Future's Back : Nuclear Rivalry, Deterrence Theory, and Crisis Stability after the Cold War.

Intro -- Contents -- Tables and Figures -- Acknowledgments -- Introduction -- 1 Cumulation in International Relations: Methodological Constraints and Solutions -- 2 Nuclear Deterrence: The Record of Aggregate Testing -- 3 New Directions for Aggregate Testing -- 4 Game Theory and Superpower Rivalry, 1948-88 -- 5 U.S.-Soviet Rivalry and Nuclear Deterrence -- 6 Nuclear Stability after the Cold War -- 7 Conventional Deterrence and Compellence Theory: Perspectives on Testing after the Cold War -- Notes -- Bibliography -- Index -- A -- B -- C -- D -- E -- F -- G -- H -- I -- J -- K -- L -- M -- N -- O -- P -- R -- S -- T -- V -- W -- Y -- Z.

Given the likely proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the future, and the failure of "non-proliferation" regimes to provide effective barriers to the spread of nuclear technology in the past, efforts towards greater understanding of nuclear rivalry are crucial. The Future's Back provides a valuable framework for organizing and evaluating research on superpower rivalry and nuclear deterrence.

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Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, Michigan : ProQuest Ebook Central, 2024. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest Ebook Central affiliated libraries.