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International and EU Tax Multilateralism : Challenges Raised by the MLI.

By: Material type: TextTextPublisher: Amsterdam : IBFD Publications USA, Incorporated, 2020Copyright date: ©2020Edition: 1st edDescription: 1 online resource (337 pages)Content type:
  • text
Media type:
  • computer
Carrier type:
  • online resource
ISBN:
  • 9789087226664
Subject(s): Genre/Form: Additional physical formats: Print version:: International and EU Tax Multilateralism: Challenges Raised by the MLIDDC classification:
  • 341.484
LOC classification:
  • K4475 .I584 2020
Online resources:
Contents:
Cover -- Title -- Copyright -- Introduction: International Tax Multilateralism or Reinforced Unilateralism? -- 0.1. Multilateralism vs unilateralism -- 0.2. In this book -- Part I: Multilateralism in International Tax Law -- Chapter 1: Substantive Multilateralism in the Context of the MLI -- 1.1. Introduction -- 1.2. Substantive multilateralism: International relations approach -- 1.3. Substantive multilateralism: Public international law approach -- 1.4. Substantive multilateralism in action: A clear example in the law of the sea -- 1.4.1. Multilateral consensus in the LOSC -- 1.4.2. The prohibition of reservations in the LOSC -- 1.4.3. The binding dispute resolution mechanism -- 1.4.4. Subsequent amendments of the multilateral convention -- 1.5. Assessment of the MLI in light of substantive multilateralism -- 1.5.1. Is the MLI heading towards customary international law in anti-avoidance matters? -- 1.5.2. Does the MLI's flexibility undermine consensus? -- 1.5.3. Is the consensus shielded from national interference? -- 1.6. Conclusion -- Part II: The EU Multilateralism -- Chapter 2: Is There a Role for Multilateralism Regarding the Euro in the EMU? -- 2.1. Introduction -- 2.1.1. Preliminary note of caution -- 2.1.2. The function of the EMU and multilateralism -- 2.2. Running a common currency like an internal market -- 2.3. The defects of continued national decision-making -- 2.3.1. Deficiencies in the decision-making procedure of the ESM -- 2.3.2. Deficiencies in the size of the rescue mechanism of the ESM -- 2.3.3. Absence of a common economic policy -- 2.3.4. Absence of a separate and independent budget -- 2.4. Remedies for improving the current institutional setup -- 2.4.1. The list of reforms -- 2.4.2. Establishing a central decision-making authority for an economic policy on the euro -- 2.4.3. A separate and independent budget.
2.4.4. Separate and independent financing of euro budget by uniform euro taxes -- 2.5. No taxation without representation -- 2.5.1. The institutional condition: No taxation without representation -- 2.5.2. The shift in mindset regarding the European Economic Union -- 2.6. Conclusion: Take it or leave it, no free riders -- Chapter 3: The European Union and Tax Good Governance in a Multilateral Environment -- 3.1. Introduction -- 3.2. Linking -- 3.3. Development cooperat -- 3.4. International tax initia -- 3.5. Conclusion -- Chapter 4: Binding Coordination in the European Union: Status Quo and Ideas for a Brighter Future -- 4.1. Introduction -- 4.2. Tax coordination in the EU: Status quo -- 4.2.1. The effects of global tax coordination on EU Member States -- 4.2.2. Recent instances of attempted binding coordination at the EU level -- 4.2.2.1. ATAD -- 4.2.2.2. Taxation of the digital economy -- 4.2.2.3. CC(C)TB -- 4.3. Issues affecting the ATAD -- 4.3.1. Policy issues -- 4.3.1.1. Overview -- 4.3.1.2. Outbound and inbound transfers -- 4.3.1.3. Controlled foreign company legislation -- 4.3.2. Possible conflicts with tax treaties concluded between Member States and third countries -- 4.3.2.1. General issues -- 4.3.2.2. Possible conflicts between the ATAD and previously concluded tax treaties: Hybrid mismatch rules -- 4.3.2.2.1. Overview -- 4.3.2.2.2. Disregarded permanent establishments -- 4.3.2.2.3. Hybrid payments -- 4.4. Better coordination at the EU level: The ATRiD proposal -- 4.4.1. General outline of the ATRiD -- 4.4.1.1. Reasons compelling coordination/harmonization within the EU -- 4.4.1.2. Why a Directive on the Allocation of Taxing Rights (ATRiD) is the right means to achieve coordination/harmonization within the European Union -- 4.4.1.3. The scope and substantive provisions of the ATRiD.
4.4.1.3.1. General scheme and scope of application of the ATRiD -- 4.4.1.3.2. Interpretation of the ATRiD -- 4.4.1.3.3. Tax residence and exit tax -- 4.4.1.3.4. Sourcing rules and definitions -- 4.4.1.3.5. General rules on the allocation of taxing rights -- 4.4.1.3.6. Rules on the allocation of taxing rights for intra-EU income flows -- 4.4.2. Effect of the ATRiD on the external competence of the EU to conclude tax treaties -- 4.4.3. A model for the tax treaties to be concluded by the EU with third countries -- 4.4.3.1. General structure of EU tax treaties with third countries -- 4.4.3.2. Double taxation relief -- 4.4.3.3. Exit taxation, CFC rules and hybrid mismatches -- 4.4.3.4. MAP and binding arbitration clauses -- 4.4.3.5. Final provision -- 4.5. Conclusions -- Part III: MLI Signatories and the Inclusive Framework -- Chapter 5: Unveiling the MLI: An Analysis of Its Nature, Relationship to Covered Tax Agreements and Interpretation in Light of the Obligations of Its Parties -- 5.1. Introduction -- 5.2. The nature of the MLI in light of the obligations of its parties -- 5.2.1. Conceptual framework: Different meanings of multilateralism -- 5.2.2. MLI and substantive multilateralism -- 5.2.2.1. Purpose of the MLI -- 5.2.2.2. Decision-making processes leading to the MLI -- 5.2.3. MLI and minimalist multilateralism -- 5.2.3.1. Subsequent bilateral amendments to the tax treaties modified by the MLI -- 5.2.3.2. Subsequent bilateral amendments and minimum standards -- 5.2.4. MLI and coordination of international tax rules -- 5.2.4.1. Coordination versus flexibility -- 5.2.4.2. Reservations and their limits -- 5.2.4.3. Other instruments of flexibility -- 5.3. The relationship between the MLI and Covered Tax Agreements and its role in identifying the parties' obligations vis-à-vis each other -- 5.3.1. Key determinants -- 5.3.2. Compatibility clauses.
5.3.3. The MLI as a lex posterior, lex specialis or subsequent agreement to the Covered Tax Agreement in the meaning of article 31(3)(b) of the VCLT? -- 5.3.3.1. Lex posterior and lex specialis as an alternative solution? -- 5.3.3.2. MLI as a subsequent agreement in the meaning of article 31(3)(b) of the VCLT? -- 5.3.4. Interpreting the MLI: Definitions, article 2(2) of the MLI and the context of the MLI -- 5.3.5. Interpretation as key to solving the relationship conundrum -- 5.4. Conclusions -- Chapter 6: Obligations to MLI Non-Signatories within the Inclusive Framework -- 6.1. Introduction -- 6.2. The Inclusive Framework -- 6.2.1. The introduction of the Inclusive Framework -- 6.2.2. The commitments under the Inclusive Framework -- 6.2.3. Problems for developing countries under the Inclusive Framework -- 6.3. The Multilateral Instrument under the BEPS Project -- 6.3.1. The Multilateral Instrument: Some features -- 6.3.2. Why should a country refrain from signing the Multilateral Instrument? -- 6.3.3. The overlap between MLI signatories and members of the Inclusive Framework: identifying the MLI non-signatories -- 6.4. Minimum standards under Action 6: Monitoring the implementation phase -- 6.4.1. What are the minimum standards under Action 6? -- 6.4.2. What guidance is provided for the peer review process? -- 6.4.3. Monitoring the implementation phase of the minimum standards of Action 6 -- 6.5. Conclusion -- Part IV: Interpretation of the MLI and Implementation Issues -- Chapter 7: Multilateralism and International Tax Law: The Interpretation of Tax Treaties in Light of the Multilateral Instrument -- 7.1. Introduction -- 7.2. The Preamble of the MLI -- 7.3. The starting point of interpretation -- 7.4. Identification of the provision that has to be interpreted.
7.5. Article 2(2) of the MLI and article 3(2) of the OECD Model, particularly regarding the concept of "context" -- 7.5.1. General issues -- 7.5.2. Context -- 7.6. The conference of the parties -- 7.7. Authentic language of the Multilateral Instrument and tax treaties -- 7.8. Nature of Explanatory Statements -- 7.9. The relation between the MLI, the OECD Commentaries and BEPS Reports -- 7.10. Reservations to the MLI -- 7.11. Influence of the MLI on non-Covered Tax Agreements -- 7.12. Conclusion -- Chapter 8: The Multilateral Instrument and Asymmetric Choices under Articles 12-15 on PE Threshold -- 8.1. Background -- 8.2. Problems to be tackled -- 8.3. Solutions for a lower PE threshold included in the MLI for existing DTTs -- 8.4. Asymmetry arising from covered tax agreements, options, notifications and reservations -- 8.5. Concluding remarks on the extent of multilateralism in respect of PE threshold -- Part V: Implementation of the Principal Purpose Testand the Limitation on Benefit Clauses -- Chapter 9: From the Guiding Principle to the Principal Purpose Test: Burden of Proof and Legal Consequences -- 9.1. Introduction -- 9.2. The guiding principle as tax treaty anti-avoidance rules in the pre-MLI world and the principal purpose test in the MLI -- 9.3. Similar features of general anti-avoidance rules (GAARs) -- 9.4. Burden of proof -- 9.5. The legal consequences of the PPT rule -- 9.6. Conclusions -- Chapter 10: Implementation and Application of the LOB Clause in BEPS Action 6/MLI: Legal and Pragmatic Challenges -- 10.1. Introduction -- 10.2. The strategic advantage of the PPT over the MLI's LOB clause in preventing treaty abuse and meeting the minimum standard -- 10.2.1. The scope of the PPT in comparison to the MLI's LOB clause -- 10.2.2. Interrelations between the PPT and the MLI's LOB clause.
10.2.3. Extensive language, technical complexity, and not much administrative discretion.
Summary: A comprehensive discussion of the meaning of multilateralism in international taxation, as well as the impact of the BEPS Project in the move towards international tax multilateralism.
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Cover -- Title -- Copyright -- Introduction: International Tax Multilateralism or Reinforced Unilateralism? -- 0.1. Multilateralism vs unilateralism -- 0.2. In this book -- Part I: Multilateralism in International Tax Law -- Chapter 1: Substantive Multilateralism in the Context of the MLI -- 1.1. Introduction -- 1.2. Substantive multilateralism: International relations approach -- 1.3. Substantive multilateralism: Public international law approach -- 1.4. Substantive multilateralism in action: A clear example in the law of the sea -- 1.4.1. Multilateral consensus in the LOSC -- 1.4.2. The prohibition of reservations in the LOSC -- 1.4.3. The binding dispute resolution mechanism -- 1.4.4. Subsequent amendments of the multilateral convention -- 1.5. Assessment of the MLI in light of substantive multilateralism -- 1.5.1. Is the MLI heading towards customary international law in anti-avoidance matters? -- 1.5.2. Does the MLI's flexibility undermine consensus? -- 1.5.3. Is the consensus shielded from national interference? -- 1.6. Conclusion -- Part II: The EU Multilateralism -- Chapter 2: Is There a Role for Multilateralism Regarding the Euro in the EMU? -- 2.1. Introduction -- 2.1.1. Preliminary note of caution -- 2.1.2. The function of the EMU and multilateralism -- 2.2. Running a common currency like an internal market -- 2.3. The defects of continued national decision-making -- 2.3.1. Deficiencies in the decision-making procedure of the ESM -- 2.3.2. Deficiencies in the size of the rescue mechanism of the ESM -- 2.3.3. Absence of a common economic policy -- 2.3.4. Absence of a separate and independent budget -- 2.4. Remedies for improving the current institutional setup -- 2.4.1. The list of reforms -- 2.4.2. Establishing a central decision-making authority for an economic policy on the euro -- 2.4.3. A separate and independent budget.

2.4.4. Separate and independent financing of euro budget by uniform euro taxes -- 2.5. No taxation without representation -- 2.5.1. The institutional condition: No taxation without representation -- 2.5.2. The shift in mindset regarding the European Economic Union -- 2.6. Conclusion: Take it or leave it, no free riders -- Chapter 3: The European Union and Tax Good Governance in a Multilateral Environment -- 3.1. Introduction -- 3.2. Linking -- 3.3. Development cooperat -- 3.4. International tax initia -- 3.5. Conclusion -- Chapter 4: Binding Coordination in the European Union: Status Quo and Ideas for a Brighter Future -- 4.1. Introduction -- 4.2. Tax coordination in the EU: Status quo -- 4.2.1. The effects of global tax coordination on EU Member States -- 4.2.2. Recent instances of attempted binding coordination at the EU level -- 4.2.2.1. ATAD -- 4.2.2.2. Taxation of the digital economy -- 4.2.2.3. CC(C)TB -- 4.3. Issues affecting the ATAD -- 4.3.1. Policy issues -- 4.3.1.1. Overview -- 4.3.1.2. Outbound and inbound transfers -- 4.3.1.3. Controlled foreign company legislation -- 4.3.2. Possible conflicts with tax treaties concluded between Member States and third countries -- 4.3.2.1. General issues -- 4.3.2.2. Possible conflicts between the ATAD and previously concluded tax treaties: Hybrid mismatch rules -- 4.3.2.2.1. Overview -- 4.3.2.2.2. Disregarded permanent establishments -- 4.3.2.2.3. Hybrid payments -- 4.4. Better coordination at the EU level: The ATRiD proposal -- 4.4.1. General outline of the ATRiD -- 4.4.1.1. Reasons compelling coordination/harmonization within the EU -- 4.4.1.2. Why a Directive on the Allocation of Taxing Rights (ATRiD) is the right means to achieve coordination/harmonization within the European Union -- 4.4.1.3. The scope and substantive provisions of the ATRiD.

4.4.1.3.1. General scheme and scope of application of the ATRiD -- 4.4.1.3.2. Interpretation of the ATRiD -- 4.4.1.3.3. Tax residence and exit tax -- 4.4.1.3.4. Sourcing rules and definitions -- 4.4.1.3.5. General rules on the allocation of taxing rights -- 4.4.1.3.6. Rules on the allocation of taxing rights for intra-EU income flows -- 4.4.2. Effect of the ATRiD on the external competence of the EU to conclude tax treaties -- 4.4.3. A model for the tax treaties to be concluded by the EU with third countries -- 4.4.3.1. General structure of EU tax treaties with third countries -- 4.4.3.2. Double taxation relief -- 4.4.3.3. Exit taxation, CFC rules and hybrid mismatches -- 4.4.3.4. MAP and binding arbitration clauses -- 4.4.3.5. Final provision -- 4.5. Conclusions -- Part III: MLI Signatories and the Inclusive Framework -- Chapter 5: Unveiling the MLI: An Analysis of Its Nature, Relationship to Covered Tax Agreements and Interpretation in Light of the Obligations of Its Parties -- 5.1. Introduction -- 5.2. The nature of the MLI in light of the obligations of its parties -- 5.2.1. Conceptual framework: Different meanings of multilateralism -- 5.2.2. MLI and substantive multilateralism -- 5.2.2.1. Purpose of the MLI -- 5.2.2.2. Decision-making processes leading to the MLI -- 5.2.3. MLI and minimalist multilateralism -- 5.2.3.1. Subsequent bilateral amendments to the tax treaties modified by the MLI -- 5.2.3.2. Subsequent bilateral amendments and minimum standards -- 5.2.4. MLI and coordination of international tax rules -- 5.2.4.1. Coordination versus flexibility -- 5.2.4.2. Reservations and their limits -- 5.2.4.3. Other instruments of flexibility -- 5.3. The relationship between the MLI and Covered Tax Agreements and its role in identifying the parties' obligations vis-à-vis each other -- 5.3.1. Key determinants -- 5.3.2. Compatibility clauses.

5.3.3. The MLI as a lex posterior, lex specialis or subsequent agreement to the Covered Tax Agreement in the meaning of article 31(3)(b) of the VCLT? -- 5.3.3.1. Lex posterior and lex specialis as an alternative solution? -- 5.3.3.2. MLI as a subsequent agreement in the meaning of article 31(3)(b) of the VCLT? -- 5.3.4. Interpreting the MLI: Definitions, article 2(2) of the MLI and the context of the MLI -- 5.3.5. Interpretation as key to solving the relationship conundrum -- 5.4. Conclusions -- Chapter 6: Obligations to MLI Non-Signatories within the Inclusive Framework -- 6.1. Introduction -- 6.2. The Inclusive Framework -- 6.2.1. The introduction of the Inclusive Framework -- 6.2.2. The commitments under the Inclusive Framework -- 6.2.3. Problems for developing countries under the Inclusive Framework -- 6.3. The Multilateral Instrument under the BEPS Project -- 6.3.1. The Multilateral Instrument: Some features -- 6.3.2. Why should a country refrain from signing the Multilateral Instrument? -- 6.3.3. The overlap between MLI signatories and members of the Inclusive Framework: identifying the MLI non-signatories -- 6.4. Minimum standards under Action 6: Monitoring the implementation phase -- 6.4.1. What are the minimum standards under Action 6? -- 6.4.2. What guidance is provided for the peer review process? -- 6.4.3. Monitoring the implementation phase of the minimum standards of Action 6 -- 6.5. Conclusion -- Part IV: Interpretation of the MLI and Implementation Issues -- Chapter 7: Multilateralism and International Tax Law: The Interpretation of Tax Treaties in Light of the Multilateral Instrument -- 7.1. Introduction -- 7.2. The Preamble of the MLI -- 7.3. The starting point of interpretation -- 7.4. Identification of the provision that has to be interpreted.

7.5. Article 2(2) of the MLI and article 3(2) of the OECD Model, particularly regarding the concept of "context" -- 7.5.1. General issues -- 7.5.2. Context -- 7.6. The conference of the parties -- 7.7. Authentic language of the Multilateral Instrument and tax treaties -- 7.8. Nature of Explanatory Statements -- 7.9. The relation between the MLI, the OECD Commentaries and BEPS Reports -- 7.10. Reservations to the MLI -- 7.11. Influence of the MLI on non-Covered Tax Agreements -- 7.12. Conclusion -- Chapter 8: The Multilateral Instrument and Asymmetric Choices under Articles 12-15 on PE Threshold -- 8.1. Background -- 8.2. Problems to be tackled -- 8.3. Solutions for a lower PE threshold included in the MLI for existing DTTs -- 8.4. Asymmetry arising from covered tax agreements, options, notifications and reservations -- 8.5. Concluding remarks on the extent of multilateralism in respect of PE threshold -- Part V: Implementation of the Principal Purpose Testand the Limitation on Benefit Clauses -- Chapter 9: From the Guiding Principle to the Principal Purpose Test: Burden of Proof and Legal Consequences -- 9.1. Introduction -- 9.2. The guiding principle as tax treaty anti-avoidance rules in the pre-MLI world and the principal purpose test in the MLI -- 9.3. Similar features of general anti-avoidance rules (GAARs) -- 9.4. Burden of proof -- 9.5. The legal consequences of the PPT rule -- 9.6. Conclusions -- Chapter 10: Implementation and Application of the LOB Clause in BEPS Action 6/MLI: Legal and Pragmatic Challenges -- 10.1. Introduction -- 10.2. The strategic advantage of the PPT over the MLI's LOB clause in preventing treaty abuse and meeting the minimum standard -- 10.2.1. The scope of the PPT in comparison to the MLI's LOB clause -- 10.2.2. Interrelations between the PPT and the MLI's LOB clause.

10.2.3. Extensive language, technical complexity, and not much administrative discretion.

A comprehensive discussion of the meaning of multilateralism in international taxation, as well as the impact of the BEPS Project in the move towards international tax multilateralism.

Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources.

Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, Michigan : ProQuest Ebook Central, 2024. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest Ebook Central affiliated libraries.

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