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Causality, Interpretation, and the Mind.

By: Material type: TextTextSeries: Oxford Philosophical MonographsPublisher: Oxford : Oxford University Press, Incorporated, 1996Copyright date: ©1996Edition: 1st edDescription: 1 online resource (245 pages)Content type:
  • text
Media type:
  • computer
Carrier type:
  • online resource
ISBN:
  • 9780191519536
Subject(s): Genre/Form: Additional physical formats: Print version:: Causality, Interpretation, and the MindDDC classification:
  • 128/.2
LOC classification:
  • BD418.3.C455 1994
Online resources:
Contents:
Intro -- Acknowledgements -- Contents -- Introduction -- 1. INTERPRETATIONISM -- 1. Interpretation and Interpretationism: Some Preliminaries -- 2. Language and Interpretation -- 3. Thought and Interpretability: Is Interpretability Necessary for Thought? -- 4. Thought and Interpretability: Is Interpretability Sufficient for Thought? -- 5. Constitutive and Non-Constitutive Interpretationism -- 2. ANOMALISM, RATIONALITY, AND PSYCHOPHYSICAL RELATIONS -- 1. The Argument for Anomalism -- 2. Psychological Indeterminacy and Psychophysical Determination -- 3. Anomalism and Supervenience -- 4. Anomalism, Psychophysical Correlations, and Functionalism -- 5. Uncodifiability and Token Correlations -- 6. Conclusions -- 3. CAUSAL THEORIES -- 1. The Basic Argument for a Causal Conception -- 2. Causation and Causal Explanation -- 3. Mentalism and Physicalism -- 4. CAUSALISM AND INTERPRETATIONISM: THE PROBLEM OF COMPATIBILITY -- 1. Incompatibilist Arguments -- 2. Compatibilism, Incompatibilism, and Realism -- 5. VISION AND EXPERIENCE: THE CAUSAL THEORY AND THE DISJUNCTIVE CONCEPTION -- 1. The Causal Theory of Vision -- 2. The Disjunctive Conception of Experience -- 3. An Objection to the Causal Theory -- 4. Compatibilism -- 5. The Conceptual Claim -- 6. Conclusions -- 6. ACTION: CAUSAL THEORIES AND EXPLANATORY RELEVANCE -- 1. Causal Explanation without Correlations -- 2. An Objection: Anomalism and Explanatory Relevance -- 3. Causal Relevance -- 4. Causal Explanatory Relevance -- 5. Causal Explanation and Non-Mental Properties -- 6. Causal Explanation and Mental Properties -- 7. Conclusions -- 8. Strict Laws and Anomalous Monism: A Concluding Note -- References -- Index -- A -- B -- C -- D -- E -- F -- G -- H -- I -- J -- K -- L -- M -- N -- O -- P -- Q -- R -- S -- T -- U -- V -- W.
Summary: William Child examines two central ideas in the philosophy of mind, and argues that (contrary to what many philosophers have thought) an understanding of the mind can and should include both. These are causalism, the idea that causality plays an essential role in our understanding of the mental; and interpretationism, the idea that we can gain an understanding of belief and desire by considering the ascription of attitudes to people on the basis of what they say and do.
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Intro -- Acknowledgements -- Contents -- Introduction -- 1. INTERPRETATIONISM -- 1. Interpretation and Interpretationism: Some Preliminaries -- 2. Language and Interpretation -- 3. Thought and Interpretability: Is Interpretability Necessary for Thought? -- 4. Thought and Interpretability: Is Interpretability Sufficient for Thought? -- 5. Constitutive and Non-Constitutive Interpretationism -- 2. ANOMALISM, RATIONALITY, AND PSYCHOPHYSICAL RELATIONS -- 1. The Argument for Anomalism -- 2. Psychological Indeterminacy and Psychophysical Determination -- 3. Anomalism and Supervenience -- 4. Anomalism, Psychophysical Correlations, and Functionalism -- 5. Uncodifiability and Token Correlations -- 6. Conclusions -- 3. CAUSAL THEORIES -- 1. The Basic Argument for a Causal Conception -- 2. Causation and Causal Explanation -- 3. Mentalism and Physicalism -- 4. CAUSALISM AND INTERPRETATIONISM: THE PROBLEM OF COMPATIBILITY -- 1. Incompatibilist Arguments -- 2. Compatibilism, Incompatibilism, and Realism -- 5. VISION AND EXPERIENCE: THE CAUSAL THEORY AND THE DISJUNCTIVE CONCEPTION -- 1. The Causal Theory of Vision -- 2. The Disjunctive Conception of Experience -- 3. An Objection to the Causal Theory -- 4. Compatibilism -- 5. The Conceptual Claim -- 6. Conclusions -- 6. ACTION: CAUSAL THEORIES AND EXPLANATORY RELEVANCE -- 1. Causal Explanation without Correlations -- 2. An Objection: Anomalism and Explanatory Relevance -- 3. Causal Relevance -- 4. Causal Explanatory Relevance -- 5. Causal Explanation and Non-Mental Properties -- 6. Causal Explanation and Mental Properties -- 7. Conclusions -- 8. Strict Laws and Anomalous Monism: A Concluding Note -- References -- Index -- A -- B -- C -- D -- E -- F -- G -- H -- I -- J -- K -- L -- M -- N -- O -- P -- Q -- R -- S -- T -- U -- V -- W.

William Child examines two central ideas in the philosophy of mind, and argues that (contrary to what many philosophers have thought) an understanding of the mind can and should include both. These are causalism, the idea that causality plays an essential role in our understanding of the mental; and interpretationism, the idea that we can gain an understanding of belief and desire by considering the ascription of attitudes to people on the basis of what they say and do.

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Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, Michigan : ProQuest Ebook Central, 2024. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest Ebook Central affiliated libraries.

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