TY  - BOOK
AU  - El Kassar,Nadja
TI  - Towards a Theory of Epistemically Significant Perception: How We Relate to the World
T2  - Ideen and Argumente Series
SN  - 9783110445626
AV  - B828.45 .E4 2015 
U1  - 121/.34 
PY  - 2015///
CY  - Berlin/Boston
PB  - Walter de Gruyter GmbH
KW  - Electronic books
N1  - Intro -- Contents -- Introduction -- Part I. Conceptualism -- 1. Introducing Conceptualism -- 1.1 Mind and World - the Beginnings of Conceptualism as We Know It -- 1.2 Details of Conceptual Capacities in Perception -- 1.3 Conceptualist Disjunctivism and the Capacity Approach to Perception -- 1.4 Two Developments of Conceptualism: Conceptual Content as Perceptual Demonstrative Content and as Enacted Content -- 2. Examining Non-Conceptualist Arguments against Conceptualism -- 2.1 A Close Reading Analysis of a Standard Non-Conceptualist Argument: the Argument from Animal Perception -- 2.2 Excursus: Remarks about Concepts, Conceptual Capacities, and Rationality -- 2.3 Reviewing the Argument from Hyper-Intellectualization -- 2.4 Reviewing the Argument from Concept Acquisition -- 2.5 Reviewing the Argument from Memory Experience -- 2.6 A Close Reading Analysis of the Argument from Fineness of Grain -- 2.7 A Close Reading Analysis of the Argument from Fallibility -- 2.8 First Conclusions: Conceptualism Survives the Non-Conceptualist Arguments, But Where Does It Stand? -- 3. Examining McDowell's Revised Conceptualism -- 3.1 Avoiding the Myth of the Given, Travis's Relationism and the Role of Intuitional Content -- 3.2 Does "Avoiding the Myth of the Given" Provide a Coherent Conceptualist Theory? -- 3.3 Is Conceptualism Just a Theory that Avoids the Myth of the Given? -- Part II. Relationism -- 4. Relationism: Perception as Conscious Acquaintance -- 4.1 What is Relationism? -- 4.2 The Object View's Rejection of Representationalism -- 5. Relationism as Anti-Representationalism -- 5.1 Travis's Anti-Representationalism: the Bigger Picture -- 5.2 Travis's Arguments against Representationalism: the Problem of Selection, the Problem of Incoherent Content and the Problem of Attaining Generality -- 5.3 Non-Conceptualist Representationalism as an Incoherent Theory; 5.4 Travis's Arguments against McDowell's Conceptualism: Perceptual Experience Does Not Have Conceptual Content -- 5.5 Perception as Mere Visual Awareness: Travis's Conception of Perceptual Experience -- 6. Why McDowell's Revised Conceptualism Does Not Avoid Travis's Anti-Representationalist Criticism -- Part III. Relational Conceptualism -- 7. Relational Conceptualism: a Theory of Epistemically Significant Perception -- 7.1 Preliminaries -- 7.2 The Nature of Perceptual Experience on the Relational Conceptualist Account -- 7.3 Developing Relational Conceptualism -- 8. Possible Objections against Relational Conceptualism -- Part IV. Relational Conceptualism and Empirical Science -- 9. Broadening the Scope of Relational Conceptualism -- 9.1 Objections against Conceptualism from Empirical Science -- 9.2 Support for Conceptualism from Empirical Science -- 9.3 Roots and Routes for Relational Conceptualism to Trace -- References -- Author Index -- Subject Index
UR  - https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/orpp/detail.action?docID=4006864
ER  -