Agency and Deontic Logic.

Intro -- Contents -- 1 Overview -- 2 Indeterminism and agency -- 2.1 Branching time -- 2.1.1 Frames and models -- 2.1.2 Propositions -- 2.2 Individual agency -- 2.2.1 Agents and choices -- 2.2.2 Stit operators -- 2.2.3 Some logical considerations -- 2.3 Individual ability -- 2.3.1 Kenny's objections -- 2.3.2 Brown's theory -- 2.3.3 Refraining and ability -- 2.4 Group agency and ability -- 2.4.1 Group actions -- 2.4.2 A group agency operator -- 3 Ought to be -- 3.1 The standard theory -- 3.2 A utilitarian theory -- 3.2.1 General models -- 3.2.2 Utilitarian models -- 3.2.3 Logic of the utilitarian ought -- 3.3 The Meinong/Chisholm analysis -- 3.3.1 The analysis -- 3.3.2 Some logical features -- 3.4 Evaluating the analysis -- 3.4.1 Agency in the complement -- 3.4.2 The gambling problem -- 4 Ought to do -- 4.1 Dominance -- 4.1.1 Ordering the propositions -- 4.1.2 A sure-thing argument -- 4.1.3 Ordering the actions -- 4.2 Dominance act utilitarianism -- 4.2.1 Optimal actions -- 4.2.2 The finite choice condition -- 4.3 A new deontic operator -- 4.3.1 The definition -- 4.3.2 Deontic logic and act utilitarianism -- 4.3.3 Logic of the dominance ought -- 4.4 Independence -- 4.4.1 Independence and conditionals -- 4.4.2 Conditionals and sure-thing reasoning -- 4.4.3 Refining the analysis -- 5 Conditional oughts -- 5.1 Conditionally optimal actions -- 5.2 A conditional ought operator -- 5.2.1 The definition -- 5.2.2 Some logical considerations -- 5.3 Two patterns of argument -- 5.3.1 The action argument -- 5.3.2 The ought argument -- 5.4 Orthodox act utilitarianism -- 5.4.1 An example -- 5.4.2 The definition -- 5.4.3 An orthodox deontic operator -- 6 Group oughts -- 6.1 Optimal group actions -- 6.2 Individual and group act utilitarianism -- 6.3 Deontic operators for group oughts -- 6.3.1 Definitions -- 6.3.2 Some logical points -- 6.4 Rule utilitarianism.

6.4.1 Formulating the theory -- 6.4.2 Act and rule utilitarianism -- 7 Strategic oughts -- 7.1 Strategies -- 7.1.1 Basic ideas -- 7.1.2 Limiting the range -- 7.2 Strategies and choices -- 7.2.1 Agency -- 7.2.2 Ability -- 7.3 Strategic dominance and optimality -- 7.3.1 Dominance -- 7.3.2 Optimality -- 7.4 A strategic ought operator -- 7.4.1 The definition -- 7.4.2 Logical points -- 7.4.3 Actualism and possibilism -- A: Proofs of validities and propositions -- A.1 Validities -- A.2 Propositions -- Bibliography -- Index -- A -- B -- C -- D -- E -- F -- G -- H -- I -- J -- K -- L -- M -- N -- O -- P -- R -- S -- T -- U -- V -- W -- X -- Z.

This original new work develops deontic logic against the background of a theory of agency in indeterministic time. The goal is to present a formal account of what individuals and groups of agents ought to do under various conditions and over extended periods of time.

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Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, Michigan : ProQuest Ebook Central, 2024. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest Ebook Central affiliated libraries.