To Agree or Not to Agree : Leadership, Bargaining, and Arms Control.
Material type:
- text
- computer
- online resource
- 9780472027200
- 327.1/747/0973
- JZ5665
Cover -- Title Page -- Copyright © -- Dedication -- Contents -- List of Tables -- List of Figures -- Preface -- 1. Leadership, Bargaining, and Arms Control -- 2. Conflicting Strategies and Inconclusive Discussions: Khrushchev, Eisenhower, and the Test Ban Talks -- 3. From Deadlock to Mutual Compromise: Khrushchev, Kennedy, and the Limited Test Ban Treaty -- 4. The Search for Unilateral Advantage: Impasse at the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Talks -- 5. Concluding the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty: Gorbachev and New Thinking Break the Deadlock -- 6. Finishing START and Achieving Unilateral Reductions: Bargaining and Leadership at the End of the Cold War -- 7. Superpower Arms Control and Joint Decision Making in International Relations -- Notes -- Bibliography -- Index.
Explains why, despite the fierce rivalry of the Cold War, Russians and Americans could negotiate arms control agreements.
Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources.
Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, Michigan : ProQuest Ebook Central, 2024. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest Ebook Central affiliated libraries.
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