Gödel, Putnam, and Functionalism : A New Reading of 'Representation and Reality'.
- 1st ed.
- 1 online resource (357 pages)
- A Bradford Book Series .
- A Bradford Book Series .
Intro -- Contents -- Preface -- Introduction -- 1 Putnam's Use of Gödel's Incompleteness Theorems to Refute Computational Functionalism -- 2 Putnam's Bombshell: The Gödelian Argument in ''Reflexive Reflections'' -- 3 Universal Realization of Computation: Putnam's Triviality Argument -- 4 Putnam's Triviality Theorem and Universal Physical Computation -- 5 Searle on Triviality and the Subjective Nature of Computation -- 6 There Are Infinitely Many Computational Realizations of an Arbitrary Intentional State -- 7 Against Local Computational Reduction: The EQUIVALENCE Argument -- 8 Rational Interpretation, Synonymy Determination, and EQUIVALENCE -- 9 The Question of the Nonformalizability of SD, Coreferentiality Decisions, and the Family of Notions: Rational Interpretation1, General Intelligence, and Reasonable Reasoning -- Notes -- Index.
The first systematic examination of Hilary Putnam's arguments against computational functionalism challenges each of Putnam's main arguments.