Collective Choice and Social Welfare.

Front Cover -- Collective Choice and social Welfare -- Copyright Page -- Table of Contents -- Dedication -- Introduction to The Series -- Preface -- Chapter 1. INTRODUCTION -- 1.1. Preliminary Remarks -- 1.2. Ingredients of Collective Choice -- 1.3. The Nature of Individual Preferences -- Chapter 1*. PREFERENCE RELATIONS -- 1*1. Binary Relations -- 1*2 Maximal Elements and Choice Sets -- 1*3. A Set of Results for Quasi-Orderings -- 1*4. Subrelations and Compatibility -- 1*5. Choice Functions and Quasi-Transiiivity -- 1*6. Preference and Rational Choice -- Chapter 2. UNANIMITY -- 2.1. The Pareto Criterion -- 2.2. Pareto-Inclusive Choice Rules -- 2.3. Consensus as a Basis of Collective Action -- Chapter 2*. COLLECTIVE CHOICE RULES ANDPARETO COMPARISONS -- 2*1. Choice and Pareto Relation -- 2*2. Compensation Tests -- Chapter 3. COLLECTIVE RATIONALITY -- 3.1. The Bergson-Samuelson Welfare Function -- 3.2. Arrowian Social Welfare Function -- 3.3. The General Possibility Theorem -- 3.4. A Comment on the Significance of Arrow's Results -- Chapter 3*. SOCIAL WELFARE FUNCTIONS -- 3*1. The Impossibility Theorem -- Chapter 4. CHOICE VERSUS ORDERINGS -- 4.1. Transitivity, Quasi-Transitivity, and Acyclicity -- 4.2. Collective Choice and Arrow's Conditions -- 4.3. Rationality and Collective Choice -- Chapter 4*. SOCIAL DECISION FUNCTIONS -- 4*1. Possibility Theorems -- Chapter 5. VALUES AND CHOICE -- 5.1. Welfare Economics and Value Judgments -- 5.2. Content of Welfare Economics: A Dilemma -- 5.3. Basic and Nonbasic Judgments -- 5.4. Facts and Values -- 5.5. Individual Orderings and Choice Rules -- 5.6. Conditions on Choice Rules -- Chapter 5*. ANONYMITY, NEUTRALITY AND RESPONSIVENESS -- 5*1. Conditions for Majority Rule -- 5*2. Pareto-Extension Rules -- Chapter 6. CONFLICTS AND DILEMMAS -- 6.1. Critique of Anonymity and Neutrality.

6.2. Liberal Values and an Impossibility Result -- 6.3. Critique of Acyclicity -- 6.4. Critique of Liberal Values -- 6.5. Critique of the Pareto Principle -- 6.6. Critique of Unrestricted Domain -- Chapter 6*. THE LIBERAL PARADOX -- 6*1. Liberalism versus the Pareto Principle -- 6*2. Extensions -- Chapter 7. INTERPERSONAL AGGREGATION AND COMPARABILITY -- 7.1. Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives -- 7.2. Comparability, Cardinality and Discrimination -- 7.3. Uses of von Neumann-Morgenstern Cardinalization -- 7.4. Partial Comparability -- 7.5. Adding Ordinal-Type Welfare -- Chapter 7*. AGGREGATION QUASI-ORDERINGS1 -- 7*1. Comparability and Aggregation -- 7*2. Partial Comparability -- 7*3. Regularity and Symmetry -- 7*4. Addition of Noncardinal Welfare -- Chapter 8. CARDINALITY WITH OR WITHOUT COMPARABILITY -- 8.1. Bargaining Advantages and Collective Choice -- 8.2. Cardinality and Impossibility -- Chapter 8*. BARGAINS AND SOCIAL WELFAREFUNCTIONALS -- 8*1. The Bargaining Problem of Nash -- 8*2. Social Welfare Functional -- Chapter 9. EQUITY AND JUSTICE -- 9.1. Universalization and Equity -- 9.2. Fairness and Maximin Justice -- 9.3. Impersonality and Expected Utility Maximization -- 9.4. Grading Principles of Justice -- 9.5. Grading Principle, Maximin, and Utilitari -- Chapter 9*. IMPERSONALITY AND COLLECTIVE QUASI-ORDERINGS -- 9*1. Grading Principles of Justice -- 9*2. Suppes and Pareto -- 9*3. Identity Axioms and the Grading Principles -- 9*4. The Maximin Relation of Justice -- 9*5. Justice and Aggregation -- Chapter 10. MAJORITY CHOICE AND RELATED SYSTEMS -- 10.1. The Method of Majority Decision -- 10.2. Probability of Cyclical Majorities -- 10.3. Restricted Preferences -- 10.4. Conditions on Collective Choice Rules and Restricted Preferences -- Chapter 10*. RESTRICTED PREFERENCES AND RATIONAL CHOICE -- 10*1. Restricted Domain.

10*2. Value Restriction and Limited Agreement -- 10*3. Extremal Restriction -- 10*4. Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Rational Choice -- 10*5. The Special Case of Anti-Symmetric Preferences -- Chapter 11. THEORY AND PRACTICE -- 11.1. Systems of Collective Choice -- 11.2. Institutions and Framework -- 11.3. Expression of Individual Preferences -- 11.4. Efficiency and Pareto Optimality -- 11.5. Concluding Observations -- BIBLIOGRAPHY -- NAME INDEX -- SUBJECT INDEX.

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Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, Michigan : ProQuest Ebook Central, 2024. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest Ebook Central affiliated libraries.