Demonstrative Thought : A Pragmatic View.

Intro -- Foreword -- Contents -- 1 Introduction: What is Demonstrative Thought and How to Explain it? -- 1.1 Four properties of demonstrative thought -- 1.2 Demonstrative thoughts as attention-based mental activities with singular demonstrative contents -- 1.3 The mode/content proposal (and its limits) -- 1.4 Perceptualist approaches to demonstrative thought -- 1.5 Conceptualist approaches to demonstrative thought -- 1.6 An alternative proposal (and the road ahead) -- 2 Perceptualist Approaches to Demonstrative Thought -- 2.1 Perception as natural predication -- 2.2 Direct and indirect reference-fixing mechanisms -- 2.3 Attention-based perceptualism -- 2.4 Non-attentional perceptualism -- 2.5 Final remarks -- 3 Attention-based Perceptualist Theories of Demonstrative Thought -- 3.1 John Campbell -- 3.1.1 Experiential highlighting -- 3.1.2 Attention and feature binding -- 3.1.3 Experiential highlighting again -- 3.2 Wayne Wu -- 3.2.1 Wu's argument against conscious attention as visual selection -- 3.2.2 Synchronic and diachronic phenomenal salience -- 3.2.3 The cognitive view of synchronic phenomenal salience -- 3.2.4 The agentive view of synchronic phenomenal salience -- 3.2.5 Attention as selection for action -- 3.3 James Stazicker -- 3.3.1 Conscious attention without synchronic phenomenal salience -- 3.3.2 Attention to thought -- 3.3.3 Demonstrative thought as cognitive attention -- 4 Non-attentional Perceptualist Theories of Demonstrative Thought -- 4.1 Joseph Levine -- 4.1.1 Intentionally mediated vs. direct meta-semantic mechanisms -- 4.1.2 Multiple object tracking and pre-attentive object representations -- 4.1.3 An attentional account of multiple object tracking -- 4.1.4 The evidence from subitizing -- 4.2 Athanassios Raftopoulos -- 4.2.1 Perception, attention and cognition -- 4.2.2 Three levels of visual processing.

4.2.3 Proto-objects and the coherence problem -- 4.3 Mohan Matthen -- 4.3.1 Seeing objects versus seeing pictures -- 4.3.2 Motion-guiding vision and visual reference -- 4.3.3 Referring to objects without motion-guiding vision -- 4.3.4 Spatial significance -- 5 The Conceptualist Challenge to Demonstrative Thought -- 5.1 Introduction: the story so far -- 5.2 The conceptualist challenge to perceptualism: preliminaries -- 5.3 The orthodox view of practical knowledge -- 5.4 The conceptualist challenge revisited -- 5.5 On the idea of an 'objective' conception of space -- 5.6 The cognitive map strategy (and its limits) -- 5.7 Campbell on the role of physical objects in spatial thinking -- 6 The Pragmatic View of Demonstrative Thought (I): Practical Knowledge -- 6.1 Introduction: conceptualism and the explanatory gap -- 6.2 Practical and image-like knowledge -- 6.3 Practical knowledge and space -- 6.4 The historical-dispositional account (and its limits) -- 6.5 Two ways of knowing about speed (again) -- 6.6 The cognitive space -- 6.7 Stabilization and movement in cognitive space -- 7 The Pragmatic View of Demonstrative Thought (II): Object Representation -- 7.1 Introduction: practical knowledge and object representation -- 7.2 Bermudez's object properties model of object perception -- 7.3 The graded knowledge approach: beyond perceptual sensitivity -- 7.4 Natural stabilization and the prefrontal cortex -- 7.5 A pragmatist answer to the conceptualist challenge -- 7.6 Natural de-stabilization -- 7.7 A new role for sortal concepts -- 7.8 Final considerations -- Bibliography -- Index.

The title of this series has changed, new books are published in Epistemic Studies.

Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources.

Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, Michigan : ProQuest Ebook Central, 2024. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest Ebook Central affiliated libraries.