Taxpayer Participation in Tax Treaty Dispute Resolution.
Material type:
- text
- computer
- online resource
- 9789087222260
- 343.0526
- K4475 .P477 2014
Intro -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Preface -- Table of Contents -- Part I: Setting the Scene -- Chapter 1: International Tax Dispute Resolution: Past, Present and Future -- 1.1. Introductory remarks -- 1.2. A glimpse into the past -- 1.2.1. The Japanese House Tax -- 1.2.2. The Administration of the Prince von Pless -- 1.3. Back to the present: The current status of international double taxation dispute resolution -- 1.3.1. An unsuccessful MAP -- 1.3.2. The negative record of the EU Arbitration Convention -- 1.4. A long established taboo: The direct participation of the taxpayer -- 1.4.1. The Lindencrona/Mattsson proposal (1980) -- 1.4.2. The doctoral thesis of Mario Züger (2001) -- 1.4.3. The International Fiscal Association study (2004) -- 1.4.4. The doctoral thesis of Zvi Altman (2005) -- 1.5. A new system proposed (structure of the thesis) -- Part II: Private Parties in International Disputes: The Case of International Tax Disputes -- Introduction -- Chapter 2: Diplomatic Protection and International Tax Disputes: An Awkward Cohabitation of Two Strangers -- 2.1. Introductory remarks -- 2.2. The general framework: International law disputes and diplomatic protection -- 2.2.1. The concept of "dispute": When does a dispute exist? -- 2.2.2. The concept of "international": When does a dispute become international -- 2.2.2.1. International disputes between an individual and a foreign state -- 2.2.2.2. International disputes between an individual and his own state -- 2.3. The concept and nature of diplomatic protection -- 2.4. Diplomatic protection and the protection of taxpayers' rights in double taxation conventions -- 2.5. Conclusion -- Chapter 3: International Double Taxation Disputes as Disputes between the State(s) and the Taxpayer(s) -- 3.1. Introductory remarks -- 3.2. The particular characteristics of double taxation conventions.
3.2.1. The broad context: Double taxation conventions as part of international investment law -- 3.2.2. The function of double taxation conventions: Distribution of taxing powers between sovereign states -- 3.2.3. Double taxation conventions as a source of interests for the states and direct rights for the taxpayers -- 3.3. Private parties as "owners" of double taxation disputes (a substance-over-form approach) -- 3.3.1. The relationship between the taxpayer and his state of residence: Concurring or opposing interests? -- 3.3.2. Functional control of the claim -- 3.3.3. The catalytic role of the taxpayer in the rise of an international tax dispute -- 3.4. Multiple parties in international taxation disputes -- 3.4.1. The application of both the formal and substance criterion in order to identify the parties to a dispute -- 3.4.2. Limitations to the number of parties -- 3.5. Conclusion -- Chapter 4: A Comparative Perspective: Private Parties in International Law Disputes -- 4.1. Introductory remarks -- 4.2. Private parties in investment treaties' disputes -- 4.2.1. Bilateral investment treaties and direct taxation disputes -- 4.2.2. Multilateral investment treaties and direct taxation -- 4.2.2.1. Free trade agreements: Direct taxation matters and the NAFTA -- 4.2.2.2. The Energy Charter Treaty: Direct taxation matters and the ECT -- 4.2.3. Taxpayer participation in investment treaty arbitration: Some practical aspects -- 4.3. The WTO rules and the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) -- 4.4. Conclusion -- Part III: Dispute Resolution and International Tax Disputes -- Chapter 5: "Access to an Effective Remedy" and International Tax Disputes - The Creation of Positive Obligations for the States -- 5.1. "Effective remedy" and "access to justice" in (international) tax matters in the universal human rights system.
5.1.1. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) -- 5.1.2. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) -- 5.2. "Effective remedy" and "access to justice" in (international) tax matters in the regional human rights systems -- 5.2.1. The Inter-American system -- 5.2.2. The African System -- 5.2.3. The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) -- 5.2.3.1. Article 6 of the ECHR and tax matters: An overview of the current status -- 5.2.3.2. The application of fair trial guarantees to tax matters: An alternative route -- 5.3. The creation of positive obligations for the states: Access to an effective remedy for international tax disputes -- 5.4. Conclusion -- Chapter 6: "Access" to an "Effective Remedy": The Domestic Courts Option -- 6.1. Introduction -- 6.2. Recourse to domestic courts of one contracting state: One is none -- 6.2.1. The risk of non-execution of the decision in the other contracting state -- 6.2.2. The risk of lack of impartiality -- 6.3. Recourse (parallel or consecutive) to domestic courts of two contracting states: Two is too many -- 6.3.1. The costs of (multiple) judicial proceedings -- 6.3.2. Language barriers in litigation abroad -- 6.3.3. The length of the (combined) proceedings -- 6.3.3.1. The need for timely dispute resolution -- 6.3.3.2. Assessing the reasonableness of the length of the proceedings -- 6.3.3.2.1. Complexity of the case -- 6.3.3.2.2. The parties' conduct -- 6.3.3.2.3. The implications of the case for the applicant -- 6.3.3.2.4. Overall assessment -- 6.4. Conclusion: Access to domestic courts does not guarantee effectiveness for international tax dispute resolution -- Chapter 7: "Access" to an "Effective Remedy": The International Route -- 7.1. Introduction -- 7.2. The requirement of effectiveness.
7.2.1. Effectiveness of the double taxation conventions mechanism -- 7.2.2. Effectiveness of the EU Arbitration Convention mechanism -- 7.2.3. An overall assessment of the effectiveness of the international system -- 7.2.3.1. One common set of procedures -- 7.2.3.2. Final decision that binds two competent authorities -- 7.2.3.3. Resolution within a reasonable and predictable time -- 7.2.3.4. Low cost for the taxpayer and the tax administration -- 7.3. The requirement of "access" to an effective remedy -- 7.3.1. Taxpayer participation under the international dispute resolution system -- 7.3.1.1. The OECD Model system -- 7.3.1.2. The EU Arbitration Convention -- 7.3.2. Does the current level of taxpayer participation satisfy the requirement of "access" to an effective remedy -- 7.3.2.1. The impact of the absolute bar of individual access -- 7.3.2.2. The impact of the limited involvement of the taxpayer -- 7.3.2.3. An overall assessment: Is individual access to the international system required? -- 7.4. The requirement of access to a(n) (independent) "tribunal" -- 7.4.1. What qualifies as a(n) (independent) "tribunal" -- 7.4.1.1. The OECD Model "joint committee" and the EU Arbitration Convention "joint committee" -- 7.4.1.2. The OECD Model "arbitration panel" and the EU Arbitration Convention "advisory commission" -- 7.4.1.2.1. Power of decision -- 7.4.1.2.2. Independence -- 7.4.2. Proposed adjustments to meet the independence requirement -- Conclusions of Part III: Direct Taxpayer Access to International Tax Dispute Resolution Mechanisms -- Part IV: Summary and Conclusions -- Chapter 8: Redesigning the International Tax Dispute Resolution Mechanism -- 8.1. General remarks -- 8.2. A modern system for the resolution of international double taxation disputes -- 8.2.1. The basic structure: Compulsory MAP followed by compulsory international arbitration.
8.2.1.1. The administrative phase: Mutual agreement procedure -- 8.2.1.1.1. Initiation: Application by the taxpayer -- 8.2.1.1.2. Fair trial standards: Individual access and independence -- 8.2.1.1.3. The use of experts -- 8.2.1.1.4. Decision: Final and binding, depending on taxpayer's consent -- 8.2.1.2. The judicial phase: Multiparty arbitration -- 8.2.1.2.1. Initiation: Automatic on taxpayer's request -- 8.2.1.2.2. Multiple parties in international taxation arbitration proceedings -- 8.2.1.2.3. Independence of the arbitral tribunal -- 8.2.1.2.4. Decision: Final, reasoned, public, and binding -- 8.2.2. A less legalistic variation: An enhanced MAP -- 8.2.2.1. Taxpayer participation -- 8.2.2.2. Independence -- 8.2.3. A more legalistic variation: MAP and international (tax) court -- 8.2.3.1. The administrative phase: MAP -- 8.2.3.2. The judicial phase: International (tax) court -- 8.2.3.2.1. Adjudication by an international (tax) court -- 8.2.3.2.2. Reference for a preliminary ruling -- Chapter 9: Taxpayer Participation in DTC Dispute Resolution in a Nutshell -- Bibliography -- Table of Cases.
The book discusses an enhanced MAP and arbitration procedure proposing direct taxpayer participation in multiparty proceedings as the way forward in international tax dispute resolution.
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Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, Michigan : ProQuest Ebook Central, 2024. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest Ebook Central affiliated libraries.
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