Passing the Buck : Congress, the Budget, and Deficits.

Cover -- Half-title -- Title -- Copyright -- Dedication -- Contents -- List of Tables -- Acknowledgments -- Introduction: Congressional Delegation of Power-Now More than Ever -- PART I: DELEGATION OF POWER AND REPRESENTATION -- 1. Origins and Significance of Delegation of Power -- Causes of Delegation of Power -- Delegation as Electoral and Policy Strategy -- Old and New Institutional Capacity Problems -- Significance of Delegation -- Conclusion -- 2. Reforming the Reforms: A Brief History of Congressional Budgeting -- 1789-1920: Congress in Controlof the Federal Budget Process -- 1921-1974: Presidential Control Increasingwith Intermittent Congressional Resistance -- Post-1914: Anti-Congress Backlash -- Recent Unsuccessful Budget Reform Initiatives -- Balanced Budget Constitutional Amendment -- Biennial Budgeting -- Conclusion -- PART II: INSTITUTIONAL SELF-DIAGNOSIS AND BUDGET REFORM, 1974-1996 -- 3. 1974 Budget Act: Congress Takes Control -- Background of the 1914 Act -- Fiscal Issues -- Institutional Issues -- Passage of the Bill -- Provisions of the 1974 Act -- The Budget Committees -- The Congressional Budget Office -- The New Budget Timetable -- The Impoundment Provisions -- Conclusions on the 1974 Act -- Strategy and Reform -- Institutional Self-Diagnosis and Reform -- 4. Congress Attacks Deficits (and Itself) with Gramm-Rudman-Hollings -- Background of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings I -- Fiscal Issues -- Partisan Issues -- Institutional Issues -- Passage of the Act -- Major Provisions of the 1985 Act -- Expedited Judicial Review and Fallback Procedures -- Fiscal and Legal Outcomes ofGRH Iand Background to GRHII -- Bowsher v. Synar -- The Balanced Budget and Emergency DeficitReduction Reaffirmation Act of 1987 -- Representative David Obey disagreed:.

Similar pros and cons were debated on the Senate floor. Carl Levin(D-MI) also defended the conference report: -- And Senator Pete Domenici disagreed: -- Conclusions on Gramm-Rudman-Hollings -- Strategy and Reform -- Institutional Self-Diagnosis and Reform -- 5. Old Problems and New Tools of Self-Restraint: The Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 -- Background of the 1990 Act -- Fiscal Issues -- Partisan Issues -- Institutional Issues -- Passage of the Act -- And Mike Synar (D-OK) agreed: -- Major Provisions of the 1990 Act -- Deficit-Reduction Schedule, Spending Caps, "PAYGO,"and New Sequestration Provisions -- Conclusions on the 1990 Budget Enforcement Act -- Strategy and Reform -- Institutional Self-Diagnosis and Reform -- 6. Stop Us Before We Spend Again: The Line-Item Veto Act of 1996 -- Background of the 1996 Act -- Fiscal Issues -- Institutional Issues -- Representative Dan Glickman (D-KS) agreed: -- Passage of the Act -- Major Provisions of the 1996 Act -- How the Item Veto Worked -- Clinton v. City of New York -- Conclusions on the Line-Item Veto Act -- Strategy and Reform -- Institutional Self-Diagnosis and Reform -- Conclusion: Understanding Delegation of Power -- Is Process the Fundamental Problem? -- Ambivalence, not Abdication, for Now -- Notes -- Bibliography -- Index.

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Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, Michigan : ProQuest Ebook Central, 2024. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest Ebook Central affiliated libraries.