TY  - BOOK
AU  - Dourado,Ana Paula
TI  - International and EU Tax Multilateralism: Challenges Raised by the MLI
SN  - 9789087226664
AV  - K4475 .I584 2020 
U1  - 341.484 
PY  - 2020///
CY  - Amsterdam
PB  - IBFD Publications USA, Incorporated
KW  - Double taxation
KW  - Double taxation-European Union countries
KW  - Taxation-Law and legislation
KW  - Electronic books
N1  - Cover -- Title -- Copyright -- Introduction: International Tax Multilateralism or Reinforced Unilateralism? -- 0.1. Multilateralism vs unilateralism -- 0.2. In this book -- Part I: Multilateralism in International Tax Law -- Chapter 1: Substantive Multilateralism in the Context of the MLI -- 1.1. Introduction -- 1.2. Substantive multilateralism: International relations approach -- 1.3. Substantive multilateralism: Public international law approach -- 1.4. Substantive multilateralism in action: A clear example in the law of the sea -- 1.4.1. Multilateral consensus in the LOSC -- 1.4.2. The prohibition of reservations in the LOSC -- 1.4.3. The binding dispute resolution mechanism -- 1.4.4. Subsequent amendments of the multilateral convention -- 1.5. Assessment of the MLI in light of substantive multilateralism -- 1.5.1. Is the MLI heading towards customary international law in anti-avoidance matters? -- 1.5.2. Does the MLI's flexibility undermine consensus? -- 1.5.3. Is the consensus shielded from national interference? -- 1.6. Conclusion -- Part II: The EU Multilateralism -- Chapter 2: Is There a Role for Multilateralism Regarding the Euro in the EMU? -- 2.1. Introduction -- 2.1.1. Preliminary note of caution -- 2.1.2. The function of the EMU and multilateralism -- 2.2. Running a common currency like an internal market -- 2.3. The defects of continued national decision-making -- 2.3.1. Deficiencies in the decision-making procedure of the ESM -- 2.3.2. Deficiencies in the size of the rescue mechanism of the ESM -- 2.3.3. Absence of a common economic policy -- 2.3.4. Absence of a separate and independent budget -- 2.4. Remedies for improving the current institutional setup -- 2.4.1. The list of reforms -- 2.4.2. Establishing a central decision-making authority for an economic policy on the euro -- 2.4.3. A separate and independent budget; 2.4.4. Separate and independent financing of euro budget by uniform euro taxes -- 2.5. No taxation without representation -- 2.5.1. The institutional condition: No taxation without representation -- 2.5.2. The shift in mindset regarding the European Economic Union -- 2.6. Conclusion: Take it or leave it, no free riders -- Chapter 3: The European Union and Tax Good Governance in a Multilateral Environment -- 3.1. Introduction -- 3.2. Linking -- 3.3. Development cooperat -- 3.4. International tax initia -- 3.5. Conclusion -- Chapter 4: Binding Coordination in the European Union: Status Quo and Ideas for a Brighter Future -- 4.1. Introduction -- 4.2. Tax coordination in the EU: Status quo -- 4.2.1. The effects of global tax coordination on EU Member States -- 4.2.2. Recent instances of attempted binding coordination at the EU level -- 4.2.2.1. ATAD -- 4.2.2.2. Taxation of the digital economy -- 4.2.2.3. CC(C)TB -- 4.3. Issues affecting the ATAD -- 4.3.1. Policy issues -- 4.3.1.1. Overview -- 4.3.1.2. Outbound and inbound transfers -- 4.3.1.3. Controlled foreign company legislation -- 4.3.2. Possible conflicts with tax treaties concluded between Member States and third countries -- 4.3.2.1. General issues -- 4.3.2.2. Possible conflicts between the ATAD and previously concluded tax treaties: Hybrid mismatch rules -- 4.3.2.2.1. Overview -- 4.3.2.2.2. Disregarded permanent establishments -- 4.3.2.2.3. Hybrid payments -- 4.4. Better coordination at the EU level: The ATRiD proposal -- 4.4.1. General outline of the ATRiD -- 4.4.1.1. Reasons compelling coordination/harmonization within the EU -- 4.4.1.2. Why a Directive on the Allocation of Taxing Rights (ATRiD) is the right means to achieve coordination/harmonization within the European Union -- 4.4.1.3. The scope and substantive provisions of the ATRiD; 4.4.1.3.1. General scheme and scope of application of the ATRiD -- 4.4.1.3.2. Interpretation of the ATRiD -- 4.4.1.3.3. Tax residence and exit tax -- 4.4.1.3.4. Sourcing rules and definitions -- 4.4.1.3.5. General rules on the allocation of taxing rights -- 4.4.1.3.6. Rules on the allocation of taxing rights for intra-EU income flows -- 4.4.2. Effect of the ATRiD on the external competence of the EU to conclude tax treaties -- 4.4.3. A model for the tax treaties to be concluded by the EU with third countries -- 4.4.3.1. General structure of EU tax treaties with third countries -- 4.4.3.2. Double taxation relief -- 4.4.3.3. Exit taxation, CFC rules and hybrid mismatches -- 4.4.3.4. MAP and binding arbitration clauses -- 4.4.3.5. Final provision -- 4.5. Conclusions -- Part III: MLI Signatories and the Inclusive Framework -- Chapter 5: Unveiling the MLI: An Analysis of Its Nature, Relationship to Covered Tax Agreements and Interpretation in Light of the Obligations of Its Parties -- 5.1. Introduction -- 5.2. The nature of the MLI in light of the obligations of its parties -- 5.2.1. Conceptual framework: Different meanings of multilateralism -- 5.2.2. MLI and substantive multilateralism -- 5.2.2.1. Purpose of the MLI -- 5.2.2.2. Decision-making processes leading to the MLI -- 5.2.3. MLI and minimalist multilateralism -- 5.2.3.1. Subsequent bilateral amendments to the tax treaties modified by the MLI -- 5.2.3.2. Subsequent bilateral amendments and minimum standards -- 5.2.4. MLI and coordination of international tax rules -- 5.2.4.1. Coordination versus flexibility -- 5.2.4.2. Reservations and their limits -- 5.2.4.3. Other instruments of flexibility -- 5.3. The relationship between the MLI and Covered Tax Agreements and its role in identifying the parties' obligations vis-à-vis each other -- 5.3.1. Key determinants -- 5.3.2. Compatibility clauses; 5.3.3. The MLI as a lex posterior, lex specialis or subsequent agreement to the Covered Tax Agreement in the meaning of article 31(3)(b) of the VCLT? -- 5.3.3.1. Lex posterior and lex specialis as an alternative solution? -- 5.3.3.2. MLI as a subsequent agreement in the meaning of article 31(3)(b) of the VCLT? -- 5.3.4. Interpreting the MLI: Definitions, article 2(2) of the MLI and the context of the MLI -- 5.3.5. Interpretation as key to solving the relationship conundrum -- 5.4. Conclusions -- Chapter 6: Obligations to MLI Non-Signatories within the Inclusive Framework -- 6.1. Introduction -- 6.2. The Inclusive Framework -- 6.2.1. The introduction of the Inclusive Framework -- 6.2.2. The commitments under the Inclusive Framework -- 6.2.3. Problems for developing countries under the Inclusive Framework -- 6.3. The Multilateral Instrument under the BEPS Project -- 6.3.1. The Multilateral Instrument: Some features -- 6.3.2. Why should a country refrain from signing the Multilateral Instrument? -- 6.3.3. The overlap between MLI signatories and members of the Inclusive Framework: identifying the MLI non-signatories -- 6.4. Minimum standards under Action 6: Monitoring the implementation phase -- 6.4.1. What are the minimum standards under Action 6? -- 6.4.2. What guidance is provided for the peer review process? -- 6.4.3. Monitoring the implementation phase of the minimum standards of Action 6 -- 6.5. Conclusion -- Part IV: Interpretation of the MLI and Implementation Issues -- Chapter 7: Multilateralism and International Tax Law: The Interpretation of Tax Treaties in Light of the Multilateral Instrument -- 7.1. Introduction -- 7.2. The Preamble of the MLI -- 7.3. The starting point of interpretation -- 7.4. Identification of the provision that has to be interpreted; 7.5. Article 2(2) of the MLI and article 3(2) of the OECD Model, particularly regarding the concept of "context" -- 7.5.1. General issues -- 7.5.2. Context -- 7.6. The conference of the parties -- 7.7. Authentic language of the Multilateral Instrument and tax treaties -- 7.8. Nature of Explanatory Statements -- 7.9. The relation between the MLI, the OECD Commentaries and BEPS Reports -- 7.10. Reservations to the MLI -- 7.11. Influence of the MLI on non-Covered Tax Agreements -- 7.12. Conclusion -- Chapter 8: The Multilateral Instrument and Asymmetric Choices under Articles 12-15 on PE Threshold -- 8.1. Background -- 8.2. Problems to be tackled -- 8.3. Solutions for a lower PE threshold included in the MLI for existing DTTs -- 8.4. Asymmetry arising from covered tax agreements, options, notifications and reservations -- 8.5. Concluding remarks on the extent of multilateralism in respect of PE threshold -- Part V: Implementation of the Principal Purpose Testand the Limitation on Benefit Clauses -- Chapter 9: From the Guiding Principle to the Principal Purpose Test: Burden of Proof and Legal Consequences -- 9.1. Introduction -- 9.2. The guiding principle as tax treaty anti-avoidance rules in the pre-MLI world and the principal purpose test in the MLI -- 9.3. Similar features of general anti-avoidance rules (GAARs) -- 9.4. Burden of proof -- 9.5. The legal consequences of the PPT rule -- 9.6. Conclusions -- Chapter 10: Implementation and Application of the LOB Clause in BEPS Action 6/MLI: Legal and Pragmatic Challenges -- 10.1. Introduction -- 10.2. The strategic advantage of the PPT over the MLI's LOB clause in preventing treaty abuse and meeting the minimum standard -- 10.2.1. The scope of the PPT in comparison to the MLI's LOB clause -- 10.2.2. Interrelations between the PPT and the MLI's LOB clause; 10.2.3. Extensive language, technical complexity, and not much administrative  discretion
N2  - A comprehensive discussion of the meaning of multilateralism in international taxation, as well as the impact of the BEPS Project in the move towards international tax multilateralism
UR  - https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/orpp/detail.action?docID=6460375
ER  -