Performance-Based Contracts (PBC) for Improving Utilities Efficiency.

Cover -- Copyright -- Contents -- Principal Authors -- Contributing Authors -- Preface -- Chapter 1: Performance-based contracts - setting the scene -- 1.1 Introduction - PBCs and PPPs -- 1.1.1 Specificity of PBCs -- 1.1.2 Legal framework -- 1.1.3 Designing a PBC -- 1.2 References -- Chapter 2: PBC and results-based financing: The inverse approach -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.2 The Direct Problem -- 2.3 The Inverse Problem -- 2.4 Case Study -- 2.5 Conclusion -- 2.6 References -- Chapter 3: PBC and energy efficiency -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 Energy Savings from Pumping -- 3.3 Other Energy Efficiency (EE) Possibilities -- 3.4 Performance-Based Contracts For Energy Efficiency -- 3.5 Designing and Implementing an EE Performance-Based Contract -- 3.6 Case Studies -- 3.6.1 Yerevan (Armenia) -- 3.6.2 Emfuleni (South Africa) -- 3.6.3 Larger contracts including an EE performance based component -- 3.6.4 Milwaukee -- 3.6.5 Lynn -- 3.7 References -- Chapter 4: Internal performance contracts: A case of the National Water and Sewerage Corporation in Uganda -- 4.1 Introduction: Why this Chapter? -- 4.2 IPCs at NWSC: Identity Card -- 4.3 Prerequisites for IPC Successful Implementation: Strong Foundations and Competition with the Private Sector -- 4.4 IPCs: An Integral Part of an Organisational Structure, A Management Style and an Organisational Culture -- 4.4.1 Key 1: Making managers accountable -- 4.4.2 Key 2: Motivate the staff -- 4.4.3 Key 3: Monitor and evaluate performance -- 4.4.4 Key 4: Manage resistance to change -- 4.5 IPCs: Only Constant is Change -- 4.5.1 Find the right balance between individual and collective incentive mechanism -- 4.5.2 Adjust the definition of performance over time -- 4.5.3 Find the right balance between control and confidence -- 4.5.4 Keep motivation high -- 4.6 Conclusion -- 4.7 Note -- 4.8 References.

Chapter 5: Performance-based service contracts in Navi Mumbai -- 5.1 Overview -- 5.1.1 Context -- 5.1.2 Current service delivery -- 5.1.3 Water supply management -- 5.2 The Performance-Based Contract Design -- 5.2.1 Overall nature of the PBC -- 5.2.2 Analysis of the contract structure -- 5.2.3 The procurement process -- 5.2.4 Performance monitoring -- 5.3 Implementation and Results Achieved -- 5.3.1 Results achieved -- 5.3.2 Sustainability -- 5.4 Lessons Drawn -- 5.5 References -- Chapter 6: Financial comparison of NRW PBCs and conventional NRW projects -- 6.1 Introduction -- 6.2 Methodology -- 6.3 Results -- 6.3.1 Project effectiveness -- 6.3.2 Project cost efficiency -- 6.3.3 Financial comparison -- 6.4 Conclusions -- Chapter 7: Tegucigalpa PBC case study -- 7.1 Context: How The PBC Came About -- 7.2 The Design of The PBC -- 7.2.1 Overall nature of the PBC -- 7.2.2 Analysis of the contract structure -- 7.2.3 The procurement/tender process -- 7.3 Implementation and Results Achieved -- 7.4 Lessons Drawn -- 7.5 References -- Chapter 8: Performance-based contracts - key design Issues -- 8.1 Introduction -- 8.2 Activities where PBCs are Typically Used -- 8.3 External Factors that can Influence Design of the Contract -- 8.4 Parties to the Contract -- 8.5 Scope of the Contract and PBC Contractor Obligations -- 8.6 Obligations of the Contracting Authority -- 8.6.1 Monitoring and supervision -- 8.6.2 Duration and sustainability of contract -- 8.6.3 Fees and incentives -- 8.6.4 Dispute resolution -- 8.6.5 Early termination -- 8.6.6 Procurement -- 8.7 Acknowledgements -- 8.8 Other Resources -- Chapter 9: NRW reduction optimization framework -- 9.1 Introduction -- 9.2 Optimizing Physical Losses -- 9.2.1 The point at which physical losses are optimized -- 9.2.2 Deriving the supply curve for physical loss reduction.

9.2.3 The various benefits of physical loss reduction -- 9.2.4 Estimating the value of deferred capital costs -- 9.3 Optimizing for Service -- 9.3.1 The interaction between physical losses and hours of supply -- 9.3.2 Valuing benefits from increased duration of supply and increased access -- 9.4 Optimizing Commercial Losses -- 9.5 A General Optimization Framework -- 9.6 Conclusions -- 9.7 Note -- 9.8 References -- Chapter 10: How to improve water services performance -- 10.1 Introduction -- 10.2 A Strong Water and Sanitation Governance -- 10.3 A Smart PBC Design -- 10.3.1 Baselines, targets and incentives -- 10.3.2 Ensure mitigation of risks and leave room for flexibility -- 10.3.3 Develop an integrated approach -- 10.4 A Resilient Economic Model -- 10.4.1 Enhanced financial sustainability -- 10.4.2 A sustainable territorial anchorage -- 10.5 Conclusion -- 10.6 References -- Chapter 11: Performance-based contracts (PBC) and regulatory issues -- 11.1 Background -- 11.2 Monitoring and Evaluating Utilities -- 11.2.1 Building information systems with key performance indicators (KPIs) that enable regulators to monitor, and evaluate operators -- 11.2.2 Setting performance targets and monitoring performance with limited data -- 11.2.3 Developing incentives for quality improvements, cost containment and network/service expansion -- Chapter 12: Peer-to-peer partnerships operational for sustainable water services -- 12.1 Introduction -- 12.2 The Water Operator Partnership -- 12.3 Components of an Operational Partnership -- 12.3.1 Preparing a WOP -- 12.3.2 Incentives: yes or no? -- 12.3.3 Priority setting in performance improvement -- 12.3.4 Conditional factors for WOP success -- 12.4 Summary and Recommendations -- 12.5 References -- Chapter 13: Performance-based contracts in Malawi: Teamwork works -- 13.1 The Context: How the PBC Came About.

13.2 The Design of the PBC -- 13.2.1 Overall nature of the PBC -- 13.2.2 What is the PBC about? -- 13.3 Performance Contract Design -- 13.3.1 Services to be provided -- 13.3.2 The remuneration structure -- 13.3.3 Performance regime: a "stick and carrot" approach -- 13.4 The Procurement/Tender Process -- 13.4.1 The pre-qualification stage -- 13.4.2 The proposal stage -- 13.5 Implementation and Results Achieved -- 13.5.1 The "office" phase -- 13.5.2 The "operations" phase -- 13.5.3 The extension phase -- 13.5.4 Remuneration -- 13.6 Did the Contract Achieve and Sustain Results? -- 13.6.1 Internalities -- 13.6.2 Externalities -- 13.7 Reflections on Performance-Based Service Contracting -- 13.8 Acknowledgements -- 13.9 References -- Chapter 14: Performance-based affermage contracts -- 14.1 The Basics of the Affermage Contract -- 14.2 Differences and Similarities Between the Affermage and Other Operations Contracts -- 14.3 Affermage Contracts from the 19th Century Until Today In France -- 14.4 The Way to a Second Generation of Affermage Contracts -- 14.5 The Performance-Based Affermage (PBA) Model -- 14.6 The Earning Logic -- 14.7 Technical Performance Indicators -- 14.8 Financial Performance Indicators -- 14.9 Case Study: The Sedif -- 14.10 Sedif: Return of Experience 2011-2013 -- 14.11 Conclusion -- 14.12 References -- Chapter 15: Performance-based contracts, the Aroona Integrated Alliance experience -- 15.1 Case Study Detail -- 15.1.1 The Aroona Integrated Alliance to deliver improvements in water and wastewater services -- 15.1.2 A commercial framework set up to generate the right behaviour -- 15.1.3 Alliance governance -- 15.1.4 The "good to great" strategy to deliver a step change -- 15.1.5 A governance model is in place to ensure business improvements are sustainable.

15.1.6 A Business improvement program designed to deliver sustainable cost efficiencies -- 15.1.7 The cultural and the change management challenge -- 15.1.8 Main achievements two years after the Good to Great strategy inception -- 15.2 Conclusion -- Chapter 16: Experience from Eastern Europe -- Chapter 17: Performance-based contracts (PBCs) for improving utilities efficiency: Experiences and perspectives: The way forward and perspectives/trends -- 17.1 Summary of Discussions of 31 October 2016 -- Index.

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Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, Michigan : ProQuest Ebook Central, 2024. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest Ebook Central affiliated libraries.