTextSeries: The MIT Press SeriesPublisher: Cambridge : MIT Press, 2010Copyright date: ©2010Edition: 1st edDescription: 1 online resource (534 pages)Content type:
  • text
Media type:
  • computer
Carrier type:
  • online resource
ISBN:
  • 9780262275538
Subject(s): Genre/Form: Additional physical formats: Print version:: The Natural Resources TrapDDC classification:
  • 333.7
LOC classification:
  • HC85.N36 2010
Online resources:
Contents:
Intro -- Contents -- Contributors -- Preface -- 1 Contracts and Investment in Natural Resources -- I Theoretical Papers -- 2 Petroleum Contracts -- Commentary: Lawrence H. Summers -- 3 Sovereign Theft -- Commentary: Jeromin Zettelmeyer -- 4 A Resource Belief Curse? -- Commentary: George-Marios Angeletos -- 5 Optimal Resource Extraction Contracts under Threat of Expropriation -- 6 Denying the Temptation to GRAB -- 7 Dealing with Expropriations -- Commentary: Erich Muehlegger -- 8 Pricing Expropriation Risk in Natural Resource Contracts -- Commentary: Robert Pindyck -- II Country Cases -- 9 Credibility, Commitment, and Regulation -- Commentary: Jeffrey Frankel -- 10 Hydrocarbon Policy, Shocks, and the Collective Imagination -- Commentary: Fernando Candia Castillo -- 11 Urgency and Betrayal -- Commentary: Louis Wells -- 12 The Political Economy of Oil Contract Renegotiation in Venezuela -- Commentary: Ramón Espinasa -- III Conclusion -- Epilogue -- Appendix -- Index.
Summary: Experts discuss the contractual instability resulting from commodity price volatility and its effect on private investment and public involvement.
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Intro -- Contents -- Contributors -- Preface -- 1 Contracts and Investment in Natural Resources -- I Theoretical Papers -- 2 Petroleum Contracts -- Commentary: Lawrence H. Summers -- 3 Sovereign Theft -- Commentary: Jeromin Zettelmeyer -- 4 A Resource Belief Curse? -- Commentary: George-Marios Angeletos -- 5 Optimal Resource Extraction Contracts under Threat of Expropriation -- 6 Denying the Temptation to GRAB -- 7 Dealing with Expropriations -- Commentary: Erich Muehlegger -- 8 Pricing Expropriation Risk in Natural Resource Contracts -- Commentary: Robert Pindyck -- II Country Cases -- 9 Credibility, Commitment, and Regulation -- Commentary: Jeffrey Frankel -- 10 Hydrocarbon Policy, Shocks, and the Collective Imagination -- Commentary: Fernando Candia Castillo -- 11 Urgency and Betrayal -- Commentary: Louis Wells -- 12 The Political Economy of Oil Contract Renegotiation in Venezuela -- Commentary: Ramón Espinasa -- III Conclusion -- Epilogue -- Appendix -- Index.

Experts discuss the contractual instability resulting from commodity price volatility and its effect on private investment and public involvement.

Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources.

Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, Michigan : ProQuest Ebook Central, 2024. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest Ebook Central affiliated libraries.

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