Regional Free Trade Areas and Strategic Trade Policies.

Intro -- Preface -- Contents -- Part I The Formation of Free Trade Agreements -- 1 Expansion of Free Trade Agreements, Overlapping Free Trade Agreements, and Market Size -- 1.1 Introduction -- 1.2 The Model -- 1.3 Preliminary Results -- 1.3.1 Initial Situation: No FTA -- 1.3.2 Feasibility of Bilateral FTA -- 1.4 Analysis -- 1.4.1 Overlapping Regime -- 1.4.1.1 Hub-and-Spoke System -- 1.4.1.2 Spoke-Spoke FTA -- 1.4.2 Expanding Regime -- 1.5 Feasibility of MFT Under Overlapping Regime and Expanding Regime -- 1.6 Concluding Remarks -- References -- 2 The Feasibility of Multilateral Free Trade and Mode of Competition: Stackelberg Versus Cournot Competitions -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.2 The Model -- 2.3 Analysis -- 2.3.1 Initial Situation: No FTA -- 2.3.2 Overlapping Regime -- 2.3.2.1 The First-Round Negotiation: Bilateral FTA -- 2.3.2.2 Hub-and-Spoke System -- 2.3.2.3 Spoke-Spoke FTA -- 2.3.3 Expanding Regime -- 2.3.3.1 Bilateral FTA -- 2.3.3.2 Expansion of Bilateral FTA -- 2.4 Comparison of Stackelberg with Cournot Competition -- 2.5 Concluding Remarks -- References -- 3 Sustainability of Free Trade Agreements Under a Maximum Revenue Tariff -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 Setup -- 3.3 Preliminary Results -- 3.3.1 Welfare-Maximizing Tariff Game -- 3.3.2 Maximum Revenue Tariff Game -- 3.3.3 Free Trade -- 3.3.4 Equilibrium Outcomes -- 3.4 Sustainability for MFT Under No FTA -- 3.4.1 Sustainability of MFT Under a Welfare-Maximizing Tariff -- 3.4.2 Sustainability of MFT Under a Maximum Revenue Tariff -- 3.4.3 Comparison of Sustainable Conditions -- 3.5 Sustainability of an FTA Under No FTA -- 3.5.1 External Tariff Rate -- 3.5.2 Sustainability of an FTA Under a Welfare-Maximizing Tariff Regime -- 3.5.3 Sustainability of an FTA Under a Maximum Revenue Tariff Regime -- 3.5.4 Comparison Between Two Tariff Schemes -- 3.6 Sustainability of MFT Under a Bilateral FTA.

3.6.1 Sustainability Under a Welfare-Maximizing Tariff Regime -- 3.6.2 Sustainability Under a Revenue-Maximizing Tariff Regime -- 3.6.3 Does FTA Become a Building Block or a Stumbling Block to MFT? -- 3.7 Concluding Remarks -- References -- 4 Technology Choice, Firm Behavior, and Free Trade Agreements -- 4.1 Introduction -- 4.2 Model -- 4.3 Preliminary Analysis -- 4.3.1 Third-Stage Equilibrium -- 4.3.2 Equilibrium Tariff Rate Under Uniform Tariff Policy -- 4.3.3 Equilibrium Tariff Rate Under FTA -- 4.4 Technology Choice -- 4.4.1 Uniform Tariff Case -- 4.4.2 FTA Case -- 4.4.3 Effects of FTA on Technology Choice -- 4.5 Effect of FTA on the Importing Country's Welfare -- 4.6 Concluding Remark -- References -- Part II The Timing of Trade Policies -- 5 Endogenous Timing in Trade Policy Under the Three-Country Model -- 5.1 Introduction -- 5.2 The Model -- 5.3 The Analysis -- 5.3.1 Stage 3 Subgame -- 5.3.2 Stage 2 Subgame -- 5.3.2.1 Simultaneous Move -- 5.3.2.2 Sequential Move -- 5.3.3 Stage 1 Subgame -- 5.4 Main Results -- 5.4.1 Comparison Among Subsidy Rates -- 5.4.2 Endogenous Timing -- 5.5 Free Trade vs. Bilateral Intervention -- 5.6 Conclusion and Remarks -- Appendix -- A Derivation of (5.13) -- B Derivation of siC and WiC -- C Derivation of siL, sjF, WiL, and WjF -- D Proof of Lemma 5.4 -- E Proof of Proposition 5.1 -- F Proof of Proposition 5.3 -- G Proof of Proposition 5.4 -- References -- 6 Endogenous Timing Decision on Trade Policies Between Importing and Exporting Countries with Many Firms -- 6.1 Introduction -- 6.2 Main Model -- 6.3 Analysis of the Third Stage -- 6.4 Analysis of the Second Stage -- 6.5 Some Lemmas -- 6.6 Analysis of the First Stage -- 6.7 Interpretation of the Results -- 6.8 Concluding Remarks -- Appendix -- A: Theorem 5 of ch6:HamiltonandSlutsky1990 -- B: The proof of Lemma 6.2 -- C: The Proof of Lemma 6.3.

D: The Proof of Lemma 6.4 -- References -- Part III The Roles of Trade Policies -- 7 Government Intervention Brings About Free-Trade Outcomes in the Long Run -- 7.1 Introduction -- 7.2 The Model -- 7.3 Short-Run Analysis -- 7.4 Long-Run Analysis -- 7.4.1 Third-Stage Subgame -- 7.4.2 Second-Stage Subgame -- 7.4.3 First-Stage Subgame -- 7.5 Main Results -- 7.6 Introduction of Tariff -- 7.6.1 Derivation of Long-Run Equilibrium -- 7.6.2 Short-Run Equilibrium vs. Long-Run Equilibrium -- 7.6.3 Effect of Tariff on the Long-Run Equilibrium -- 7.7 Conclusion -- Appendix -- A. Derivation of (7.7) -- References -- 8 Optimum Welfare and Maximum Revenue Tariff Under Oligopoly: A Note -- 8.1 Introduction -- 8.2 Basic Model -- 8.2.1 Setup -- 8.3 Optimum Welfare and Maximum Revenue Tariff Under a Fixed Number of Firms -- 8.3.1 Optimum Welfare Tariff -- 8.3.2 Maximum Revenue Tariff -- 8.3.3 Comparisons -- 8.4 Analysis for Endogenous Market Structure -- 8.4.1 Case of Free Entry and Exit of Domestic Firms -- 8.4.2 Case of Free Entry and Exit of Foreign Firms -- 8.5 Conclusions -- References -- 9 Cost Asymmetries and Import Tariff Policy in a Vertically Related Industry -- 9.1 Introduction -- 9.2 Model -- 9.2.1 Downstream Markets -- 9.2.2 Upstream Markets -- 9.3 Import Tariff Policy Game -- 9.3.1 Trade Policy Game with Import Tariff on the Final Good -- 9.3.2 Trade Policy Game with Import Tariff on the Intermediate Good -- 9.3.3 Trade Policy Game with Import Tariffs on the Final and the Intermediate Goods -- 9.4 Conclusion -- Appendix -- Cournot Duopoly Model Without an Intermediate Goods Sector -- References -- Part IV Food and Trade Policies -- 10 Strategic Trade Policy and Food Trade -- 10.1 Introduction -- 10.2 Model -- 10.3 Preliminary Analysis -- 10.4 Game -- 10.5 Optimal Inspection -- 10.6 Concluding Remarks -- References.

11 International Price Competition Among Food Industries: The Role of Income, Population, and Biased Consumer Preference -- 11.1 Introduction -- 11.2 Model of Population Changes, Food Prices, and Food Safety -- 11.2.1 Consumers and Health Awareness -- 11.2.2 Link Between Population Growth and Income -- 11.3 Timing of Game -- 11.3.1 Demands and Producers in the Case of a Developed Country in the North -- 11.3.2 Demands and Producers in the Case of a Developing Country in the South -- 11.4 Comparative Statics -- 11.4.1 Population Movement -- 11.4.2 Economic Growth and Income Gaps -- 11.4.3 Health Hazards -- 11.5 Policy Implications -- Appendix A: Stability Conditions -- A.1. Case of a Developed Country in the North -- A.2. Case of a Developing Country in the South -- Appendix B: Comparative Statics -- B.1. Case of a Developed Country in the North -- B.2. Case of a Developing Country in the South -- Appendix C: Nature of Reaction Functions -- C.1. Case of a Developed Country in the North -- C.2. Case of a Developing Country in the South -- References -- Web Resources.

Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources.

Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, Michigan : ProQuest Ebook Central, 2024. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest Ebook Central affiliated libraries.