Survival and Consolidation : The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia, 1918-1921.

Intro -- Contents -- Acknowledgments -- Preface -- I Introduction -- 2 "We are not accustomed to waiting": Soviet Russia, the German revolution, and eastern Europe -- 3 Audiatur et altera pars: The Soviets propose peace -- 4 "Concessions to imperialism": Soviet Russia and the Bullitt Mission -- 5 Defence against "disguised intervention": Soviet policy in the Baltic and Poland -- 6 "The Intruder": Soviet Russia and the final months of the Paris peace conference -- 7 "Don't halloo until you're out of the woods": Soviet nationalities policy and the Baltic -- 8 The end of "spontaneous victories": Ukraine, Hungary, and Bessarabia -- 9 The peace of Dorpat: "A dress rehearsal for an agreement with the Entente -- 10 "Co-existence of socialist and capitalist states": The Soviet initiation of peace negotiations with Great Britain -- 11 "We should take Baku": Soviet policy in the Caucasus, 1919-1920 -- 12 "Astoundingly attractive offers": Attempted peace negotiations with Poland -- 13 "A frantic acceleration of the offensive against Poland": Soviet policy in eastern Europe, April-August 1920 -- 14 "The policy of the bayonet, as usual, has broken down": The end of the Polish ephemeron -- 15 Seeking a "substitute for peace": Anglo-Soviet negotiations, May-November 1920 -- 16 Final French failure: The preliminary peace of Riga and the destruction of Wrangel -- 17 "Getting Poland away from the Entente": Soviet-German relations -- 18 "The right to an independent existence": The treaties with Britain, Poland, and Germany -- 19 Federation and alliance: Soviet policy in Southwest Asia, 1920-1921 -- 20 "Not a step further towards the East": The creation of the Far Eastern Republic -- Conclusion -- Notes -- Bibliography -- Index -- A -- B -- C -- D -- E -- F -- G -- H -- I -- J -- K -- L -- M -- N -- O -- P -- R -- S -- T -- U -- V -- W -- Y -- Z.

At a time when the Soviet Union is disintegrating, Richard Debo provides an intriguing and detailed examination of the new political realities that slowly and painfully emerged in eastern Europe out of the chaos left in the wake of the First World War. Revealing the reasons for the victory of Lenin's Bolshevik government in the Russian civil war, Debo demonstrates that Bolshevik political and diplomatic skills were far superior to those of either their indigenous opponents or their many foreign enemies. For much of 1919, enemies of the Soviet government were more interested in fighting each other than the Bolsheviks, and, although foreign powers sought to influence competing anti-Bolshevik generals, they actually contributed little to the defeat of the Red Army. Meanwhile, the Bolsheviks established realistic priorities, formulated flexible policies, and made political sacrifices unimagined by their enemies. As a result they were able to find allies and divide opponents.

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Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, Michigan : ProQuest Ebook Central, 2024. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest Ebook Central affiliated libraries.