Intro -- Contents -- 1. Warrant: A First Approximation -- I. Proper Function -- II. The Design Plan -- III. Reliability -- 2. Warrant: Objections and Refinements -- I. The Design Plan -- II. Two Concluding Comments -- 3. Exploring the Design Plan: Myself and My Past -- I. Knowledge of Myself -- II. Memory -- 4. Other Persons and Testimony -- I. Other Persons -- II. Testimony -- 5. Perception -- I. Perceptual Belief as Knowledge -- II. Perceptual Experience -- III. Perceptual Beliefs as Basic -- IV. Perceptual Beliefs Formed on the Basis of Experience -- V. Nature, Nurture, and Perceptual Judgments -- 6. A Priori Knowledge -- I. A Priori Knowledge Initially Characterized -- II. A Priori Knowledge Is Knowledge -- III. Fallibilistic A Priorism -- IV. A Priori Knowledge and the Causal Requirements -- V. Why Propositions Cannot Be Concrete -- VI. Back to the Causal Requirement -- 7. Induction -- I. The Old Riddle of Induction -- II. The New Riddle of Induction -- 8. Epistemic Probability: Some Current Views -- I. Epistemic Probability and Statistical Probability -- II. Theories of Epistemic Probability -- 9. Epistemic Conditional Probability: The Sober Truth -- I. The Two Faces of Epistemic Probability -- II. An Account of the Normative Component -- III. Replies and Comments -- 10. Coherence, Foundations, and Evidence -- I. Coherence and Foundations -- II. Evidentialism -- 11. Naturalism versus Proper Function? -- I. Naturalistic Analyses of Proper Function -- II. So What's a Poor Naturalist to Do? -- 12. Is Naturalism Irrational? -- I. The Problem -- II. Darwin's Doubt -- III. A Preliminary Argument against Naturalism -- IV. The Main Argument Against Naturalism -- Index -- A -- B -- C -- D -- E -- F -- G -- H -- I -- J -- K -- L -- M -- N -- O -- P -- Q -- R -- S -- T -- U -- V -- W -- Z.
9780198024057
Belief and doubt. Cognition. Knowledge, Theory of.