Granting and Renegotiating Infrastructure Concessions : Avoiding the Pitfalls.

Intro -- Contents -- Foreword -- Preface -- Acknowledgments -- 1. Overview -- Infrastructure's Importance for Economic Growth -- Private Sector Participation and New Regulations and Risks -- Drawing on Experience to Improve Performance -- Outcomes of the Renegotiation Process -- Renegotiating Only When Justified -- 2. Options for Private Participation in Infrastructure -- Concessions-A Cancelable Right to Cash Flow -- Transferring Infrastructure Services to the Private Sector -- How Do Concessions Work? -- How Do Concessions Differ from Privatizations? -- Benefits of Concessions -- Drawbacks of Concessions -- Concession and Regulatory Design -- 3. Concessions and the Problem of Renegotiation -- Renegotiation Incidence and Incidents -- The Principle of Financial Equilibrium in Regulated Markets: More Regulation, More Renegotiation -- Bidding, Renegotiation, and Government Responses: Sanctity of the Bid -- The Case of Directly Adjudicated Concessions -- Other Drivers of Renegotiation -- 4. Anecdotal Evidence of the Drivers of Renegotiation -- Political and Institutional Issues -- Aggressive Bidding -- Faulty Contract Designs -- Government Failure to Honor Contract Clauses -- Defective Regulation and Its Effects -- Profile of a Typical Municipal Concession: Common Problems of Process and Design -- Macroeconomic Shocks -- 5. Renegotiation in Theory and Practice -- Reasons for Incomplete Contracts -- Incomplete Contracts, Concession Successes and Failures, and the Theory of Renegotiation -- Renegotiation Issues in Latin America and the Caribbean -- 6. Confirming Anecdote and Theory: Empirical Analysis of the Determinants of Renegotiation -- Basic Findings -- Empirical Analysis of the Determinants of Renegotiation -- Significant Variables Influencing the Incidence of Renegotiation -- Marginal Effects on the Probability of Renegotiation.

Interpretation of Empirical Results -- 7. Policy Implications and Lessons: Guidelines for Optimal Concession Design -- Shortcomings in Concession Designs and Regulations That Lead to Renegotiation -- Guidelines for Optimal Concession Design -- The Process for Awarding Concessions and Award Criteria -- Implementation of an Optimal Concession Award Criteria -- Financial Equilibrium Clauses for the Operation of the Concession in the Concession Contract -- Renegotiation Clauses and Triggers for Renegotiation -- Sanctity of the Bid -- Concession Length and Financing -- Investment Commitments -- Determining Future Tariffs -- Regulatory Structure: Rate of Return Versus Price Caps -- Cost of Capital and How It Should Be Determined -- Tariff and Revenue Implications of Increased Cost of Capital -- Concession Risks and Their Allocation -- Valuation of Concession Assets -- Informational Requirements Set in the Concession Contract -- Regulatory Accounting Norms -- Addressing Termination of the Concession and Dispute Resolution -- Arbitration Rules Stated in Concession Contract -- Institutional Structure of Regulatory Agencies -- 8. Conclusion -- Appendix 1. Data Description -- Appendix 2. Choice and Definition of Independent Variables -- Definition of Terms -- Detailed Description of the Variables -- Appendix 3. Econometric Analysis: Results of the Probit Estimations -- Summary Results -- Complete Estimates -- References -- Index.

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Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, Michigan : ProQuest Ebook Central, 2024. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest Ebook Central affiliated libraries.