Christian Faith : Dogmatics in Outline.

Front Cover -- Christian Faith -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Table of Contents -- Preface -- Abbreviations -- Appendix -- Selected Bibliography -- Index of Scripture Citations -- Index of Subjects and Persons -- Back Cover.

Subject Matter of Dogmatics Christian dogmatics, as a part of Christian theology, has for its subject matter the distinctively Christian way of having faith, in which elemental faith is confirmed, specified, and represented as filial trust in God the Father of Jesus Christ. The Greek word theologia ("theology") is older than Christianity, but it is not to be found in the Greek New Testament.1 The second-century Apologists, sometimes regarded as the fi Christian theologians, took more readily to the term philosophia ("philosophy"), which does occur once in the New Testament--in the pejorative sense of "sophistry" (Col. 2:8). Justin Martyr (ca. 100-ca. 165) continued to wear his philosopher''s cloak after he embraced Christianity: he thought of himself as a Christian philosopher. But "theology" became the accepted term for Christian reflection and discourse on God, and the number of Christian "theologians" was taken to include the biblical writers themselves, preeminently the author of the Fourth Gospel. By drawing attention to the theological motives of the individual authors or compilers of the New Testament books, modern biblical scholarship--in particular, redaction criticism of the Gospels--confi rms the justice of finding the church''s first theologians already in the Scriptures. Old Testament scholars have made a similar case for the individual sources of the Pentateuch.. In the Old and New Testaments theological reflection remained unsystematic--even in Paul''s Letter to the Romans, in which a limited pattern of sorts becomes visible. A more orderly and extensive presentation of Christian theology appeared in the third century in Origen of Alexandria''s (ca. 185-ca. 254) On First Principles. However, "theology" as the name for a comprehensive science of matters that relate to God established itself only with the growth of the

medieval universities, in which theology took its place as one discipline among others--and supposedly their "queen." Even then other names were used, such as sacra pagina ("the sacred page," i.e., interpretation of Scripture) and doctrina fidei ("the doctrine of faith"). I. From Sacred Doctrine to the Science of Faith Thomas Aquinas (1225-74), the most eminent of the medieval schoolmen, distinguished the theology that pertains to sacred doctrine from the theology that is part of philosophy. The science of sacred doctrine is called "theology," he explains, because its concern is with God and with other things only insofar as they relate to God; and it differs from philosophical theology in that it views everything under the single aspect of revelation. Why, then, did Thomas proceed in his summary of sacred doctrine, the Summa theologiae (or Summa theologica), to offer five rational proofs for the existence of God, which surely belong to the domain of philosophy? We may let his procedure pose for us the general question, Where should any system of theology begin, including our own? 1. Sacred Doctrine and What Everyone Calls "God" Thomas decided to launch his Summa theologiae not with the articles of faith, but with what he called a "preamble" to the articles of faith: a demonstration that God exists. "For faith presupposes natural knowledge, even as grace pre- supposes nature, and perfection supposes something that can be perfected" (ST 1:12). Thomas''s "five ways" infer the existence of God from God''s effects, which are open to sense experience. Why he chose to present the proofs before dealing with the proper concern of sacred doctrine--the revealed knowledge of God--has been debated. The objection has been made that his proofs start Thomas off on the wrong foot, because they are at odds with Blaise Pascal''s (1623-62) famous

Memorial, the record of his religious experience of 23 November 1654, found in the lining of his coat after his death: "God of Abraham, God of Isaac, God of Jacob, not of the philosophers and the learned . . . God of Jesus Christ." Why speak in sacred theology about God as first mover, first efficient cause, a necessary being, and so on? I offer a suggestion that cannot pretend to lay the problem to rest but will contribute to the direction in which I propose to take the dogmatic project. The proofs might better be understood not as intruding an alternative to the biblical God, but rather as seeking to get back to a more elemental idea of God presupposed by biblical faith. The idea is generally recognizable, for each of the proofs, though couched in philosophical language, concludes with some such assertion as: "And this is what everyone calls ''God.''" For example, everyone understands that by "God" we mean a "being having of itself its own necessity, and not receiving it from another." In this general idea of God Thomas does not have the full Christian belief in God; it is not yet the distinctively Christian God he is describing. Rather, he has offered a provisional and generally accessible notion of God such as one must suppose to underlie Christian faith in the God of revelation. He thinks that "to know that God exists in a general and confused way is implanted in us by nature." The proofs of God''s existence, whether or not they succeed as proofs, serve to articulate this natural knowledge for those who have the aptitude to follow them. But they do not give us the full Christian idea of God. For "to know that someone is approaching is not the same as to know that Peter is approaching, even though it is Peter who is approaching" (ST 1:12). There is no need, for our purposes, to distinguish Thomas''s five ways any further, or to assess

their cogency as philosophical arguments. Our interest is in the initial methodological move they may be said to propose for the project of sacred doctrine or Christian dogmatics. It needs to be shown next that the principle, "Faith presupposes natural knowledge, even as grace presupposes nature," underlies, in effect if not in name, the choice of a starting point in the Protestant dogmatic works of John Calvin (1509-64) and Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768-1834): the definitive edition of Calvin''s Institutes of the Christian Religion (1559) and the second, revised edition of Schleiermacher''s The Christian Faith (1830-31). We will then be in a position to see how the Thomist principle might be retrieved and adapted to launch our own dogmatic project. 2. The Sum of Piety and the Innate Sense of God Calvin''s theme is the knowledge of God. But it is a knowledge that engages the heart. Where there is no religion or piety, we cannot say that God is known. Accordingly, the 1559 Institutes begins with what we might describe as an introduction, partly borrowed from the Roman philosopher Cicero (106-43 BCE), on the concept of piety--or on religion, the outward expression of the pious dis- position. Calvin argues that a sense of divinity, or awareness of God, is engraved on every human heart; it is what distinguishes humans from mere animals. Even idolatry attests its presence, as does the panic fear that calls on God in a life-threatening crisis. Calvin can also employ a metaphor from farming to describe this sense of divinity: it is the seed of religion. In a world overflowing with inestimable divine riches, the seed ought to grow naturally into genuine piety. But it doesn''t. It is either suppressed or corrupted. The sparks (another metaphor!) are put out, or else the sense of divinity issues in idolatry, denial of God''s concern for the world,

craven terror instead of reverence, or superstition. What is the theological point of this introduction to Calvin''s Institutes? We will not ask, for now, about the content of his natural religion, or about what- ever persuasiveness it may have, if any, for philosophers and historians of religion. The question is what function he assigns to it as the first move in his theological project. It may appear that the sole purpose of Calvin''s natural his- tory of religion (if we may call it such) is to establish the guilt of all humanity in sin, because scarcely one person in a hundred cultivates the seed, and in none at all does it naturally mature or bear fruit. Calvin takes a Ciceronian natural theology and puts it to a Pauline use. Paul wrote: "What can be known about God is plain to them [humans, who suppress the truth]. . . . So they are without excuse" (Rom. 1:19-20). The door is firmly closed against any natural ascent to sound knowledge of God, and another door is opened to God''s self-revelation. Is there, then, no parallel in Calvin''s prolegomena to the Thomist principle that faith presupposes natural knowledge? It is essential to Calvin''s case to insist that the sense of divinity cannot be eradicated; if it ever were, the accusation of human guilt would disappear with it. But there is more. When he turns to the necessity for the added light of God''s Word, he compares Scripture to the provision of spectacles for the elderly or for anyone else whose vision is clouded. The Word focuses the otherwise confused knowledge of God in our minds and clearly shows us the true God. I will need to return later (in chap. 9) to the hint that one may think of revelation not as items of supernaturally conveyed information but as divinely improved vision. For now, the point is that the sense of divinity is self-evidently the condition for the

possibility.

Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources.

Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, Michigan : ProQuest Ebook Central, 2024. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest Ebook Central affiliated libraries.