Wittgenstein's Account of Truth.
- 1st ed.
- 1 online resource (165 pages)
- SUNY Series in Philosophy Series .
- SUNY Series in Philosophy Series .
Intro -- Wittgenstein's Account of Truth -- Contents -- Abbreviations -- Preface -- Acknowledgments -- PART I: From "Meaning is Use" to the Rejection of Transcendent Truth -- 1. Wittgenstein's Rejection of Realism versus Semantic Antirealism -- 2. The Positive Account of Truth -- 3. Antirealism Revisited -- PART II: From "Meaning is Use" to Semantic Antirealism -- 4. The Acquisition Argument and the Manifestation Criterion -- 5. Antirealism Presupposes Realism -- 6. Tensions between Wittgenstein and Dummett -- 7. Semantic Antirealism Is Inconsistent -- PART III: Why a Revisionist Account of Truth? -- 8. Criteria and Justification Conditions -- 9. Criteria and Realist Truth Conditions -- 10. Why Criteria Are Not Defeasible -- 11. Criterial Change, Conceptual Change, and Their Implications for the Concept of Truth -- 12. Why a Revisionist Account of Truth? -- Notes -- 1. Wittgenstein's Rejection of Realism versus Semantic Antirealism -- 2. The Positive Account of Truth -- 3. Antirealism Revisited -- Part II. From "Meaning is Use" to Semantic Antirealism -- 4. The Acquisition Argument and the Manifestation Criterion -- 5. Antirealism Presupposes Realism -- 6. Tensions between Wittgenstein and Dummett -- 7. Semantic Antirealism Is Inconsistent -- Part III. Why a Revisionist Account of Truth? -- 8. Criteria and Justification Conditions -- 9. Criteria and Realist Truth Conditions -- 10. Why Criteria Are Not Defeasible -- 11. Criterial Change, Conceptual Change, and Their Implications for the Concept of Truth -- 12. Why a Revisionist Account of Truth? -- Bibliography -- Index -- A -- B -- C -- D -- E -- F -- G -- H -- I -- J -- K -- L -- M -- N -- O -- P -- Q -- R -- S -- T -- U -- V -- W.
Explores the complex nature of truth in Wittgenstein's philosophy.