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Carbon Tax and Cap-and-trade Tools : Market-based Approaches for Controlling Greenhouse Gases.

By: Material type: TextTextSeries: Climate Change and its Causes, Effects and PredictionPublisher: New York : Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2010Copyright date: ©2010Edition: 1st edDescription: 1 online resource (128 pages)Content type:
  • text
Media type:
  • computer
Carrier type:
  • online resource
ISBN:
  • 9781612098715
Subject(s): Genre/Form: Additional physical formats: Print version:: Carbon Tax and Cap-and-trade ToolsDDC classification:
  • 363.738/746
LOC classification:
  • HC110.A4 -- B86 2010eb
Online resources:
Contents:
Intro -- CARBON TAX AND CAP-AND-TRADE TOOLS: MARKET-BASED APPROACHES FOR CONTROLLING GREENHOUSE GASES -- CARBON TAX AND CAP-AND-TRADE TOOLS: MARKET-BASED APPROACHES FOR CONTROLLING GREENHOUSE GASES -- CONTENTS -- PREFACE -- CARBON TAX AND GREENHOUSE GAS CONTROL: OPTIONS ANDCONSIDERATIONS FOR CONGRESS -- SUMMARY -- INTRODUCTION -- OTHER POLICY OPTIONS FOR ADDRESSINGGHG EMISSIONS -- COST OF QUANTITY CONTROL: AN OVERVIEW -- Economic Theory vs. Uncertainty -- A Stark Choice or a Policy Continuum? -- A Flexible Emissions Cap -- A Flexible Carbon Tax -- Limits of the Policy Continuum -- POTENTIAL ADVANTAGES OF A CARBON TAX -- Economic Efficiency -- Basis for the Argument -- Underpinnings of the Argument -- Relative Flatness of Benefits Curve? -- Relative Steepness of the Marginal Cost Curve? -- Short-Term Time Frame -- Only Cost Uncertainty is Considered -- Modeled Eficiency Gains -- Economic Efficiency versus Precaution -- Price Stability -- Tax Revenue Applications -- Potential Implementation Advantages -- Transparency -- Administrative Issues -- Policy Modification -- POTENTIAL DISADVANTAGES -- Uncertain Emissions -- Political Feasibility -- What's in a Name? -- THE ROLE OF COMMITTEE JURISDICTION -- Support from Industry? -- Support from Environmental Groups? -- Consideration of International Efforts and Cooperation -- Coordination with Existing International Efforts -- Maximizing Participation -- International Implementation Concerns -- IMPLEMENTATION OF A CARBON TAX -- Point of Taxation -- Where to Impose a Carbon Tax? -- CO2 Emissions or All CHG Emission? -- THE 1993 ENERGY OR BTU TAX -- Which Emission Sources to Control? -- Level of Taxation -- Tax Based on Estimates of Costs and Benefits117 -- Social Cost of Carbon Estimates -- Applying Social Cost of Carbon Estimates -- Tax Based on Meeting an Emissions Target -- Tax Revenue Distribution.
Estimates of Tax Revenues -- Use of Tax Revenues -- Offset Reductions in Other Taxes -- Direct or Indirect Payments to Households -- Provide Assitance to Carbon-Intensive Industries -- Fund Specific Objectives -- Policy Considerations of Different Revenue Applications -- Overall Costs to Society -- Distributional Impacts -- Carbon-Intensive Industries -- Technology Development -- CONCLUSIONS -- APPENDIX. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION -- End Notes -- IMPLICATIONS OF A CAP-AND-TRADE PROGRAM FOR CARBON DIOXIDE EMISSIONS -- FLEXIBILITY IN THE TIMING OF EMISSION REDUCTIONS -- Potential Savings in Costs As a Result of Timing Flexibility -- Design Features That Provide Firms with Timing Flexibility -- Keeping Costs from Climbing Too High -- Keeping Costs from Falling Too Low -- THE DISTRIBUTIONAL CONSEQUENCES OF A CAP-AND-TRADE PROGRAM -- Market Forces Would Determine Who Bore the Costs of a Cap -- BOX 1. CBO'S COST ESTIMATE FOR S. 2191 -- Policymakers Would Determine Who Received the Value of the Allowances -- REDUCING THE OVERALL ECONOMIC IMPACTOF A CO2 CAP -- CAP-AND-TRADE PROGRAMS AND THE FEDERAL BUDGET -- End Notes -- ISSUES IN DESIGNING A CAP-AND-TRADE PROGRAM FOR CARBON DIOXIDE EMISSIONS -- HOW A CAP-AND-TRADE PROGRAM WOULD WORK -- THE POTENTIAL VALUE AND BUDGETARY TREATMENT OF ALLOWANCES -- THE DISTRIBUTIONAL CONSEQUENCES OF A CAP-AND-TRADE PROGRAM -- Market Forces Would Determine Who Bore the Costs of a Cap -- Policymakers Would Determine Who Received the Value of the Allowances -- REDUCING THE OVERALL ECONOMIC IMPACTOF A CO2 CAP -- Using the Allowance Value to Reduce the Total Economic Cost -- ALLOWING FLEXIBILITY IN THE TIMING OF EMISSION REDUCTIONS TO LOWER COSTS -- Design Features Providing Flexibility in the Timing of Emission Reductions -- A Price Ceiling and a Price Floor -- Borrowing and Banking Allowances -- Aggregate Borrowing by Regulators.
Design Features Addressing Energy-Intensive Manufacturing Industries -- Border Adjustments -- Transitional Assistance -- Compatibility with WTO Agreements -- End Notes -- CHAPTER SOURCES -- INDEX.
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Intro -- CARBON TAX AND CAP-AND-TRADE TOOLS: MARKET-BASED APPROACHES FOR CONTROLLING GREENHOUSE GASES -- CARBON TAX AND CAP-AND-TRADE TOOLS: MARKET-BASED APPROACHES FOR CONTROLLING GREENHOUSE GASES -- CONTENTS -- PREFACE -- CARBON TAX AND GREENHOUSE GAS CONTROL: OPTIONS ANDCONSIDERATIONS FOR CONGRESS -- SUMMARY -- INTRODUCTION -- OTHER POLICY OPTIONS FOR ADDRESSINGGHG EMISSIONS -- COST OF QUANTITY CONTROL: AN OVERVIEW -- Economic Theory vs. Uncertainty -- A Stark Choice or a Policy Continuum? -- A Flexible Emissions Cap -- A Flexible Carbon Tax -- Limits of the Policy Continuum -- POTENTIAL ADVANTAGES OF A CARBON TAX -- Economic Efficiency -- Basis for the Argument -- Underpinnings of the Argument -- Relative Flatness of Benefits Curve? -- Relative Steepness of the Marginal Cost Curve? -- Short-Term Time Frame -- Only Cost Uncertainty is Considered -- Modeled Eficiency Gains -- Economic Efficiency versus Precaution -- Price Stability -- Tax Revenue Applications -- Potential Implementation Advantages -- Transparency -- Administrative Issues -- Policy Modification -- POTENTIAL DISADVANTAGES -- Uncertain Emissions -- Political Feasibility -- What's in a Name? -- THE ROLE OF COMMITTEE JURISDICTION -- Support from Industry? -- Support from Environmental Groups? -- Consideration of International Efforts and Cooperation -- Coordination with Existing International Efforts -- Maximizing Participation -- International Implementation Concerns -- IMPLEMENTATION OF A CARBON TAX -- Point of Taxation -- Where to Impose a Carbon Tax? -- CO2 Emissions or All CHG Emission? -- THE 1993 ENERGY OR BTU TAX -- Which Emission Sources to Control? -- Level of Taxation -- Tax Based on Estimates of Costs and Benefits117 -- Social Cost of Carbon Estimates -- Applying Social Cost of Carbon Estimates -- Tax Based on Meeting an Emissions Target -- Tax Revenue Distribution.

Estimates of Tax Revenues -- Use of Tax Revenues -- Offset Reductions in Other Taxes -- Direct or Indirect Payments to Households -- Provide Assitance to Carbon-Intensive Industries -- Fund Specific Objectives -- Policy Considerations of Different Revenue Applications -- Overall Costs to Society -- Distributional Impacts -- Carbon-Intensive Industries -- Technology Development -- CONCLUSIONS -- APPENDIX. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION -- End Notes -- IMPLICATIONS OF A CAP-AND-TRADE PROGRAM FOR CARBON DIOXIDE EMISSIONS -- FLEXIBILITY IN THE TIMING OF EMISSION REDUCTIONS -- Potential Savings in Costs As a Result of Timing Flexibility -- Design Features That Provide Firms with Timing Flexibility -- Keeping Costs from Climbing Too High -- Keeping Costs from Falling Too Low -- THE DISTRIBUTIONAL CONSEQUENCES OF A CAP-AND-TRADE PROGRAM -- Market Forces Would Determine Who Bore the Costs of a Cap -- BOX 1. CBO'S COST ESTIMATE FOR S. 2191 -- Policymakers Would Determine Who Received the Value of the Allowances -- REDUCING THE OVERALL ECONOMIC IMPACTOF A CO2 CAP -- CAP-AND-TRADE PROGRAMS AND THE FEDERAL BUDGET -- End Notes -- ISSUES IN DESIGNING A CAP-AND-TRADE PROGRAM FOR CARBON DIOXIDE EMISSIONS -- HOW A CAP-AND-TRADE PROGRAM WOULD WORK -- THE POTENTIAL VALUE AND BUDGETARY TREATMENT OF ALLOWANCES -- THE DISTRIBUTIONAL CONSEQUENCES OF A CAP-AND-TRADE PROGRAM -- Market Forces Would Determine Who Bore the Costs of a Cap -- Policymakers Would Determine Who Received the Value of the Allowances -- REDUCING THE OVERALL ECONOMIC IMPACTOF A CO2 CAP -- Using the Allowance Value to Reduce the Total Economic Cost -- ALLOWING FLEXIBILITY IN THE TIMING OF EMISSION REDUCTIONS TO LOWER COSTS -- Design Features Providing Flexibility in the Timing of Emission Reductions -- A Price Ceiling and a Price Floor -- Borrowing and Banking Allowances -- Aggregate Borrowing by Regulators.

Design Features Addressing Energy-Intensive Manufacturing Industries -- Border Adjustments -- Transitional Assistance -- Compatibility with WTO Agreements -- End Notes -- CHAPTER SOURCES -- INDEX.

Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources.

Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, Michigan : ProQuest Ebook Central, 2024. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest Ebook Central affiliated libraries.

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