TY  - BOOK
AU  - Gilbert,Margaret
TI  - Rights and Demands: A Foundational Inquiry
SN  - 9780192543196
AV  - K3240 .G553 2018 
U1  - 323.01 
PY  - 2018///
CY  - Oxford
PB  - Oxford University Press, Incorporated
KW  - Human rights
KW  - Human rights-Philosophy
KW  - Responsibility
KW  - Electronic books
N1  - Cover -- Rights and Demands: A Foundational Inquiry -- Copyright -- Preface -- Acknowledgments -- Contents -- Detailed Contents -- Introduction: Rights in the Conversation of Humanity -- I.1. The Long History of Rights -- I.2. Rights as Valuable Possessions -- I.3. Rights and Revolution: Natural Rights -- Human Rights -- I.4. The Proliferation of Rights Talk -- I.5. Contemporary Questions about Rights -- I.6. The Focus of This Book -- I.7. Going Forward -- PART I: A Problem Posed -- 1: Some Central Distinctions from Rights Theory -- 1. Hohfeld's Four-Fold Distinction -- 1.1 Claims -- 1.2 Liberties -- 1.3 Direction in the Hohfeldian scheme -- 1.4 Powers -- 1.5 Immunities -- 2. Powers and Immunities Revisited -- 3. Some Arguments for the Primacy of Claims -- 3.1 A common assumption: rights correlate with duties -- 3.2 A tendency to speak of "rights" only when claims are present -- 3.3 Thomson's argument from conceptual priority -- 3.4 A genealogical argument -- 4. Asserting a Right -- 5. The Importance of Claims -- 2: Two Realms of Rights -- 1. Two Realms of Rights: Institutional and Moral -- 2. Legal and Other Institutional Rights -- 2.1 Legal rights as artifacts of legal systems -- 2.2 Institutional rights in general: ontology -- 2.3 Institutional rights in general: their (lack of ) normativity -- 2.4 Institutional rights and rules -- 2.5 Institutional rights, moral criticism, and moral rights -- 2.6 Institutional rights: summary -- 3. Moral Rights: A Broad Conception -- 4. Morality: Some Central Features -- 4.1 Normativity -- 4.2 Independence of recognition -- 4.3 Morality versus moralities -- 4.4 Moral requirements and context-sensitivity -- 4.5 Morality and value -- 4.6 Morality, desires, and interests -- 5. A Partial Characterization of Morality -- 6. Morality, Decisions, and the Normative Realm -- 6.1 The normativity of decisions; 6.2 Excluded considerations -- 7. Two Realms of Rights: Normativity and Epistemology -- 3: Hohfeld's Claims and Thomson's Doubts -- 1. Hohfeld's Claims -- 1.1 The nature of equivalence -- 1.2 The object of a claim -- 2. Directed Duties: Their Relationship to Plain Duties Is at Best Unclear -- 3. Thomson's Reductive Approach to Hohfeldian Directed Duties -- 3.1 Thomson's fixed points -- 3.2 Thomson on Hohfeld -- 3.3 Note on the idea that rights "impose" constraints -- 3.4 Assessment of Thomson's argument -- 4. Review and Prospect -- 4: Demand-Rights-and the Demand-Right Problem -- 1. Hohfeld on the Label "Claim" -- 2. Demanding -- 2.1 Standing versus justification -- 2.2 Demanding versus requesting -- 3. Demand-Rights: A First Equivalence -- 3.1 Demands versus commands -- 3.2 Demands and enforcement -- 4. Hart on the Rights of Promisees -- 4.1 General versus special rights -- 4.2 The language of rights -- 4.3 Directed obligation -- 4.4 Owing -- 4.5 Wronging -- 4.6 Waiving and releasing -- 5. Demand-Rights: More Equivalences -- 5.1 Standing to demand, directed obligation, and owing -- 5.2 A possible further equivalence -- 5.3 Demand-rights and ownership -- 5.4 Setting aside further equivalences -- 6. The Rights Assertion Argument for the Primacy of Claims -- 7. The Demand-Right Problem -- 5: Contemporary Rights Theories: The Problem Remains -- 1. Rights Theory and the Demand-Right Problem -- 2. Contemporary Rights Theory -- 2.1 The standard aim -- 2.2 The standard method -- 3. Duties Concerning a Person -- 4. Do Thomsonian Claims Support Demands? -- 4.1 Thomsonian constraints -- 4.2 The permissibility of verbal attempts -- 4.3 The matter of "release" -- 4.4 Thomson's theory of claims and the standing to demand -- 5. Interest Theories -- 5.1 Beneficiary theories: Bentham -- 5.2 Raz's theory -- 5.3 Another type of interest theory; 6. Moral Status Theories -- 7. Choice Theory and Directionality -- 8. Demand-Rights and Contemporary Rights Theory -- PART II: The Problem Solved -- 6: Agreements and Promises: Hume's Legacy -- 1. Two Special Demand-Right Problems -- 1.1 Agreements, promises, and rights -- 1.2 The literature on promises and agreements -- 2. Promising: Some Fixed Points -- 2.1 Promising without "I promise" -- 2.2 Promising versus expressing an intention -- 2.3 Promising versus predicting -- 2.4 The promisor cannot unilaterally rescind the promise -- 2.5 Promises and agreements are close cousins -- 2.6 Everyday agreements and promises versus contracts in law -- 3. The Role of Acceptance -- 3.1 The promisor's input not conclusive -- 3.2 Acceptance as a form of concurrence -- 3.3 Motives for making and accepting promises -- 4. Promissory Obligation -- 4.1 Inevitability -- 4.2 Direction -- 4.3 Ancillary obligations -- 5. Historical Interlude: Hume on Promising and Its Obligation -- 5.1 No promising in a "state of nature" -- 5.2 The monological assumption -- 5.3 The nature of the obligation -- 5.4 Against the monological assumption (1): resolution, desire, willing -- 5.5 Against the monological assumption (2): "a manifest absurdity" -- 5.6 The turn to convention -- 6. After Hume -- 6.1 Two assumptions -- 6.2 The insufficiency of Hume's argument for conventionalism -- 6.3 Two types of non-conventionalism -- 7: Problems with Moral Principle Accounts -- 1. Moral Principle Accounts of Promissory Obligation -- 1.1 Two types of moral principle account -- 1.2 Two problems of too many stages -- 1.3 A problem for some practice accounts -- 2. Scanlon's Account -- 2.1 Scanlonian owing -- 2.2 The relevance of expectations -- 2.3 The content of a promisor's obligation -- 2.4 Principle F -- 2.5 The consent clause -- 3. The Inevitability Problem -- 3.1 Clarifying the inevitability point; 3.2 Moral requirement versus inevitability -- 3.3 Immoral promises -- 3.4 Rights-transfer theories -- 3.5 Conflicting obligations -- 3.6 On what is intuitive -- 3.7 The problem of promissory obligation and another classic problem -- 4. The Problem of Promisees' Rights -- 5. Scanlon's Principle and Promisees' Rights -- 5.1 The violation of a moral principle -- 5.2 The consent clause -- 5.3 The "right to rely" on performance -- 5.4 The interests of a promisee -- 6. Adding New Rules or Principles -- 6.1 A social rule permitting "rebukes" if Principle F is violated -- 6.2 Subsidiary moral principles -- 7. Rescuing Scanlon's Principle-at a Cost -- 8. The Demand-Right Problem for Promises -- 8: A Fundamental Ground of Demand-Rights -- 1. The Argument of This Chapter with Some Reference to Kant and Hume -- 2. Preliminaries -- 2.1 Terminology -- 2.2 Commitment in general -- 2.3 Commitments of the will -- personal commitments -- 3. Joint Commitment -- 3.1 Creation: participants -- 3.2 Rescission: participants -- 3.3 Content -- 3.4 Who or what is committed -- 3.5 Associated "individual" commitments -- 3.6 Creation: the process -- 4. Joint Commitment as a Ground of Demand-Rights -- 4.1 An intuitive judgment -- 4.2 A basis for the standing to demand -- 4.3 Demanding what is mine: an interpretation -- 4.4 Joint commitment, demand-rights, and ownership -- 4.5 A related sense of "my action" -- 4.6 Demand-rights and joint commitment -- 5. The Demand-Rights of Joint Commitment -- 5.1 Joint-commitment-based demand-rights and normative constraints -- 5.2 A function for demanding -- 5.3 The standing to demand what is wrong, all things considered -- 5.4 Demand-rights against the self -- 5.5 Waiving and releasing -- 5.6 Wronging -- 5.7 Who or what is owed conforming actions -- 6. Two Phenomena Akin to Joint Commitment -- 6.1 A different process -- 6.2 A different product; 7. A Problem Solved-and a Conjecture -- 7.1 Joint commitment and the demand-right problem -- 7.2 The joint-commitment conjecture -- 7.3 Some implications of the conjecture -- Coda: Kant on Contract Right -- 9: A Theory of Agreements and Promises -- 1. Agreements, Promises, and Demand-Rights -- 2. Agreements: Central Points -- 2.1 The inevitability of demand-rights -- 2.2 Performance and ancillary rights -- 2.3 Agreements are close cousins to promises -- 2.4 Only one party need have a performance right -- 2.5 Interdependent performance rights -- 2.6 Rescission -- 3. Toward a Theory of Agreements -- 3.1 Analogies between agreements and personal decisions -- 3.2 "We agreed" versus "We decided" -- 4. Agreements as Joint Decisions -- 4.1 The joint endorsement of a plan -- 4.2 The joint decision account of agreements -- 4.3 Note on the explicit expressions condition -- 5. Some Virtues of the Joint Decision Account of Agreements -- 5.1 It respects central pre-theoretical points -- 5.2 Advantages over moral principle accounts -- 5.3 A further virtue -- 6. Promises as Joint Decisions -- 6.1 The joint decision account of promises -- 6.2 Distinguishing promises and agreements -- 7. Some Virtues of the Joint Decision Account of Promises -- 7.1 It respects central pre-theoretical points -- 7.2 A response to Hume -- 8. Rescission of a Promise -- 8.1 The standard background -- 8.2 A promisor rejects rescission -- 8.3 A possible elaboration of the account -- 9. Agreements and Promises as Joint Decisions -- 9.1 Virtues of joint decision accounts -- 9.2 Another kind of joint decision -- 9.3 Two special demand-right problems solved -- 9.4 Three dogmas rejected -- 10: The Ubiquity of Joint Commitment -- 1. Joint Commitment beyond Agreements and Promises -- 1.1 Pertinent points about joint commitments in general -- 1.2 Topics to be discussed -- 2. Shared Plans; 3. Doing Things Together
N2  - Margaret Gilbert presents the first full-length treatment of a central class of rights: demand-rights. To have such a right is to have the standing or authority to demand a particular action of another person. Gilbert argues that joint commitment is a ground of demand-rights, and gives joint commitment accounts of both agreements and promises
UR  - https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/orpp/detail.action?docID=5346288
ER  -