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Cooperative Compliance : A New Approach to Managing Taxpayer Relations.

By: Material type: TextTextSeries: IBFD Doctoral SeriesPublisher: Amsterdam : IBFD Publications USA, Incorporated, 2016Copyright date: ©2016Edition: 1st edDescription: 1 online resource (572 pages)Content type:
  • text
Media type:
  • computer
Carrier type:
  • online resource
ISBN:
  • 9789087223892
Subject(s): Genre/Form: Additional physical formats: Print version:: Cooperative ComplianceDDC classification:
  • 343.04
LOC classification:
  • K4466 .B766 2016
Online resources:
Contents:
Intro -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Table of Contents -- Acknowledgements -- Acronyms and Abbreviations -- Part I Setting the Grounds -- Chapter 1: Introduction -- 1.1. Setting the scene -- 1.2. Subject of the thesis - CC between the tax authorities and the large business taxpayers -- 1.3. Research questions -- 1.4. Scope of the thesis -- 1.5. Limits of the thesis -- 1.6. Methodology of the study -- 1.7. Outline of the thesis -- Chapter 2: Historic Introduction -- 2.1. Introduction -- 2.2. Historical background -- 2.2.1. General remarks -- 2.2.2. Taxpayers - Tax authority cooperation -- 2.3. Compliance models -- 2.3.1. Compliance -- 2.3.2. Responsive regulation -- 2.3.3. Compliance costs -- 2.3.4. Other factors impacting on compliance -- 2.4. The OECD analysis -- 2.4.1. OECD work in the field of an ER/CC -- 2.4.2. Cooperation with banks -- 2.4.3. Report on the Corporate Loss Utilization through Aggressive Tax Planning (the "Corporate Loss Report 2011") -- 2.4.4. OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (2011) -- 2.5. Summary -- Chapter 3: The Levels of Relationship between Taxpayers and the Tax Authorities -- 3.1. Introduction -- 3.2. The basic relationship - Why it is not working, or is it? -- 3.2.1. The basic taxpayer-tax authorities relationship -- 3.2.2. The main objective of the basic relationship -- 3.2.3. Problems that the tax authorities and the taxpayers experience at this level of relationship -- 3.3. Advanced relationship -- 3.3.1. General remarks and the concept of the advanced relationship -- 3.3.2. What is the advance ruling? -- 3.3.2.1. General remarks - Definition -- 3.3.2.2. Who can apply for a ruling? - The objective scope -- 3.3.2.3. For what issues may a ruling be requested? - The subjective scope -- 3.3.2.4. Who issues a ruling? -- 3.3.2.5. Binding effect -- 3.3.2.6. Procedure and time.
3.3.3. How does the system work in countries that already have a type of CC? -- 3.3.3.1. Australia -- 3.3.3.2. Netherlands -- 3.3.3.3. United Kingdom -- 3.3.3.4. United States -- 3.4. Why the basic relationship with the ATR is still not enough -- 3.5. ER/CC -- 3.5.1. Objectives of CC -- 3.6. Conclusions -- Part II Implementation of CC -- Chapter 4: Description of Different Models -- 4.1. Introduction -- 4.2. The OECD Model of CC -- 4.2.1. What is the OECD CC? -- 4.2.2. Why CC should be introduced -- 4.2.2.1. Benefits for a taxpayer -- 4.2.2.2. Benefits for the tax authority -- 4.2.3. How can the CC be introduced? -- 4.2.3.1. Conditions to be met by the tax authorities in the OECD CC -- 4.2.3.2. Conditions to be met by the taxpayer in the OECD CC -- 4.3. Australia -- 4.3.1. Introduction -- 4.3.2. ATO - Structure and tasks -- 4.3.3. What is CC in Australia? -- 4.3.4. Why has CC been introduced? -- 4.3.5. How has CC been introduced? -- 4.3.6. Recapitulation -- 4.4. Netherlands -- 4.4.1. Introduction -- 4.4.2. NTCA - Structure and tasks -- 4.4.3. What is CC in the Netherlands? -- 4.4.4. Why has CC been introduced? -- 4.4.5. How has CC been introduced? -- 4.4.6. Recapitulation -- 4.5. United Kingdom -- 4.5.1. Introduction -- 4.5.2. HMRC -- 4.5.3. What is CC in the United Kingdom? -- 4.5.4. Why has CC been introduced? -- 4.5.5. How has CC been introduced? -- 4.5.6. Recapitulation -- 4.6. United States -- 4.6.1. Introduction -- 4.6.2. US tax authorities -- 4.6.3. What is CC in the United States? -- 4.6.4. Why has CC been introduced? -- 4.6.5. How has CC been introduced? -- 4.6.5.1. Real-time and pre-filing issue resolution -- 4.6.5.2. CAP -- 4.6.5.3. New post-filing examination processes -- 4.6.5.3.1. LIFE as an example of CC in a post-filing environment -- 4.6.6. Summary -- 4.7. Other countries' experiences -- 4.7.1. EU developments in the field of CC.
4.7.2. Other countries' experience -- 4.8. Summary -- Chapter 5: CC - Its Building Blocks and Description -- 5.1. Introduction -- 5.2. The building blocks of CC -- 5.2.1. Hierarchy of the building blocks -- 5.2.2. A successful basic relationship -- 5.2.3. Culture and CC -- 5.2.4. Trust -- 5.2.4.1. Trust as a building block -- 5.2.4.2. Trust in the CC context -- 5.2.4.3. Trust's levels -- 5.2.4.4. Trust as one of the CC pillars -- 5.2.5. Culture translating into political and social acceptance of CC -- 5.2.6. Tax culture -- 5.2.7. Organizational culture -- 5.2.8. Tax authority's readiness -- 5.2.9. Taxpayers' readiness -- 5.2.10. Legal environment -- 5.2.11. Summary -- 5.3. In search of a definition -- 5.3.1. Introduction -- 5.3.2. Description -- 5.3.3. What is CC not? -- 5.3.4. Classification -- 5.3.4.1. Stage of development -- 5.3.4.2. Common versus civil law countries -- 5.3.4.3. Ways in which the aims may be achieved - Different models -- 5.4. Summary -- Part III Theoretical Issues -- Chapter 6: Theoretical Issues - SWOT Analysis -- 6.1. Introduction -- 6.2. Strengths of CC -- 6.2.1. Benefits of CC -- 6.2.1.1. Benefits for taxpayers -- 6.2.1.2. Benefits for the tax authorities -- 6.2.2. Time scope of CC -- 6.2.3. Subjective scope of CC -- 6.2.4. CRM -- 6.2.5. TCF -- 6.2.6. Division of work (no duplication of work) -- 6.2.7. The minimization of use of ATP versus limiting the taxpayer's planning opportunities -- 6.3. Weaknesses of CC -- 6.3.1. Obstacles to the introduction of CC -- 6.3.2. Equality perception -- 6.3.3. Administrative limitations -- 6.3.4. Lack of transparency -- 6.3.5. Fair share concept -- 6.3.6. Lack of sanctions for misbehaviour -- 6.3.7. Performance measurement -- 6.4. Opportunities for CC -- 6.4.1. Management of large taxpayers -- 6.4.2. Corporate governance -- 6.4.3. Tax risk management - Risk rating -- 6.4.4. PR tool.
6.4.5. CSR -- 6.4.6. International CC -- 6.5. Threats to CC -- 6.5.1. Reliance on risk rating -- 6.5.2. Lack of tax expertise and remuneration levels at the tax authorities -- 6.5.3. Implementation -- 6.5.4. Social factors -- 6.5.5. Economic factors - The economic crisis and sustainability of CC -- 6.5.6. Internal governance of the tax authorities -- 6.5.7. Opportunistic behaviour of both parties -- 6.5.8. International tax competition -- 6.6. Summary -- Chapter 7: Theoretical Issues - Legal Analysis -- 7.1. Introduction -- 7.2. Voluntary nature of the cooperation -- 7.3. Written agreement -- 7.4. Rule of law requirements and CC -- 7.4.1. Rule of law -- 7.4.2. Discretionary powers of tax authorities -- 7.4.3. Discretionary powers and CC -- 7.4.4. Meaning of tax avoidance and abuse of law in the CC context -- 7.4.4.1. Abuse of law and tax avoidance in various jurisdictions -- 7.4.4.2. The EU prohibition of the abuse of law -- 7.4.4.3. Tax abuse versus CC -- 7.4.5. Equality principle -- 7.4.5.1. Legal definition of equality -- 7.4.5.2. Equal access to CC -- 7.4.5.3. Summary -- 7.5. Dispute resolution within CC -- 7.5.1. ADR in tax disputes -- 7.5.1.1. Mediation -- 7.5.1.2. Arbitration -- 7.5.1.3. Six ways to reach an agreement in the CC environment -- 7.6. Cancellation of cooperation -- 7.7. Privacy and confidentiality -- 7.7.1. General remarks -- 7.7.2. Privacy and confidentiality -- 7.7.2.1. Netherlands -- 7.7.2.2. United Kingdom -- 7.7.2.3. United States -- 7.8. Professional privilege -- 7.8.1. Legal privilege - General remarks -- 7.8.2. Regulation of the tax profession -- 7.8.2.1. Netherlands -- 7.8.2.2. United Kingdom -- 7.8.2.3. United States -- 7.8.3. Privacy and confidentiality in CC -- 7.9. Criminal proceedings -- 7.10. Exchange of information -- 7.11. Conclusions -- Part IV Possible Implementation of CC in Poland.
Chapter 8: Introducing CC in Poland -- 8.1. Introduction -- 8.2. The Polish tax authorities - Historical and legal context -- 8.2.1. An outline of the history of the Polish tax authorities -- 8.3. Design of the Polish tax authorities -- 8.3.1. General information -- 8.3.1.1. Large taxpayers' offices -- 8.3.1.2. Administrative courts -- 8.3.1.3. A reform of the tax authorities -- 8.3.2. Recapitulation - Are the tax authorities ready for CC? -- 8.4. Culture, trust and economic climate -- 8.5. Basic relationship in Poland -- 8.5.1. Legal framework of the basic relationship between the taxpayers and the tax authorities -- 8.5.2. Measures to advance the basic relationship -- 8.5.2.1. General rulings -- 8.5.2.2. Individual interpretations -- 8.5.2.3. APAs -- 8.5.2.4. Recapitulation -- 8.5.3. Recapitulation - Is the basic relationship a successful and working one? -- 8.6. Taxpayers' readiness -- 8.7. CC in Poland - Feasibility study -- 8.7.1. Framework of CC -- 8.7.1.1. How could CC look? -- 8.7.1.2. Parties to the relationship -- 8.7.1.3. TCF -- 8.7.1.4. CRM within LTO -- 8.7.1.5. Agreement-based cooperation versus normative model -- 8.7.2. Legal environment -- 8.7.2.1. Constitution and GTA -- 8.7.2.2. Regulation of anti-avoidance -- 8.7.2.3. ADR -- 8.7.2.4. Privacy of taxpayer's data -- 8.7.2.5. Confidentiality and professional privilege -- 8.7.3. Mental shift of approach -- 8.8. Conclusions -- Part V Conclusion -- Chapter 9: CC and BEPS -- 9.1. Introduction -- 9.2. Shift towards a global tax transparency -- 9.2.1. What do multinationals do and is it moral? -- 9.2.2. Trust, reputation and fairness -- 9.2.3. A brief history of the shift towards global tax transparency -- 9.2.3.1. Main "players'" actions -- 9.2.3.2. Impact of the climate change on CC -- 9.3. Increased compliance burden resulting from BEPS.
9.3.1. BEPS actions relevant from the CC perspective.
Summary: This book analyses the concept of cooperative compliance, a relatively new style of cooperation between corporate taxpayers and tax authorities.
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Intro -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Table of Contents -- Acknowledgements -- Acronyms and Abbreviations -- Part I Setting the Grounds -- Chapter 1: Introduction -- 1.1. Setting the scene -- 1.2. Subject of the thesis - CC between the tax authorities and the large business taxpayers -- 1.3. Research questions -- 1.4. Scope of the thesis -- 1.5. Limits of the thesis -- 1.6. Methodology of the study -- 1.7. Outline of the thesis -- Chapter 2: Historic Introduction -- 2.1. Introduction -- 2.2. Historical background -- 2.2.1. General remarks -- 2.2.2. Taxpayers - Tax authority cooperation -- 2.3. Compliance models -- 2.3.1. Compliance -- 2.3.2. Responsive regulation -- 2.3.3. Compliance costs -- 2.3.4. Other factors impacting on compliance -- 2.4. The OECD analysis -- 2.4.1. OECD work in the field of an ER/CC -- 2.4.2. Cooperation with banks -- 2.4.3. Report on the Corporate Loss Utilization through Aggressive Tax Planning (the "Corporate Loss Report 2011") -- 2.4.4. OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (2011) -- 2.5. Summary -- Chapter 3: The Levels of Relationship between Taxpayers and the Tax Authorities -- 3.1. Introduction -- 3.2. The basic relationship - Why it is not working, or is it? -- 3.2.1. The basic taxpayer-tax authorities relationship -- 3.2.2. The main objective of the basic relationship -- 3.2.3. Problems that the tax authorities and the taxpayers experience at this level of relationship -- 3.3. Advanced relationship -- 3.3.1. General remarks and the concept of the advanced relationship -- 3.3.2. What is the advance ruling? -- 3.3.2.1. General remarks - Definition -- 3.3.2.2. Who can apply for a ruling? - The objective scope -- 3.3.2.3. For what issues may a ruling be requested? - The subjective scope -- 3.3.2.4. Who issues a ruling? -- 3.3.2.5. Binding effect -- 3.3.2.6. Procedure and time.

3.3.3. How does the system work in countries that already have a type of CC? -- 3.3.3.1. Australia -- 3.3.3.2. Netherlands -- 3.3.3.3. United Kingdom -- 3.3.3.4. United States -- 3.4. Why the basic relationship with the ATR is still not enough -- 3.5. ER/CC -- 3.5.1. Objectives of CC -- 3.6. Conclusions -- Part II Implementation of CC -- Chapter 4: Description of Different Models -- 4.1. Introduction -- 4.2. The OECD Model of CC -- 4.2.1. What is the OECD CC? -- 4.2.2. Why CC should be introduced -- 4.2.2.1. Benefits for a taxpayer -- 4.2.2.2. Benefits for the tax authority -- 4.2.3. How can the CC be introduced? -- 4.2.3.1. Conditions to be met by the tax authorities in the OECD CC -- 4.2.3.2. Conditions to be met by the taxpayer in the OECD CC -- 4.3. Australia -- 4.3.1. Introduction -- 4.3.2. ATO - Structure and tasks -- 4.3.3. What is CC in Australia? -- 4.3.4. Why has CC been introduced? -- 4.3.5. How has CC been introduced? -- 4.3.6. Recapitulation -- 4.4. Netherlands -- 4.4.1. Introduction -- 4.4.2. NTCA - Structure and tasks -- 4.4.3. What is CC in the Netherlands? -- 4.4.4. Why has CC been introduced? -- 4.4.5. How has CC been introduced? -- 4.4.6. Recapitulation -- 4.5. United Kingdom -- 4.5.1. Introduction -- 4.5.2. HMRC -- 4.5.3. What is CC in the United Kingdom? -- 4.5.4. Why has CC been introduced? -- 4.5.5. How has CC been introduced? -- 4.5.6. Recapitulation -- 4.6. United States -- 4.6.1. Introduction -- 4.6.2. US tax authorities -- 4.6.3. What is CC in the United States? -- 4.6.4. Why has CC been introduced? -- 4.6.5. How has CC been introduced? -- 4.6.5.1. Real-time and pre-filing issue resolution -- 4.6.5.2. CAP -- 4.6.5.3. New post-filing examination processes -- 4.6.5.3.1. LIFE as an example of CC in a post-filing environment -- 4.6.6. Summary -- 4.7. Other countries' experiences -- 4.7.1. EU developments in the field of CC.

4.7.2. Other countries' experience -- 4.8. Summary -- Chapter 5: CC - Its Building Blocks and Description -- 5.1. Introduction -- 5.2. The building blocks of CC -- 5.2.1. Hierarchy of the building blocks -- 5.2.2. A successful basic relationship -- 5.2.3. Culture and CC -- 5.2.4. Trust -- 5.2.4.1. Trust as a building block -- 5.2.4.2. Trust in the CC context -- 5.2.4.3. Trust's levels -- 5.2.4.4. Trust as one of the CC pillars -- 5.2.5. Culture translating into political and social acceptance of CC -- 5.2.6. Tax culture -- 5.2.7. Organizational culture -- 5.2.8. Tax authority's readiness -- 5.2.9. Taxpayers' readiness -- 5.2.10. Legal environment -- 5.2.11. Summary -- 5.3. In search of a definition -- 5.3.1. Introduction -- 5.3.2. Description -- 5.3.3. What is CC not? -- 5.3.4. Classification -- 5.3.4.1. Stage of development -- 5.3.4.2. Common versus civil law countries -- 5.3.4.3. Ways in which the aims may be achieved - Different models -- 5.4. Summary -- Part III Theoretical Issues -- Chapter 6: Theoretical Issues - SWOT Analysis -- 6.1. Introduction -- 6.2. Strengths of CC -- 6.2.1. Benefits of CC -- 6.2.1.1. Benefits for taxpayers -- 6.2.1.2. Benefits for the tax authorities -- 6.2.2. Time scope of CC -- 6.2.3. Subjective scope of CC -- 6.2.4. CRM -- 6.2.5. TCF -- 6.2.6. Division of work (no duplication of work) -- 6.2.7. The minimization of use of ATP versus limiting the taxpayer's planning opportunities -- 6.3. Weaknesses of CC -- 6.3.1. Obstacles to the introduction of CC -- 6.3.2. Equality perception -- 6.3.3. Administrative limitations -- 6.3.4. Lack of transparency -- 6.3.5. Fair share concept -- 6.3.6. Lack of sanctions for misbehaviour -- 6.3.7. Performance measurement -- 6.4. Opportunities for CC -- 6.4.1. Management of large taxpayers -- 6.4.2. Corporate governance -- 6.4.3. Tax risk management - Risk rating -- 6.4.4. PR tool.

6.4.5. CSR -- 6.4.6. International CC -- 6.5. Threats to CC -- 6.5.1. Reliance on risk rating -- 6.5.2. Lack of tax expertise and remuneration levels at the tax authorities -- 6.5.3. Implementation -- 6.5.4. Social factors -- 6.5.5. Economic factors - The economic crisis and sustainability of CC -- 6.5.6. Internal governance of the tax authorities -- 6.5.7. Opportunistic behaviour of both parties -- 6.5.8. International tax competition -- 6.6. Summary -- Chapter 7: Theoretical Issues - Legal Analysis -- 7.1. Introduction -- 7.2. Voluntary nature of the cooperation -- 7.3. Written agreement -- 7.4. Rule of law requirements and CC -- 7.4.1. Rule of law -- 7.4.2. Discretionary powers of tax authorities -- 7.4.3. Discretionary powers and CC -- 7.4.4. Meaning of tax avoidance and abuse of law in the CC context -- 7.4.4.1. Abuse of law and tax avoidance in various jurisdictions -- 7.4.4.2. The EU prohibition of the abuse of law -- 7.4.4.3. Tax abuse versus CC -- 7.4.5. Equality principle -- 7.4.5.1. Legal definition of equality -- 7.4.5.2. Equal access to CC -- 7.4.5.3. Summary -- 7.5. Dispute resolution within CC -- 7.5.1. ADR in tax disputes -- 7.5.1.1. Mediation -- 7.5.1.2. Arbitration -- 7.5.1.3. Six ways to reach an agreement in the CC environment -- 7.6. Cancellation of cooperation -- 7.7. Privacy and confidentiality -- 7.7.1. General remarks -- 7.7.2. Privacy and confidentiality -- 7.7.2.1. Netherlands -- 7.7.2.2. United Kingdom -- 7.7.2.3. United States -- 7.8. Professional privilege -- 7.8.1. Legal privilege - General remarks -- 7.8.2. Regulation of the tax profession -- 7.8.2.1. Netherlands -- 7.8.2.2. United Kingdom -- 7.8.2.3. United States -- 7.8.3. Privacy and confidentiality in CC -- 7.9. Criminal proceedings -- 7.10. Exchange of information -- 7.11. Conclusions -- Part IV Possible Implementation of CC in Poland.

Chapter 8: Introducing CC in Poland -- 8.1. Introduction -- 8.2. The Polish tax authorities - Historical and legal context -- 8.2.1. An outline of the history of the Polish tax authorities -- 8.3. Design of the Polish tax authorities -- 8.3.1. General information -- 8.3.1.1. Large taxpayers' offices -- 8.3.1.2. Administrative courts -- 8.3.1.3. A reform of the tax authorities -- 8.3.2. Recapitulation - Are the tax authorities ready for CC? -- 8.4. Culture, trust and economic climate -- 8.5. Basic relationship in Poland -- 8.5.1. Legal framework of the basic relationship between the taxpayers and the tax authorities -- 8.5.2. Measures to advance the basic relationship -- 8.5.2.1. General rulings -- 8.5.2.2. Individual interpretations -- 8.5.2.3. APAs -- 8.5.2.4. Recapitulation -- 8.5.3. Recapitulation - Is the basic relationship a successful and working one? -- 8.6. Taxpayers' readiness -- 8.7. CC in Poland - Feasibility study -- 8.7.1. Framework of CC -- 8.7.1.1. How could CC look? -- 8.7.1.2. Parties to the relationship -- 8.7.1.3. TCF -- 8.7.1.4. CRM within LTO -- 8.7.1.5. Agreement-based cooperation versus normative model -- 8.7.2. Legal environment -- 8.7.2.1. Constitution and GTA -- 8.7.2.2. Regulation of anti-avoidance -- 8.7.2.3. ADR -- 8.7.2.4. Privacy of taxpayer's data -- 8.7.2.5. Confidentiality and professional privilege -- 8.7.3. Mental shift of approach -- 8.8. Conclusions -- Part V Conclusion -- Chapter 9: CC and BEPS -- 9.1. Introduction -- 9.2. Shift towards a global tax transparency -- 9.2.1. What do multinationals do and is it moral? -- 9.2.2. Trust, reputation and fairness -- 9.2.3. A brief history of the shift towards global tax transparency -- 9.2.3.1. Main "players'" actions -- 9.2.3.2. Impact of the climate change on CC -- 9.3. Increased compliance burden resulting from BEPS.

9.3.1. BEPS actions relevant from the CC perspective.

This book analyses the concept of cooperative compliance, a relatively new style of cooperation between corporate taxpayers and tax authorities.

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Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, Michigan : ProQuest Ebook Central, 2024. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest Ebook Central affiliated libraries.

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