Anatomy of Victory : Why the United States Triumphed in World War II, Fought to a Stalemate in Korea, Lost in Vietnam, and Failed in Iraq.

Intro -- CONTENTS -- ILLUSTRATIONS -- PREFACE -- ACKNOWLEDGMENTS -- PART I. STRATEGIC ARCHITECTURES: INTRODUCTION -- PART II. WORLD WAR II -- CHAPTER 1. BATTLE OF BRITAIN: Winning by Not Losing -- CHAPTER 2. BATTLE OF THE ATLANTIC: Protecting the Maritime Lifeline -- CHAPTER 3. INVASION OF RUSSIA: Hitler's Strategic Mistake -- CHAPTER 4. BATTLE OF EL ALAMEIN AND OPERATION TORCH: Cracking German Invincibility -- CHAPTER 5. BATTLES OF MIDWAY AND GUADALCANAL: Regaining Initiative in the Pacific -- CHAPTER 6. STRATEGIC BOMBING OFFENSIVE: Breaking German Airpower -- CHAPTER 7. INVASION OF ITALY: Deciding to Fight Somewhere in Europe in 1943 -- CHAPTER 8. D-DAY AND THE BATTLE FOR NORMANDY: Retaking the Continent -- CHAPTER 9. BATTLE FOR THE RHINE: Attacking Germany's Vitals -- CHAPTER 10. BATTLE OF OKINAWA AND THE BOMBING OF JAPAN: Ending the War -- CHAPTER 11. THE STRATEGIC ARCHITECTURES OF WORLD WAR II -- PART III. THE KOREAN WAR -- CHAPTER 12. BATTLE OF THE PUSAN PERIMETER: Getting the Most Out of a Bad Situation -- CHAPTER 13. INCHON-OPERATION CHROMITE: MacArthur's Masterstroke -- CHAPTER 14. CROSSING THE 38TH PARALLEL AND DRIVING NORTH TO THE YALU: The Risks of Overreaching -- CHAPTER 15. OPERATIONS RIPPER AND KILLER: Recovery and Frustration -- CHAPTER 16. THE STRATEGIC ARCHITECTURES OF THE KOREAN WAR -- PART IV. THE VIETNAM WAR -- CHAPTER 17. BATTLE OF THE IA DRANG VALLEY: Not Fighting the Decisive Battle -- CHAPTER 18. BOMBING CAMPAIGN AND HIGH-TECH INITIATIVES: Operations Rolling Thunder and Igloo White-Airpower and Technology Indecisive -- CHAPTER 19. THE PACIFICATION PROGRAM (1967-1968): Failing to Change Behavior -- CHAPTER 20. THE TET OFFENSIVE (1968): Strategic Disaster -- CHAPTER 21. VIETNAMIZATION: Never a Winning Strategy -- CHAPTER 22. THE FINAL YEARS (1969-1975): The Losing Path.

CHAPTER 23. THE STRATEGIC ARCHITECTURES OF THE VIETNAM WAR -- PART V. THE IRAQI WARS -- CHAPTER 24. IRAQI WAR I, PERSIAN GULF WAR: Defeating Saddam, Losing Politically -- CHAPTER 25. IRAQI WAR II, THIRTEEN-YEAR AIR CONFLICT: The Limits of Airpower -- CHAPTER 26. IRAQI WAR III, INVASION OF IRAQ: Winning without an Endgame -- CHAPTER 27. IRAQI WAR IV, THE INSURGENCY AND THE SURGE (2007-2008): Relearning Counterinsurgency -- CHAPTER 28. IRAQI WAR V, THE RISE OF ISIS: A New, More Violent Enemy -- CHAPTER 29. THE STRATEGIC ARCHITECTURES OF THE IRAQI WARS -- PART VI. STRATEGIC ARCHITECTURES: THE ENDGAME -- ACRONYMS AND SELECTED GLOSSARY -- NOTES -- SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY -- INDEX.

This groundbreaking book provides the first systematic comparison of America's modern wars, analyzing how and why the United States has moved from success to failure since WWII. As the United States enters a new period of uncertainty in the world, Caldwell makes the compelling case that leaders must think, plan, and prepare before shooting.

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Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, Michigan : ProQuest Ebook Central, 2024. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest Ebook Central affiliated libraries.