Valdes, Alejandro Piera.

Greenhouse Gas Emissions from International Aviation : Legal and Policy Challenges. - 1st ed. - 1 online resource (512 pages) - Essential Air and Space Law ; v.14 . - Essential Air and Space Law .

Cover -- Table of Contents -- Preface -- Acknowledgments -- Abbreviations -- Introduction -- 1 Setting the Scene -- 1.1 Understanding the Problem -- 1.1.1 Aviation Market Outlook and Economic Contribution -- 1.1.2 Aviation under Siege -- 1.1.3 Climate Change -- 1.1.4 Aviation and Climate Change -- 1.1.5 The "Only 2 Percent" Exculpation Argument -- 1.1.6 The "Communication Problem" Defense -- 1.1.7 The All-Mighty Technological Efficiencies -- 1.1.8 Alternative Fuels -- 1.1.9 Aviation's Fuel Factor: Is Regulation Needed After All? -- 1.2 International Legal Regime -- 1.2.1 UNFCCC/Kyoto Protocol -- 1.2.2 The EU ETS -- 1.3 The Political Dimension: A Small Piece within a Bigger Puzzle -- 1.3.1 The Problems with Lack of Progress -- 1.3.2 Exogenous Threats -- 1.4 Conclusion -- 2 Aviation and Climate Change: A Case of Fragmentation of International Law -- 2.1 The Interaction between International Aviation and the Climate Change Regime -- 2.1.1 The Kyoto Protocol -- 2.1.2 ICAO and Climate Change: Some Unanswered Questions -- 2.1.3 The CBDR/Non-Discrimination Saga -- 2.2 From Theory to What Happens in Practice -- 2.2.1 Understanding Non-Discrimination -- 2.2.2 Understanding CBDR -- 2.3 A Look into Fragmentation of International Law -- 2.3.1 The ILC Report on Fragmentation of International Law -- 2.4 Applying VCLT Rules to the CBDR/Non-Discrimination Saga -- 2.4.1 Systemic Integration and ICAO -- 2.5 Attempts to Accommodate the Special Needs of Developing Countries -- 2.5.1 The De Minimis Principle -- 2.5.1.1 The 2010 De Minimis Proposal -- 2.5.1.2 The 38th Assembly: A Similar De Minimis Proposal -- 2.5.2 Reinventing CBDR: ICAO's SCRC -- 2.5.2.1 What Is the Difference? -- 2.5.2.2 Why Has SCRC Not Worked? -- 2.5.3 CBDR Finally Arrives at ICAO through the Back Door -- 2.6 Toward a New Approach: Reconciling Principles -- 2.6.1 CBDR Is Not Static. 2.6.2 Avoiding Isolation -- 2.6.3 Reconciling CBDR with Non-Discrimination -- 2.6.4 From Theory to Practice: Some Design Elements to Consider -- 2.7 Conclusion -- 3 The International Civil Aviation Organization -- 3.1 ICAO's Institutional Setting -- 3.1.1 Objectives -- 3.1.2 Governing Structure -- 3.1.3 Constituency -- 3.1.4 ICAO's Committee on Aviation Environmental Protection (CAEP) -- 3.1.5 Industry Participation -- 3.1.6 NGO Participation -- 3.2 ICAO and Climate Change -- 3.2.1 Historical Background -- 3.2.2 The Long Road to the CO2 Standard -- 3.2.3 State Action Plans -- 3.2.4 Aspirational Goals -- 3.2.5 A Framework for MBMs -- 3.2.6 A Global Scheme for MBMs -- 3.3 Conclusion -- 4 The Inclusion of International Aviation in the EU ETS -- 4.1 The EU ETS -- 4.1.1 Background -- 4.1.2 EU ETS and Aviation -- 4.1.3 Calculation of Emissions -- 4.1.4 Distribution of Allowances: Surrendering of Allowances -- 4.1.5 Emission Credit Units (ECUs) -- 4.1.6 Generation and Use of Revenues -- 4.1.7 Cost or Windfall Gains? -- 4.2 International Opposition -- 4.2.1 Judicial Attacks: A4A's Legal Challenge -- 4.2.2 Political Statements: From New Delhi to Moscow -- 4.2.2.1 The New Delhi Declaration -- 4.2.2.2 ICAO Council Declaration of 2 November 2011 -- 4.2.2.3 Moscow Declaration -- 4.2.3 The Nail in the Coffin: The Anti-EU ETS US Bill -- 4.3 Why Did Europe Decide to Fly Solo? -- 4.3.1 Rationale for Including Non-EU Aircraft Operators -- 4.3.2 The "Temporary" Suspension of the EU ETS -- 4.4 Conclusion -- 5 Legal Challenges against the EU ETS: Extraterritoriality -- 5.1 Principles of International Law on Jurisdiction -- 5.1.1 Territorial Principle -- 5.1.2 Nationality Principle -- 5.1.3 Passive Personality Principle -- 5.1.4 Protective Principle -- 5.1.5 Universal Jurisdiction -- 5.2 State Responsibility and Obligations Erga Omnes -- 5.3 The Effects Doctrine. 5.4 The EU ETS and Extraterritoriality -- 5.4.1 The Commission's Approach -- 5.4.2 The ATA Decision and Extraterritoriality -- 5.4.2.1 Drawing Symbolism -- 5.4.2.2 Physical Presence Leads to Unlimited Jurisdiction -- 5.4.2.3 Events Partly Outside -- 5.4.2.4 A Condition to Access the Market -- 5.4.2.5 A Vehicle to Advance EU's Climate Change Policy: Where Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Meets Rational Choice -- 5.4.2.6 The Surreptitious Effects Doctrine -- 5.5 The EU ETS, Extraterritoriality, and Principles of International Law -- 5.5.1 The Nationality Principle -- 5.5.2 Territorial Principle: The National Airspace Approach -- 5.5.2.1 Flight Information Regions -- 5.5.2.2 The 38th Assembly and the Non-Recognition of the Airspace Approach -- 5.5.2.3 Universal Jurisdiction -- 5.6 Is the Extraterritoriality of the EU ETS Unprecedented? Other Examples of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in International Civil Aviation -- 5.7 Can the Doctrine of State Responsibility Exonerate the EU ETS? -- 5.8 Conclusion -- 6 Additional Legal Issues Involving the EU ETS -- 6.1 Unilateral Action -- 6.1.1 The Kyoto Protocol, ICAO, and Unilateral State Action -- 6.1.2 Types of Unilateral State Actions -- 6.1.3 Where Does the EU ETS Stand? -- 6.1.4 The EU ETS under the Lenses of Bodansky's Balanced, Liberal Approach -- 6.2 The Tax Controversy -- 6.2.1 Understanding the Genesis of ETS: An Alternative to Taxes -- 6.2.2 Does Article 15 of the Chicago Convention Prohibit the EU ETS? -- 6.2.3 Jennison's Functional Equivalency Theory -- 6.2.4 Why the EU ETS Is Not a Tax -- 6.2.5 Does the EU ETS Contravene Article 24 of the Chicago Convention? -- 6.2.6 Is Braathens Relevant? -- 6.3 A Scheme Violating WTO Rules? -- 6.4 An Attack upon CBDR? -- 6.5 Does the Chicago Convention Matter? -- 6.5.1 Background -- 6.5.2 The Theory of Functional Succession -- 6.5.3 When Strasbourg Negated Chicago. 6.5.4 Repercussions -- 6.6 Conclusion -- 7 We Are All Ahead of the Curve -- 7.1 The Theory of Norms and Norm Entrepreneurship -- 7.1.1 What Are Norms? -- 7.1.2 The Emergence of Non-State Actors -- 7.1.3 Who Are Norm Entrepreneurs? -- 7.1.4 Transnational Networks -- 7.1.5 What Drives Norm Entrepreneurs? -- 7.1.6 The Norm's Life Cycle -- 7.1.7 Conditions Inducing Norm Entrepreneurship -- 7.1.8 Influences Hampering Norm Entrepreneurship -- 7.1.9 Norm Internalization -- 7.1.10 The Relevance of Regime Architectural Design in the Formation of International Norms -- 7.1.10.1 Bottom-Up Norm Construction -- 7.1.10.2 Top-Down Norm Construction -- 7.2 Who Is the Real Norm Entrepreneur? -- 7.2.1 Europe -- 7.2.1.1 An Obstacle or a Building Block for an International Agreement? -- 7.2.1.2 Why Has the EU ETS Not Led to Norm Cascading? -- 7.2.1.3 EU ETS and Norm Internalization -- 7.2.1.4 EU ETS: Significant Contribution or Missed Opportunity? -- 7.2.2 IATA -- 7.2.2.1 A Reactive Response: The IATA Four-Pillar Strategy -- 7.2.2.2 The Fear of Patchwork Regulations -- 7.2.2.3 The Long Road to the IATA Industry Targets -- 7.2.2.4 A Global, Sectoral Approach -- 7.2.2.5 Why Not Binding Industry Self-Regulation? -- 7.2.2.6 The "Historic" Resolution: Shaping the Future? -- 7.2.2.7 Exogenous Influences: Some Problems for Sectoral Norm Entrepreneurs -- 7.2.2.8 An Assessment of IATA's Norm Entrepreneurship Role -- 7.2.3 ICAO -- 7.2.3.1 ICAO: A Norm Entrepreneur or an Institutional Platform? -- 7.2.3.2 Barriers to Norm Entrepreneurship -- 7.2.3.3 Assessing ICAO's Role -- 7.2.4 The United States -- 7.2.4.1 Not Just Another Player -- 7.2.4.2 The United States and Climate Change -- 7.2.4.3 The United States: Aviation and Climate Change -- 7.2.4.4 Changing the Approach: From Resistance to Endorsement -- 7.2.4.5 Assessing the United States' Role -- 7.3 Conclusion. 8 The Way Ahead: Key Considerations in Addressing GHG Emissions from International Aviation in the Future -- 8.1 Addressing Some of the Required Design Elements of the Global MBM Scheme -- 8.1.1 Reconciling CBDR and Non-Discrimination -- 8.1.1.1 Route-Based/Phase-In Approach -- 8.1.1.2 The Potential Value of Voluntary Commitments -- 8.1.1.3 Potential Criticism -- 8.1.2 Redirecting Financial Flows -- 8.1.3 Addressing Fast Growers and Early Movers -- 8.2 The Challenge of Finding a Legal Vehicle to Enforce Compliance with the Global MBM Scheme -- 8.2.1 ICAO Standards -- 8.2.2 ICAO Assembly Resolution -- 8.2.3 International Convention -- 8.2.4 Enforcement -- 8.2.4.1 The Value of Transparency -- 8.2.4.2 External Enforcers -- 8.2.4.3 Reporting Non-Compliance to the Assembly: Article 54 (j) -- 8.3 Additional Actions -- 8.3.1 ICAO -- 8.3.2 IATA -- 8.3.3 Europe -- 8.4 Conclusion -- 9 Concluding Remarks -- 9.1 Setting the Aviation and Climate Change Discourse and the Research Problem -- 9.2 The Interaction between International Aviation and the Climate Change Regime -- 9.3 ICAO and Climate Change -- 9.4 The EU ETS -- 9.5 The Global MBM Scheme -- 9.6 The Role Played by Some of the Main Actors -- 9.7 The Road Ahead -- Bibliography.

While the aviation sector has introduced a number of technological and operational measures to curb its greenhouse gas emissions, these will not offset the emissions expected from its projected growth. This book examines the legal framework underlying the international aviation and climate change discourse. It analyzes the suitability of the International Civil Aviation Organization's (ICAO) institutional setting to address climate change and provides a critical assessment of the European Union Emission Trading Scheme. Finally, the book makes several recommendations to facilitate the adoption, implementation, and, ultimately, compliance with the ICAO's global market-based measure scheme to limit greenhouse gas emissions from international aviation. (Series: Essential Air and Space Law [EASL] - Vol. 14).

9789462741430


Greenhouse gases -- Environmental aspects.
Greenhouse gas mitigation.


Electronic books.

TD885.5.G73 -- .P547 2015eb

363.73874