Detection of Nuclear Weapons and Materials.
- 1st ed.
- 1 online resource (167 pages)
- Weapons of Mass Destruction .
- Weapons of Mass Destruction .
Intro -- DETECTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND MATERIALS -- DETECTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND MATERIALS -- CONTENTS -- PREFACE -- Chapter 1 COMBATING NUCLEAR SMUGGLING: DHS'S PHASE 3 TEST REPORT ON ADVANCED PORTAL MONITORS DOES NOT FULLY DISCLOSE THE LIMITATIONS OF THE TEST RESULTS -- WHY GAO DID THIS STUDY -- WHAT GAO RECOMMENDS -- WHAT GAO FOUND -- ABBREVIATIONS -- RESULTS IN BRIEF -- BACKGROUND -- DNDO'S PHASE 3 TEST REPORT FREQUENTLY OVERLOOKS THE LIMITATIONS ASSOCIATED WITH THE TESTS' SMALL SAMPLE SIZES -- The Phase 3 Test Report Largely Overlooks the Limiting Effects of Performing a Small Number of Tests -- Report Text Often Omits the Range of Values Surrounding Each Test Result -- DNDO's Phase 3 Test Report Omits Important Details that Affect the Interpretation of the Test Results -- PHASE 3 TEST RESULTS PROVIDE LITTLE EVIDENCE AS TO WHETHER ASPS REPRESENT AN IMPROVEMENT OVER CURRENTLY DEPLOYED TECHNOLOGY -- SNL'S SPECIAL TESTS WERE DESIGNED TO IMPROVE ASP PERFORMANCE -- CONCLUSIONS -- RECOMMENDATIONS FOR EXECUTIVE ACTION -- COMMENTS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY AND OUR EVALUATION -- APPENDIX I. COMMENTS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY -- End Notes -- Chapter 2 DETECTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND MATERIALS: SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGIES, OBSERVATIONS -- SUMMARY -- 1. NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND MATERIALS: SIGNATURES AND DETECTION -- What Is to Be Detected? -- Photons 101 -- What Signatures show the presence of nuclear weapons and SNM? -- Atomic number and density -- Opacity to photons -- Radioactivity -- How Does Detection Work? -- How are signatures gathered, processed, and used? -- Principles of detection -- Means of detection -- Detecting gamma rays -- Detecting neutrons -- Detecting dense material -- Evasion of detection technologies -- Current Detection Technologies -- Radiation "pagers -- Radiation portal monitors. Radioactive isotope identification devices -- Radiographic imaging systems -- 2. ADVANCED TECHNOLOGIES -- Nanocomposite Scintillators13 -- The problem -- Background -- Technology description -- Potential Advantages -- Status, schedule, and funding -- Risks and concerns -- Scientific risks and concerns -- Engineering risks and concerns -- Cost and schedule risks and concerns -- Operational risks and concerns -- Potential gains by increased funding -- Potential synergisms and related applications -- GADRAS: A Gamma-Ray Spectrum Analysis Algorithm18 -- The problem -- Background -- Technology description -- Potential advantages -- Status, schedule, and funding -- Risks and concerns -- Scientific risks and concerns -- Engineering risks and concerns -- Cost and schedule risks and concerns -- Operational risks and concerns -- Potential gains by increased funding -- Potential synergisms and related applications -- Computer Modeling to Evaluate Detection Capability27 -- The problem -- Background -- Technology description -- Potential advantages -- Status, schedule, and funding -- Risks and concerns -- Scientific risks and concerns -- Engineering risks and concerns -- Cost risks and concerns -- Schedule risks and concerns -- Operational risks and concerns -- Potential gains by increased funding -- Potential synergisms and related applications -- L-3 CAARS: A Low-Risk Dual-Energy Radiography System33 -- The problem -- Background -- Technology description -- Potential benefits -- Status, schedule, and funding -- Risks and concerns -- Scientific risks and concerns -- Engineering risks and concerns -- Cost and schedule risks and concerns -- Operational risks and concerns -- Potential gains by increased funding -- Potential synergisms and related applications -- SAIC CAARS: A Higher-Risk, Higher-Benefit Dual-Energy Radiography System53 -- Technology description. Potential benefits -- Status, schedule, and funding -- Risks and concerns -- Scientific risks and concerns -- Engineering risks and concerns -- Cost and schedule risks and concerns -- Operational risks and concerns -- Potential gains by increased funding -- Potential Synergisms and Related Applications -- AS& -- E CAARS: Using Backscattered X-Rays to Detect Dense Material58 -- Background -- Technology description -- Potential benefits -- Status, schedule, and funding -- Risks and concerns -- Scientific risks and concerns -- Engineering risks and concerns -- Cost and schedule risks and concerns -- Operational risks and concerns -- Potential gains by increased funding -- Potential synergisms and related applications -- Muon Tomography67 -- The problem -- Background -- Technology description -- Potential benefits -- Status, schedule, and funding -- Risks and concerns -- Scientific risks and concerns -- Engineering risks and concerns -- Cost and schedule risks and concerns -- Operational risks and concerns -- Potential gains by increased funding -- Potential synergisms and other applications -- Scanning Cargo or Analyzing a Terrorist Nuclear Weapon with Nuclear Resonance Fluorescence89 -- Two problems -- Background -- Technology description -- Potential benefits -- Status, schedule, and funding -- Risks and concerns -- Scientific risks and concerns -- Engineering risks and concerns -- Cost and schedule risks and concerns -- Operational risks and concerns -- Potential gains by increased funding -- Potential synergisms and related applications -- Detecting SNM at a Distance105 -- The problem -- Background -- Technology description -- Potential benefits -- Status, schedule, and funding -- Risks and concerns -- Scientific risks and concerns -- Engineering risks and concerns -- Cost and schedule risks and concerns -- Operational risks and concerns. Potential gains by increased funding -- Potential synergisms and related applications -- 3. OBSERVATIONS -- Observations on Progress in Detection Technology -- Observations on Technical Progress and Congress -- Observations on Technical Progress and Terrorism -- APPENDIX. THE PHYSICS OF NUCLEAR DETECTION121 -- What Is to Be Detected? -- Background -- Photons -- Radioactivity -- Fissile material -- Detection -- Shielding and background radiation -- Signatures of Plutonium, Highly Enriched Uranium, and Nuclear Weapons -- Atomic number and density -- Opacity to photons -- Presence of gamma rays beyond background levels -- Presence of neutrons beyond background levels -- Gamma ray spectra -- Time pattern of neutrons and gamma rays -- Prompt gamma rays and neutrons -- Delayed gamma rays and neutrons -- Differential die-away -- Fission chain time signature -- Detecting Signatures of a Nuclear Weapon or SNM -- Overview: How are signatures gathered, processed, and used? -- How detectors work -- Detecting gamma rays -- Detecting neutrons -- Detecting absorption or scattering of high-energy photons -- Evasion of Detection Technologies -- End Notes -- Chapter 3 THE GLOBAL NUCLEAR DETECTION ARCHITECTURE: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS -- SUMMARY -- INTRODUCTION -- Domestic Nuclear Detection Office -- WHAT IS THE GLOBAL NUCLEAR DETECTION ARCHITECTURE? -- Layered Defense -- Methodology and Metrics for Evaluation -- Priority Setting -- Interagency Coordination -- ISSUES FOR CONGRESS -- Priority Setting and Appropriateness of Funding Levels Within the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture -- Balance between Incremental and Transformational Changes to the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture -- Long-Term Maintenance of the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture -- Research and Development Coordination -- End Notes. Chapter 4 NUCLEAR DETECTION: PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS ON THE DOMESTIC NUCLEAR DETECTION OFFICE'S EFFORTS TO DEVELOP A GLOBAL NUCLEAR DETECTION ARCHITECTURE -- WHY GAO DID THIS STUDY -- WHAT GAO RECOMMENDS -- WHAT GAO FOUND -- SUMMARY -- BACKGROUND -- DNDO HAS BEGUN TO DEVELOP PROGRAMS TO ENHANCE THE INITIAL ARCHITECTURE, BUT IT LACKS AN OVERARCHING STRATEGIC PLAN FOR ACHIEVING FUTURE ARCHITECTURE IMPROVEMENTS -- DNDO AND OTHER AGENCIES FACE COORDINATION, TECHNOLOGICAL, AND MANAGEMENT CHALLENGES -- Federal Agencies Have Experienced Difficulties Coordinating Radiation Detection Efforts -- Limitations in Detection Technology Hamper the Architecture's Effectiveness -- DNDO Faces Challenges in Managing the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture -- APPROXIMATELY 2.8 BILLION IN FISCAL YEAR 2007 FUNDED PROGRAMS ASSOCIATED WITH DETECTING THE TRANSPORT OF RADIOLOGICAL AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS OR MATERIALS -- CONCLUSIONS -- RECOMMENDATIONS FOR EXECUTIVE ACTION -- End Notes -- CHAPTER SOURCES -- INDEX -- Blank Page.
9781613243374
Radioactive substances -- Detection. Nuclear weapons. Nuclear terrorism -- United States -- Prevention. Radiation warning systems. Nuclear nonproliferation -- Government policy -- United States. Nuclear arms control -- Verification. Smuggling -- Prevention.