Evaluation and Legal Theory.

Half Title Page -- Half Title verso -- Title Page -- Title verso -- General Editor's Preface -- Contents -- Acknowledgements -- 1. What's the Point of Jurisprudence? -- A. Introduction: Outlining the Project -- B. Some Remarks on the Methodology of Methodology -- C. A Closer Look at the Task of Analytical Jurisprudence -- D. A Guide to the Book's Structure -- 2. Introducing the Moral Evaluation Thesis -- A. Introduction -- B. Evaluation and Legal Theory: Some Popular Myths -- C. Evaluation and Legal Theory: All or Nothing at All? -- 3. Indirectly Evaluative Legal Theory: Meeting Finnis' Challenge -- A. Directly vs. Indirectly Evaluative Propositions -- B. Recasting the Finnisian Challenge -- C. Directly vs. Indirectly Evaluative Legal Theory -- D. Law's Aspirations -- 4. Finnis and the Moral Justification Thesis -- A. From Evaluation to Justification -- B. Supporting the Moral Justification Thesis by Other Means -- 5. The Beneficial Moral Consequences Thesis and an Introduction to Dworkinian Methodology -- A. Evaluation and Identification: Schauer's Argument from Beneficial Moral Consequences -- B. Evaluation and Identification: Dworkin's Stance -- C. Dworkin and the Beneficial Moral Consequences Thesis -- 6. What's the Point of Law? Dworkinian Methodology and the Argument from Law's Function -- A. Constructive Interpretation and the Function of Law -- B. Dvyorkin vs. Raz: The Argument From Law's Function -- C. Consequences of Methodology: The Role of Legal Theory Reconsidered -- 7. Carrying on the Conversation -- A. The Functions of Indirectly Evaluative Legal Theory -- B. Conclusion -- Index.

If Raz and Dworkin disagree over how law should be characterised,how are we, their jurisprudential public, supposed to go about adjudicating between the rival theories which they offer us? To what considerations would those theorists themselves appeal in order to convince us that their accounts of law are accurate and successful? Moreover, what is it that makes an account of law successful? Evaluation and Legal Theory tackles methodological or meta-theoretical issues such as these, and does so via attempting to answer the question: to what extent, and in what sense, must a legal theorist make value judgements about his data in order to construct a successful theory of law? Dispelling the obfuscatory myth that legal positivism seeks a 'value-free' account of law, the author attempts to explain and defend Joseph Razs position that evaluation is essential to successful legal theory, whilst refuting John Finnis and Ronald Dworkins contentions that the legal theorist must morally evaluate and morally justify the law in order to properly explain its nature. The book does not claim to solve the many mysteries of meta-legal theory but does seek to contribute to and engender rigorous and focused debate on this topic.

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Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, Michigan : ProQuest Ebook Central, 2024. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest Ebook Central affiliated libraries.