Intentionality, Cognition, and Mental Representation in Medieval Philosophy.

Cover -- Contents -- Acknowledgments -- Introduction: Intentionality, Cognition, and Mental Representation in Medieval Philosophy -- Concepts and Meaning in Medieval Philosophy -- Mental Language in Aquinas? -- Causality and Cognition: An Interpretation of Henry of Ghent's Quodlibet V, q. 14 -- Two Models of Thinking: Thomas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus on Occurrent Thoughts -- Thinking About Things: Singular Thought in the Middle Ages -- Singular Terms and Vague Concepts in Late Medieval Mental Language Theory: Or, the Decline and Fall of Mental Language -- Act, Species, and Appearance: Peter Auriol on Intellectual Cognition and Consciousness -- Ockham's Externalism -- Was Adam Wodeham an Internalist or an Externalist? -- How Chatton Changed Ockham's Mind: William Ockham and Walter Chatton on Objects and Acts of Judgment -- The Nature of Intentional Objects in Nicholas of Autrecourt's Theory of Knowledge -- On the Several Senses of "Intentio" in Buridan -- Mental Representation in Animals and Humans: Some Late Medieval Discussions -- The Intersubjective Sameness of Mental Concepts in Late Scholastic Thought -- Mental Representations and Concepts in Medieval Philosophy -- Bibliography -- List of Contributors -- Index -- A -- B -- C -- D -- E -- F -- H -- I -- L -- M -- N -- O -- P -- R -- S -- T -- U -- V -- W.

The essays of this volume explore the conceptual relationships among intentionality, cognition and mental representation as conceived by some of the greatest medieval philosophers, including Aquinas, Scotus, Ockham and Buridan, and some of their lesser known, but in their own time equally influential contemporaries.

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Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, Michigan : ProQuest Ebook Central, 2024. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest Ebook Central affiliated libraries.