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Corporate Finance and Capital Structure : A Theoretical Introduction.

By: Material type: TextTextPublisher: Oxford : Taylor & Francis Group, 2020Copyright date: ©2021Edition: 1st edDescription: 1 online resource (105 pages)Content type:
  • text
Media type:
  • computer
Carrier type:
  • online resource
ISBN:
  • 9781000320497
Subject(s): Genre/Form: Additional physical formats: Print version:: Corporate Finance and Capital StructureDDC classification:
  • 658.15
LOC classification:
  • HG4026 .A835 2021
Online resources:
Contents:
Cover -- Half Title -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Contents -- 1 Introduction -- 1.1 What this book is about -- 1.2 Chapter overview -- 2 Capital structure choice in a frictionless world -- 2.1 Overview -- 2.2 Frictionless capital market -- 2.3 Additivity and uniqueness of security valuation -- 2.4 Neutrality of capital structure -- 2.5 Discussion -- 3 Trade-off theory -- 3.1 Criticism against Modigliani and Miller -- 3.2 Tax benefit of debt and bankruptcy costs -- 3.3 Empirical evidence -- 3.4 Discussion -- 4 Agency theory -- 4.1 Overview -- 4.2 Safe debt can mitigate agency problem -- 4.3 Risky debt can aggravate agency problem -- 4.4 Debt overhang and risk shifting -- 4.5 Discussion -- 5 Security design -- 5.1 Overview -- 5.2 Optimal risk-sharing with moral hazard -- 5.3 Financial contract under limited liability -- 5.4 Financial contract under costly state verification -- 5.5 Optimal allocation of control rights -- 5.6 Discussion -- 6 Asymmetric information -- 6.1 Overview -- 6.2 Underpricing in an initial public offering -- 6.3 Signaling through retained ownership -- 6.4 Signaling through debt -- 6.5 Pecking-order versus trade-off theory -- 6.6 Discussion -- 7 Continuous-time model -- 7.1 Overview -- 7.2 Derivative valuation model -- 7.3 Capital structure irrelevance revisited -- 7.4 Derivative valuation under a stationary case -- 7.5 Trade-off theory revisited -- 7.6 Discussion -- 8 Capital structure of a bank -- 8.1 Two roles of a bank -- 8.2 Bank run and deposit insurance -- 8.3 Unintended consequence of deposit insurance -- 8.4 Capital regulation -- 8.5 Ongoing debate on capital regulation -- 8.6 Discussion -- Index.
Summary: This book discusses several key theories of corporate capital structure to answer how funding structure shapes an institution's value. The author shows how various microeconomic frameworks, such as price and game theories, principal-agent model, and mechanism design, can be applied to solve the optimal capital structure of a firm.
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Cover -- Half Title -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Contents -- 1 Introduction -- 1.1 What this book is about -- 1.2 Chapter overview -- 2 Capital structure choice in a frictionless world -- 2.1 Overview -- 2.2 Frictionless capital market -- 2.3 Additivity and uniqueness of security valuation -- 2.4 Neutrality of capital structure -- 2.5 Discussion -- 3 Trade-off theory -- 3.1 Criticism against Modigliani and Miller -- 3.2 Tax benefit of debt and bankruptcy costs -- 3.3 Empirical evidence -- 3.4 Discussion -- 4 Agency theory -- 4.1 Overview -- 4.2 Safe debt can mitigate agency problem -- 4.3 Risky debt can aggravate agency problem -- 4.4 Debt overhang and risk shifting -- 4.5 Discussion -- 5 Security design -- 5.1 Overview -- 5.2 Optimal risk-sharing with moral hazard -- 5.3 Financial contract under limited liability -- 5.4 Financial contract under costly state verification -- 5.5 Optimal allocation of control rights -- 5.6 Discussion -- 6 Asymmetric information -- 6.1 Overview -- 6.2 Underpricing in an initial public offering -- 6.3 Signaling through retained ownership -- 6.4 Signaling through debt -- 6.5 Pecking-order versus trade-off theory -- 6.6 Discussion -- 7 Continuous-time model -- 7.1 Overview -- 7.2 Derivative valuation model -- 7.3 Capital structure irrelevance revisited -- 7.4 Derivative valuation under a stationary case -- 7.5 Trade-off theory revisited -- 7.6 Discussion -- 8 Capital structure of a bank -- 8.1 Two roles of a bank -- 8.2 Bank run and deposit insurance -- 8.3 Unintended consequence of deposit insurance -- 8.4 Capital regulation -- 8.5 Ongoing debate on capital regulation -- 8.6 Discussion -- Index.

This book discusses several key theories of corporate capital structure to answer how funding structure shapes an institution's value. The author shows how various microeconomic frameworks, such as price and game theories, principal-agent model, and mechanism design, can be applied to solve the optimal capital structure of a firm.

Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources.

Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, Michigan : ProQuest Ebook Central, 2024. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest Ebook Central affiliated libraries.

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