Anti-Cartel Enforcement in a Contemporary Age : Leniency Religion.

Cover -- Half-title -- Title -- Copyright -- Foreword -- Contents -- List of Contributors -- Part I: Introduction -- 1. Leniency Policies: Revolution or Religion? -- I. BACKGROUND -- II. AIMS OF THIS BOOK -- III. STRUCTURE OF THE BOOK -- IV. REFLECTIONS -- Part II: Leniency Convergence and Divergence -- 2. Leadership of Leniency -- I. INTRODUCTION -- II. THE HISTORY AND PROLIFERATION OF THE UNITED STATES LENIENCY POLICY -- III. BUILDING AN EFFECTIVE LENIENCY POLICY -- IV. TRANSPARENT POLICIES: THE KEY TO CONTINUED LENIENCY SUCCESS -- V. CONCLUSION -- 3. Leniency Policy with Chinese Characteristics -- I. INTRODUCTION -- II. THE THEORETICAL RATIONALE FOR LENIENCY IN CARTEL ENFORCEMENT -- III. COMPETITION LAW AND LENIENCY COME TO CHINA -- IV. CHINESE LENIENCY IN PRACTICE -- V. CONCLUSION -- Part III: Leniency and the Competition Authority -- 4. What do we know about the Effectiveness of Leniency Policies? A Survey of the Empirical and Experimental Evidence -- I. INTRODUCTION -- II. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON LENIENCY POLICIES -- III. EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE ON LENIENCY POLICIES -- IV. CONCLUSION -- 5. Anti-Cartel Enforcement in Japan: Does Leniency Make the Difference? -- I. INTRODUCTION -- II. THE JAPANESE LENIENCY PROGRAMME -- III. A SIMPLE, CLEAR AND TRANSPARENT LENIENCY PROGRAMME -- IV. THE LENIENCY PROGRAMME: APPLICATIONS AND FINAL DECISIONS -- V. THE JAPANESE LENIENCY PROGRAMME AND DETECTION -- VI. THE JAPANESE LENIENCY PROGRAMME AND DETERRENCE -- VII. THE LENIENCY PROGRAMME'S CONTRIBUTION TO A DIVERSIFIED ENFORCEMENT POLICY -- VIII. CONCLUSION -- 6. Leniency, Profi ling and Reverse Profiling in Multi-Product Markets: Strategic Challenges for Competition Authorities -- I. INTRODUCTION -- II. BACKGROUND -- III. LITERATURE -- IV. SUMMARY OF THE MODEL -- V. IMPLICATIONS FOR PROFILING -- VI. CONCLUSION -- APPENDIX A: FORMAL STATEMENT OF THE MODEL.

APPENDIX B: PROOF -- 7. A Case for Capping the Dosage: Leniency and Competition Authority Governance -- I. INTRODUCTION -- II. THE DOJ LENIENCY REFORMS OF THE 1990S -- III. LENIENCY SIDE-EFFECTS AND COMPETITION AGENCY GOVERNANCE -- IV. LENIENCY AS ONE ELEMENT OF A DIVERSIFIED ANTI-CARTEL PROGRAMME -- V. TOWARD AN INTEGRATED UNDERSTANDING OF ANTI-COMPETITIVE CONDUCT -- Part IV: Leniency and the Corporation -- 8. Leniency Decision-Making from a Corporate Perspective: Complex Realities -- I. INTRODUCTION -- II. THE THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF LENIENCY POLICIES -- III. LENIENCY AS A RATIONAL CHOICE -- IV. DO LENIENCY POLICIES DESTABILISE AND DETER CARTELS? -- V. IS THERE REALLY A ' RACE ' TO THE COMPETITION AUTHORITY? -- VI. CONCLUSION -- 9. Leniency: The Poisoned Chalice or the Pot at the End of the Rainbow? -- I. INTRODUCTION -- II. GENERAL FEATURES OF THE EU LENIENCY REGIME -- III. 'SETTLEMENTS' OF EU CARTEL CASES -- IV. PROS AND CONS OF APPLYING FOR LENIENCY -- V. PROCEDURAL CONCERNS LINKED TO THE PROCESS OF APPLYING FOR LENIENCY -- VI. THE (UNDUE) WEIGHT GIVEN TO LENIENCY STATEMENTS -- VII. CRITERIA TO ASSESS PROBATIVE VALUE -- VIII. CONCLUSION -- 10. Reconditioning Corporate Leniency: The Possibility of Making Compliance Programmes a Condition of Immunity -- I. INTRODUCTION -- II. COMPLIANCE PROGRAMMES AND CURRENT CORPORATE LENIENCY POLICIES -- III. THE LAXITY OF CURRENT CORPORATE LENIENCY POLICIES -- IV. THEORIES OF OPTIMAL INCENTIVISATION OF CORPORATE ACTION -- V. MAKING AN ADEQUATE COMPLIANCE PROGRAMME A CONDITION OF CORPORATE LENIENCY -- VI. CONCLUSION -- Part V: Leniency and the Individual -- 11. Leniency, Whistle-Blowing and the Individual: Should We Create Another Race to the Competition Agency? -- I. INTRODUCTION -- II. WHY TWO RACES ARE INSUFFICIENT TO DETER CARTELS.

III. ENCOURAGING A THIRD RACE- BETWEEN THE CARTEL PARTICIPANTS AND WHISTLE-BLOWERS -- IV. CONCLUSION -- Part VI: Leniency and Crime -- 12. Leniency and Criminal Sanctions in Anti-Cartel Enforcement: Happily Married or Uneasy Bedfellows? -- I. INTRODUCTION -- II. LENIENCY AND CRIMINALISATION-WHICH THE CART AND WHICH THE HORSE? -- III. LENIENCY AND CRIMINALISATION: TENSIONS, AMBIGUITIES AND CONTRADICTIONS -- IV. CONCLUSION -- Part VII: Leniency and Compensation -- 13. Why Leniency does not Undermine Compensation -- I. INTRODUCTION -- II. LENIENCY AND COMPENSATION: THE MECHANICS -- III. CORRECTIVE JUSTICE: THE BROAD VIEW -- IV. ANTITRUST AS A COMPENSATORY SYSTEM -- 14. Leniency and the Two Faces of Janus: Where Public and Private Enforcement Merge and Converge -- I. INTRODUCTION -- II. COMPENSATION AND OPTIMAL DETERRENCE -- III. REASSESSING THE MYTHS FROM A WELFARE-BASED PERSPECTIVE -- IV. BEYOND THE PURELY ECONOMIC WELFARE PERSPECTIVE: TOWARDS A MORE PLURALISTIC APPROACH -- V. CONCLUSION -- Part VIII: Leniency and Compliance -- 15. The Air Cargo Cartel: Lessons for Compliance -- I. INTRODUCTION -- II. METHODOLOGY -- III. BACKGROUND -- IV. LUFTHANSA CASE STUDY -- V. CONCLUSION -- 16. Combining Leniency Policies and Compliance Programmes to Prevent Cartels -- I. INTRODUCTION -- II. AN OVERVIEW OF COMPLIANCE AND ETHICS PROGRAMMES -- III. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LENIENCY AND COMPLIANCE -- IV. COMPETITION AUTHORITIES AND COMPLIANCE PROGRAMMES -- V. THE CASE FOR INCORPORATING COMPLIANCE PROGRAMMES INTO LENIENCY POLICIES -- VI. CONCLUSION -- Index.

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Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, Michigan : ProQuest Ebook Central, 2024. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest Ebook Central affiliated libraries.