Psychiatry and Philosophy of Science.

Cover -- Half Title -- Title -- Dedication -- Copyright -- Contents -- Acknowledgements -- 1 Introduction: psychiatry and philosophy of science -- 1.1 An introduction to terms and concepts -- 1.2 Is psychiatry a science? And who cares? -- 1.3 An overview of the themes of the book -- 2 The nature of mental illness 1: is mental illness a myth? -- 2.1 Is mental illness in the eye of the psychiatrist? -- 2.2 Is mental illness a historically unstable category? -- 2.3 Is mental illness a moral, rather than medical, problem? -- 2.4 Do the symptoms of mental illness depend too radically on social context? -- 2.5 Can mental illness be viewed as a good thing? -- 2.6 Conclusion -- 3 The nature of mental illness 2: if mental disorders exist, what are they? -- 3.1 The distinction between physical and mental disorders -- 3.2 Biological accounts of disorder -- 3.3 Fulford's action-based account -- 3.4 Aristotelian accounts of disorder -- 3.5 Messy accounts -- 3.6 Disorder as a Roschian concept -- 3.7 Conclusion -- 4 Explanations in psychiatry 1: natural-history based explanations -- 4.1 More on natural kinds -- 4.2 Arguments against mental disorders being natural kinds -- 4.3 Are types of mental disorder natural kinds? -- 4.4 Consequences -- 4.5 Conclusion -- 5 Explanations in psychiatry 2: individual case histories -- 5.1 The simulation account of folk-psychological understanding -- 5.2 Simulation and case histories -- 5.3 What are the limits of simulation? -- 5.4 Returning to tradition: this account of case histories compared with others -- 5.5 Ethics and case histories -- 5.6 Conclusion -- 6 Relations between theories 1: when paradigms meet -- 6.1 Kuhn on paradigms and normal science -- 6.2 Kuhn on incommensurability -- 6.3 Paradigms in psychiatry -- 6.4 An extra problem Kuhn does not discuss: inter-professional rivalry.

6.5 Coordination without full communication -- 6.6 Aiming for full communication across paradigms -- 6.7 Conclusion -- 7 Relations between theories 2: reductionisms -- 7.1 Three types of reductionism -- 7.2 What is the mind? Can theories about the mind be reduced to theories about the brain? -- 7.3 Methodological reductionism -- 7.4 Conclusion -- 8 Managing values and interests 1: psychiatry as a value-laden science -- 8.1 Introduction to the case studies -- 8.2 Varieties of value-ladenness -- 8.3 Comparison with other sciences -- 8.4 What can be done? -- 8.5 Conclusion -- 9 Managing values and interests 2: big business and judging treatments -- 9.1 An introduction to randomized controlled trials -- 9.2 Problems with evaluating the effectiveness of treatments -- 9.3 Social epistemology and the breakdown of trust in psychiatry -- 9.4 Diagnosis of the problem -- 9.5 Returning to psychiatry -- 9.6 Conclusion -- 10 Conclusion -- Notes -- Further reading -- Bibliography -- Index.

Through an examination of those features of psychiatry that distinguish it from other sciences - for example, its contested subject matter, its particular modes of explanation, and its multiple different theoretical frameworks - this book explores some of the many conceptual, metaphysical and epistemological issues that arise in psychiatry.

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Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, Michigan : ProQuest Ebook Central, 2024. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest Ebook Central affiliated libraries.