Logic and How It Gets That Way.

Cover -- Half Title -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Dedication -- Table of Contents -- Preface -- Introduction: Logic, philosophy, analysis -- 1 Logical form -- Concepts of logic -- Logical units and reasoning chains -- Deductively valid inference forms -- Pragmatic formalization rationale -- Formal semantics and logical metatheory -- 2 Monkey raisins -- An expressive limitation -- Surprisingly problematic quantifications -- Monkeys and raisins, craisins and kmonkeys -- Implications of the paradox -- Classical alternatives -- Intensional solution to the expressibility problem -- The monkey's tale -- 3 The secret life of truth- functions -- Truth- functions -- Cornerstone of extensional logic -- Truth- tables for all and sundry -- Truth- function mysteries -- Constant truth- functions -- Counter- examples to extensionalism -- Objections anticipated -- Expanding the counter- example family -- Formal standards of (non- )truth- functionality -- Extensionalism beyond reason and repair -- 4 Reference and identity -- Identity relata -- Cognitive significance of non-trivially true identity statements -- Objections to Frege's identity thesis -- Self- identity and designation -- What's in a name? -- Idea, sense and reference -- Linsky's critique of Frege -- Identical sense and the extensional criterion -- Intentionality of meaning -- Semantics as a theory of the expression of thought -- Reference's debt to identity -- 5 Intensional versus extensional logic and semantics -- Against the semantic grain -- Referring and attributing properties to objects -- Disguised definite descriptions -- Problems in extensionalist reference models -- Semantic oppositions idealized -- Poverty of purely formal semantics -- Davidson's T-schema -- Purely formal semantics -- Formalizing intentional meaning relations -- Explanatory advantages of intensional semantics.

Slingshot arguments -- 6 Truth -- What is truth? -- Truth and meaning, meaning and truth -- Constitutive versus regulative truth -- Frege's theory of reified truth and falsehood -- Tarski's analysis of truth-conditions in formal languages -- Regulative alternative to constitutive truth concepts -- Positive correspondence -- Truth-makers, truth-breakers -- Negative states of affairs -- True and false sentences -- Conceivability of a null universe -- 7 Logical and semantic paradoxes -- Why paradoxes matter -- Philosophical legacy of inconsistency -- Precarious logical integrity -- A. Paradoxes of conditionals -- B. Self-non-applications -- C. Grelling's paradox contra type theory -- D. Inductive paradoxes in a deductive logical framework -- Conclusion: Moral lessons of logic -- Notes -- References -- Index.

Clears the ground of some very well-entrenched philosophical doctrines about the nature of logic, including some of the fundamental seldom-questioned parts of elementary propositional and predicate-quantificational logic.

Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources.

Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, Michigan : ProQuest Ebook Central, 2024. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest Ebook Central affiliated libraries.