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Tax Incentives in the BEPS Era.

By: Contributor(s): Material type: TextTextSeries: IBFD Tax Research SeriesPublisher: Amsterdam : IBFD Publications USA, Incorporated, 2018Copyright date: ©2018Edition: 1st edDescription: 1 online resource (289 pages)Content type:
  • text
Media type:
  • computer
Carrier type:
  • online resource
ISBN:
  • 9789087224455
Subject(s): Genre/Form: Additional physical formats: Print version:: Tax Incentives in the BEPS EraDDC classification:
  • 343.05266999999998
LOC classification:
  • K4550 .T39 2018
Online resources:
Contents:
Intro -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Table of Contents -- Foreword -- General Acknowledgements -- Introduction -- Abbreviations and Acronyms -- Part One: Introduction -- Chapter 1: Introduction to Tax Incentives in the BEPS Era -- 1.1. Introduction -- 1.2. What are tax incentives? -- 1.3. Purposes of the selected tax incentives -- 1.4. Characteristics of the selected tax incentives -- 1.5. Analysis of the survey's results -- 1.6. Conclusion -- Part Two: Selected Tax Incentives Affected by the BEPS Developments -- Chapter 2: Tax Holidays -- 2.1. Introduction -- 2.2. Some policy and practical considerations -- 2.2.1. Administration -- 2.2.2. Eligibility -- 2.2.3. Duration -- 2.2.4. Scope -- 2.2.4.1. Taxes covered and other provisions -- 2.2.4.2. Interaction with other tax rules -- 2.3. Advantages and disadvantages of tax holidays -- 2.3.1. Host country's perspective -- 2.3.2. Investor's perspective -- 2.4. Tax planning arrangements and anti-avoidance measures -- 2.4.1. Overview -- 2.4.2. Transfer pricing -- 2.4.2.1. Concerns -- 2.4.2.1.1. Multiple activity subsidiary -- 2.4.2.1.2. Transfers of assets -- 2.4.2.2. Anti-avoidance measures -- 2.4.2.2.1. Transfer pricing rules -- 2.4.2.2.2. Thin capitalization rules -- 2.4.2.2.3. Limitation on other deductions -- 2.4.3. Holding company structures -- 2.4.3.1. Concerns -- 2.4.3.2. Anti-avoidance measures -- 2.4.4. Round-tripping -- 2.4.4.1. Concern -- 2.4.4.2. Anti-avoidance measures -- 2.4.5. Other anti-avoidance measures -- 2.4.5.1. CFC rules -- 2.4.5.2. Examples of countries' measures specific to tax holidays -- 2.5. Interaction with BEPS -- 2.5.1. BEPS Action 3: Designing Effective Controlled Foreign Company Rules -- 2.5.1.1. CFC exemptions and threshold requirements -- 2.5.1.1.1. Overview -- 2.5.1.1.2. Impact on tax holidays -- 2.5.1.2. CFC income -- 2.5.1.2.1. Overview.
2.5.1.2.2. Impact on tax holidays -- 2.5.1.3. Computation of income, and prevention and elimination of double taxation -- 2.5.1.3.1. Overview -- 2.5.1.3.2. Impact on tax holidays -- 2.5.2. Other BEPS measures -- 2.6. Conclusion -- Chapter 3: Tax Incentives for Capital Investment: An Analysis of Investment Incentives Commonly Used for Tax Planning Purposes and their Interaction with the OECD BEPS Project and Other Anti-Avoidance Measures -- 3.1. Introduction -- 3.2. Various forms of commonly applied tax incentivesfor capital investments -- 3.2.1. General -- 3.2.2. Investment allowances -- 3.2.2.1. Methods of tax depreciation -- 3.2.2.2. Timing differences -- 3.2.3. R&amp -- D tax incentives -- 3.2.3.1. Input-related R&amp -- D tax incentives -- 3.2.3.1.1. Accelerated depreciation of R&amp -- D capital costs -- 3.2.3.1.2. R&amp -- D tax credits -- 3.2.3.2. Output-related R&amp -- D tax incentives -- 3.2.4. Comparison overview of IP box regimes in Europe -- 3.2.5. Special IP box regimes outside of Europe -- 3.3. Advantages and disadvantages of tax incentivesfor capital investments -- 3.3.1. Investment allowances -- 3.3.2. R&amp -- D tax incentives -- 3.3.2.1. R&amp -- D tax credits -- 3.3.2.2. IP box regimes -- 3.4. Typical planning structures -- 3.4.1. Investment allowances used in tax planning structures -- 3.4.1.1. Sale and leaseback structure -- 3.4.1.2. Asset pooling -- 3.4.2. R&amp -- D tax incentives -- 3.4.2.1. R&amp -- D tax credits -- 3.4.2.2. IP tax planning strategies -- 3.4.2.2.1. Common IP tax planning strategies -- 3.4.2.2.2. IP branch model -- 3.5. BEPS measures that affect the benefits of tax incentives for capital investments -- 3.5.1. General -- 3.5.2. Impact of Action 3 of the OECD BEPS Project on IP tax planning strategies -- 3.5.3. Impact of Action 5 of the OECD BEPS Project on IP tax planning structures.
3.5.4. Impact of Action 6 of the OECD BEPS Project on IP tax planning strategies -- 3.5.5. Impact of Actions 8-10 of the OECD BEPS Project on IP tax planning strategies -- 3.5.6. The importance of substance considerations -- 3.6. Interaction of domestic anti-avoidance rules with tax incentives for capital investment -- 3.6.1. Domestic measures -- 3.6.2. EU Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive -- 3.7. Conclusion -- Chapter 4: Reduced Tax Rates at a Crossroads: Before and After the OECD BEPS Project -- 4.1. Definition, scope and examples of reduced tax rates -- 4.1.1. What are reduced tax rates? -- 4.1.2. Scope and examples of reduced tax rates -- 4.1.2.1. Tax incentives for specific types of companies -- 4.1.2.2. Tax incentives for specific types of activities -- 4.1.2.3. Tax incentives for certain sectors of the economy -- 4.1.2.4. Tax incentives for certain income sources -- 4.1.2.5. Regional tax incentives -- 4.2. Reduced tax rates as a tax competition tool and BEPS recommendations -- 4.3. Reduced tax rates and anti-avoidance measures -- 4.3.1. Domestic anti-avoidance rules -- 4.3.1.1. GAARs -- 4.3.1.2. CFC rules -- 4.3.2. BEPS anti-avoidance recommendations -- 4.3.2.1. Action 5 of the OECD BEPS Project -- 4.3.2.2. Action 3 of the OECD BEPS Project -- 4.4. Conclusion -- Chapter 5: Special Economic Zones: The Acceptance of Tax Incentives in the BEPS World -- 5.1. Introduction -- 5.2. The concept of SEZs -- 5.3. Features of SEZs for investors and governments -- 5.3.1. The goals of SEZs -- 5.3.2. The relationship between SEZs and the main jurisdictions -- 5.3.3. SEZs and tax incentives -- 5.3.4. Economic development with SEZs -- 5.4. The distinction between SEZs and tax havens -- 5.5. Interaction with the OECD BEPS Project -- 5.5.1. Common remarks on the OECD BEPS Project and SEZs -- 5.5.2. CFC rules and SEZs.
5.6. Measures that states can invoke against undesirable tax planning structures using SEZs -- 5.6.1. OECD BEPS developments in harmful tax practices -- 5.6.1.1. OECD initial steps regarding harmful tax practices -- 5.6.1.2. Action 5 of the OECD BEPS Project -- 5.6.2. SEZs and substance -- 5.6.2.1. What is substantial activity? -- 5.6.2.2. Substantial activity and service companies -- 5.6.2.3. Substantial activity and acceptability of SEZs -- 5.7. Additional issues on the SEZ framework -- 5.7.1. Tax treaties and SEZs -- 5.7.2. European Union and re-launched Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) -- 5.8. Conclusions -- Part Three: Challenges in Securing the Use of Tax Incentives -- Chapter 6: Tax Incentives and Tax Treaties -- 6.1. Introduction -- 6.2. Tax treaties as a tool to attract foreign investment -- 6.2.1. Non-discrimination clauses -- 6.2.2. Mutual agreement procedure (MAP) and binding arbitration clauses -- 6.2.3. Reduced tax rates, MFN clauses and branch profit taxes -- 6.2.4. Interim concluding remarks -- 6.3. The role of tax treaties in securing the effects of domestic tax incentives -- 6.3.1. Domestic tax incentives and foreign investment: The nullifying effect of tax treaties -- 6.3.2. The celebrated solution: Tax sparing credit clauses -- 6.3.3. A reconsideration by the OECD: The turning point -- 6.3.4. Tax sparing credit clauses in the BEPS era: A newtrend ahead? -- 6.4. Concluding remarks -- Chapter 7: Challenges of Unlawful and Incompatible State Aid Investigations in the Tax Incentives Realm -- 7.1. Introduction -- 7.2. Challenges of unlawful and incompatible State aid investigations -- 7.2.1. Challenges for EU Member States -- 7.2.1.1. Tax incentives may qualify as incompatible State aid -- 7.2.1.2. The procedure regarding the authorization of notified tax aid is time-consuming.
7.2.1.3. Breaching the standstill obligation -- 7.2.1.4. EU Member States are obliged to recover the State aid -- 7.2.1.5. Recipients of tax incentives are difficult to be identified -- 7.2.1.6. The determination of the tax advantages -- 7.2.1.7. The efforts to recover the aid may be too costly if nothing is able to be recovered -- 7.2.1.8. Fines may apply in the case of disregarding the Commission's decisions -- 7.2.1.9. The time frame to implement the Commission's decision is too short -- 7.2.2. Challenges for the recipients of the State aid -- 7.2.2.1. Access to information -- 7.2.2.2. Inapplicability of the statute of limitation in tax cases -- 7.2.2.3. The principle of protection of legitimate expectations is not actually protecting the recipients -- 7.2.2.4. Payment of interest -- 7.2.2.5. The potential recipients have no rights during the preliminary examination -- 7.2.2.6. Participation in the formal investigation procedure is costly -- 7.2.2.7. Limited participation in the judicial proceedings -- 7.2.2.8. The possibility to obtain temporary suspension of the recovery is limited -- 7.2.2.9. Deggendorf principle -- 7.2.2.10. Liability of the EU Member State should also be addressed as tax incentives are a tool to promote development -- 7.2.3. Challenges for the EU Commission -- 7.2.3.1. The recovery decision is problematic -- 7.2.3.2. State aid provisions and tax planning -- 7.2.3.3. State aid provisions do not work the same in tax cases -- 7.2.3.4. Judicial review -- 7.2.3.5. Surpassing its competence -- 7.3. Conclusion -- Chapter 8: Tax Rulings: Uncertain Certainty -- 8.1. Introduction -- 8.2. Concept of tax rulings -- 8.2.1. Definition -- 8.2.2. Characteristics -- 8.2.3. Benefits and drawbacks -- 8.2.4. Tax rulings vs. tax incentives -- 8.3. Tax rulings and harmful tax competition -- 8.3.1. OECD -- 8.3.2. European Union.
8.3.3. EU State aid investigations.
Summary: This book analyses selected tax incentives that are commonly promoted by both developed and developing states, particularly those tax incentives that are of relevance to corporate income taxation.
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Intro -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Table of Contents -- Foreword -- General Acknowledgements -- Introduction -- Abbreviations and Acronyms -- Part One: Introduction -- Chapter 1: Introduction to Tax Incentives in the BEPS Era -- 1.1. Introduction -- 1.2. What are tax incentives? -- 1.3. Purposes of the selected tax incentives -- 1.4. Characteristics of the selected tax incentives -- 1.5. Analysis of the survey's results -- 1.6. Conclusion -- Part Two: Selected Tax Incentives Affected by the BEPS Developments -- Chapter 2: Tax Holidays -- 2.1. Introduction -- 2.2. Some policy and practical considerations -- 2.2.1. Administration -- 2.2.2. Eligibility -- 2.2.3. Duration -- 2.2.4. Scope -- 2.2.4.1. Taxes covered and other provisions -- 2.2.4.2. Interaction with other tax rules -- 2.3. Advantages and disadvantages of tax holidays -- 2.3.1. Host country's perspective -- 2.3.2. Investor's perspective -- 2.4. Tax planning arrangements and anti-avoidance measures -- 2.4.1. Overview -- 2.4.2. Transfer pricing -- 2.4.2.1. Concerns -- 2.4.2.1.1. Multiple activity subsidiary -- 2.4.2.1.2. Transfers of assets -- 2.4.2.2. Anti-avoidance measures -- 2.4.2.2.1. Transfer pricing rules -- 2.4.2.2.2. Thin capitalization rules -- 2.4.2.2.3. Limitation on other deductions -- 2.4.3. Holding company structures -- 2.4.3.1. Concerns -- 2.4.3.2. Anti-avoidance measures -- 2.4.4. Round-tripping -- 2.4.4.1. Concern -- 2.4.4.2. Anti-avoidance measures -- 2.4.5. Other anti-avoidance measures -- 2.4.5.1. CFC rules -- 2.4.5.2. Examples of countries' measures specific to tax holidays -- 2.5. Interaction with BEPS -- 2.5.1. BEPS Action 3: Designing Effective Controlled Foreign Company Rules -- 2.5.1.1. CFC exemptions and threshold requirements -- 2.5.1.1.1. Overview -- 2.5.1.1.2. Impact on tax holidays -- 2.5.1.2. CFC income -- 2.5.1.2.1. Overview.

2.5.1.2.2. Impact on tax holidays -- 2.5.1.3. Computation of income, and prevention and elimination of double taxation -- 2.5.1.3.1. Overview -- 2.5.1.3.2. Impact on tax holidays -- 2.5.2. Other BEPS measures -- 2.6. Conclusion -- Chapter 3: Tax Incentives for Capital Investment: An Analysis of Investment Incentives Commonly Used for Tax Planning Purposes and their Interaction with the OECD BEPS Project and Other Anti-Avoidance Measures -- 3.1. Introduction -- 3.2. Various forms of commonly applied tax incentivesfor capital investments -- 3.2.1. General -- 3.2.2. Investment allowances -- 3.2.2.1. Methods of tax depreciation -- 3.2.2.2. Timing differences -- 3.2.3. R&amp -- D tax incentives -- 3.2.3.1. Input-related R&amp -- D tax incentives -- 3.2.3.1.1. Accelerated depreciation of R&amp -- D capital costs -- 3.2.3.1.2. R&amp -- D tax credits -- 3.2.3.2. Output-related R&amp -- D tax incentives -- 3.2.4. Comparison overview of IP box regimes in Europe -- 3.2.5. Special IP box regimes outside of Europe -- 3.3. Advantages and disadvantages of tax incentivesfor capital investments -- 3.3.1. Investment allowances -- 3.3.2. R&amp -- D tax incentives -- 3.3.2.1. R&amp -- D tax credits -- 3.3.2.2. IP box regimes -- 3.4. Typical planning structures -- 3.4.1. Investment allowances used in tax planning structures -- 3.4.1.1. Sale and leaseback structure -- 3.4.1.2. Asset pooling -- 3.4.2. R&amp -- D tax incentives -- 3.4.2.1. R&amp -- D tax credits -- 3.4.2.2. IP tax planning strategies -- 3.4.2.2.1. Common IP tax planning strategies -- 3.4.2.2.2. IP branch model -- 3.5. BEPS measures that affect the benefits of tax incentives for capital investments -- 3.5.1. General -- 3.5.2. Impact of Action 3 of the OECD BEPS Project on IP tax planning strategies -- 3.5.3. Impact of Action 5 of the OECD BEPS Project on IP tax planning structures.

3.5.4. Impact of Action 6 of the OECD BEPS Project on IP tax planning strategies -- 3.5.5. Impact of Actions 8-10 of the OECD BEPS Project on IP tax planning strategies -- 3.5.6. The importance of substance considerations -- 3.6. Interaction of domestic anti-avoidance rules with tax incentives for capital investment -- 3.6.1. Domestic measures -- 3.6.2. EU Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive -- 3.7. Conclusion -- Chapter 4: Reduced Tax Rates at a Crossroads: Before and After the OECD BEPS Project -- 4.1. Definition, scope and examples of reduced tax rates -- 4.1.1. What are reduced tax rates? -- 4.1.2. Scope and examples of reduced tax rates -- 4.1.2.1. Tax incentives for specific types of companies -- 4.1.2.2. Tax incentives for specific types of activities -- 4.1.2.3. Tax incentives for certain sectors of the economy -- 4.1.2.4. Tax incentives for certain income sources -- 4.1.2.5. Regional tax incentives -- 4.2. Reduced tax rates as a tax competition tool and BEPS recommendations -- 4.3. Reduced tax rates and anti-avoidance measures -- 4.3.1. Domestic anti-avoidance rules -- 4.3.1.1. GAARs -- 4.3.1.2. CFC rules -- 4.3.2. BEPS anti-avoidance recommendations -- 4.3.2.1. Action 5 of the OECD BEPS Project -- 4.3.2.2. Action 3 of the OECD BEPS Project -- 4.4. Conclusion -- Chapter 5: Special Economic Zones: The Acceptance of Tax Incentives in the BEPS World -- 5.1. Introduction -- 5.2. The concept of SEZs -- 5.3. Features of SEZs for investors and governments -- 5.3.1. The goals of SEZs -- 5.3.2. The relationship between SEZs and the main jurisdictions -- 5.3.3. SEZs and tax incentives -- 5.3.4. Economic development with SEZs -- 5.4. The distinction between SEZs and tax havens -- 5.5. Interaction with the OECD BEPS Project -- 5.5.1. Common remarks on the OECD BEPS Project and SEZs -- 5.5.2. CFC rules and SEZs.

5.6. Measures that states can invoke against undesirable tax planning structures using SEZs -- 5.6.1. OECD BEPS developments in harmful tax practices -- 5.6.1.1. OECD initial steps regarding harmful tax practices -- 5.6.1.2. Action 5 of the OECD BEPS Project -- 5.6.2. SEZs and substance -- 5.6.2.1. What is substantial activity? -- 5.6.2.2. Substantial activity and service companies -- 5.6.2.3. Substantial activity and acceptability of SEZs -- 5.7. Additional issues on the SEZ framework -- 5.7.1. Tax treaties and SEZs -- 5.7.2. European Union and re-launched Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) -- 5.8. Conclusions -- Part Three: Challenges in Securing the Use of Tax Incentives -- Chapter 6: Tax Incentives and Tax Treaties -- 6.1. Introduction -- 6.2. Tax treaties as a tool to attract foreign investment -- 6.2.1. Non-discrimination clauses -- 6.2.2. Mutual agreement procedure (MAP) and binding arbitration clauses -- 6.2.3. Reduced tax rates, MFN clauses and branch profit taxes -- 6.2.4. Interim concluding remarks -- 6.3. The role of tax treaties in securing the effects of domestic tax incentives -- 6.3.1. Domestic tax incentives and foreign investment: The nullifying effect of tax treaties -- 6.3.2. The celebrated solution: Tax sparing credit clauses -- 6.3.3. A reconsideration by the OECD: The turning point -- 6.3.4. Tax sparing credit clauses in the BEPS era: A newtrend ahead? -- 6.4. Concluding remarks -- Chapter 7: Challenges of Unlawful and Incompatible State Aid Investigations in the Tax Incentives Realm -- 7.1. Introduction -- 7.2. Challenges of unlawful and incompatible State aid investigations -- 7.2.1. Challenges for EU Member States -- 7.2.1.1. Tax incentives may qualify as incompatible State aid -- 7.2.1.2. The procedure regarding the authorization of notified tax aid is time-consuming.

7.2.1.3. Breaching the standstill obligation -- 7.2.1.4. EU Member States are obliged to recover the State aid -- 7.2.1.5. Recipients of tax incentives are difficult to be identified -- 7.2.1.6. The determination of the tax advantages -- 7.2.1.7. The efforts to recover the aid may be too costly if nothing is able to be recovered -- 7.2.1.8. Fines may apply in the case of disregarding the Commission's decisions -- 7.2.1.9. The time frame to implement the Commission's decision is too short -- 7.2.2. Challenges for the recipients of the State aid -- 7.2.2.1. Access to information -- 7.2.2.2. Inapplicability of the statute of limitation in tax cases -- 7.2.2.3. The principle of protection of legitimate expectations is not actually protecting the recipients -- 7.2.2.4. Payment of interest -- 7.2.2.5. The potential recipients have no rights during the preliminary examination -- 7.2.2.6. Participation in the formal investigation procedure is costly -- 7.2.2.7. Limited participation in the judicial proceedings -- 7.2.2.8. The possibility to obtain temporary suspension of the recovery is limited -- 7.2.2.9. Deggendorf principle -- 7.2.2.10. Liability of the EU Member State should also be addressed as tax incentives are a tool to promote development -- 7.2.3. Challenges for the EU Commission -- 7.2.3.1. The recovery decision is problematic -- 7.2.3.2. State aid provisions and tax planning -- 7.2.3.3. State aid provisions do not work the same in tax cases -- 7.2.3.4. Judicial review -- 7.2.3.5. Surpassing its competence -- 7.3. Conclusion -- Chapter 8: Tax Rulings: Uncertain Certainty -- 8.1. Introduction -- 8.2. Concept of tax rulings -- 8.2.1. Definition -- 8.2.2. Characteristics -- 8.2.3. Benefits and drawbacks -- 8.2.4. Tax rulings vs. tax incentives -- 8.3. Tax rulings and harmful tax competition -- 8.3.1. OECD -- 8.3.2. European Union.

8.3.3. EU State aid investigations.

This book analyses selected tax incentives that are commonly promoted by both developed and developing states, particularly those tax incentives that are of relevance to corporate income taxation.

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Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, Michigan : ProQuest Ebook Central, 2024. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest Ebook Central affiliated libraries.

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