Judge Pinto de Albuquerque and the Progressive Development of International Human Rights Law.

Half Title -- Series Information -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Contents -- Laudatio for the Honorary Doctorate to Judge Paulo Pinto de Albuquerque -- Part 1 The Politics of Human Rights -- Chapter 1 The Relationship between the Convention and Constitutional Law -- 1.1 From Constitutional Parochialism to Multilevel Constitutionalism (giem and Others v. Italy) -- i Introduction ( 1-2) -- ii The Relationship between the Convention and the Constitution ( 3-20) -- A The Ground-Breaking First "twin judgments" ( 3-7) -- (i) The Convention as a Norm of Intermediate Rank between Constitution and Statute Law ( 3-4) -- (ii) The Ordinary Judges' Limited Power to Apply the Convention ( 5-7) -- B The Refined Second "twin judgments" ( 8-14) -- (i) The Maximum Expansion of Convention and Constitution Guarantees ( 8-10) -- (ii) The "margin of appreciation" of the Court's Judgments ( 11-15) -- C The Revolutio of Judgment no. 49/2015 ( 16-20) -- (i) The Undisputed Legacy of Sud Fondi ( 16-17) -- (ii) Varvara Interpreted in the "continuous stream" of the Strasbourg Case-Law ( 18-20) -- iii The Consequences of Judgment no. 49/2015 in the Italian Legal Order ( 21-56) -- A The Wrongful Reading of Varvara ( 21-27) -- (i) The Obliteration of the "right to be forgotten" ( 21-24) -- (ii) The Instrumentalisation of Penal Justice for Administrative Policy Purposes ( 25-27) -- B The Illusory "substantive" Declaration of Liability ( 28-35) -- (i) The Insurmountable Lack of Legal Certainty ( 28-33) -- (ii) The Breach of the Presumption of Innocence Principle ( 34-35) -- C The Volatile "consolidated law" Test ( 36-56) -- (i) The Distortion of Well-Established Case-Law ( 36-42) -- (ii) The Troubling Criteria of "non-consolidation" of Law ( 43-56) -- iv The Court's Place in Europe ( 57-71) -- A The Spirit of the Age ( 57-63).

(i) Strong Headwinds against the Court ( 57-60) -- (ii) The Efficiency-Interests-Oriented Approach to Criminal Law ( 61-63) -- B The Court's Civilisational Acquis ( 64-67) -- (i) The Extraordinary Legacy of the Court ( 64-65) -- (ii) The Telling Example of Italy ( 66-67) -- C What Judicial Dialogue? ( 68-71) -- (i) The Antagonistic "us and them" Logic ( 68-69) -- (ii) The Proxy Fight for the Survival of International Law ( 70-71) -- v The Court with the "final say" ( 72-90) -- A The "interpretative authority" of the Court's Judgment ( 72-80) -- (i) From Res Interpretata to the Erga Omnes Effect of the Court's Judgment ( 72-77) -- (ii) From Constitutional Parochialism to Multilevel Constitutionalism ( 78-80) -- B A Convention-Oriented Constitutional Theory of Fundamental Rights ( 81-86) -- (i) The Embedding of the Convention into the Constitutional and Legal Order ( 81-84) -- (ii) Convention Protection as a "floor", not as a "ceiling" ( 85-86) -- C The Challenge of the "national identity" Rhetoric ( 87-90) -- (i) A Lesson from the Taricco Saga ( 87-88) -- (ii) The "Maginot line" between the Convention and the Charter of Fundamental Rights ( 89-90) -- vi Conclusion ( 91-95) -- 1.2 Double Standards in Europe (Hutchinson v. United Kingdom) -- i Introduction ( 1) -- ii The Convention Law on Parole ( 2-10) -- A The Acknowledgment of the Right to Parole in Vinter ( 2-6) -- B The Statement of the "relevant principles" on Parole in Murray ( 7-10) -- iii The UK Legal Framework on Parole for Whole Life Sentence ( 11-26) -- A The Reaction of the Court of Appeal to Vinter ( 11-18) -- B The Duty to Take into Account the Convention ( 19-25) -- iv The State Obligation in the Present Case ( 26-34) -- A The Position of the Respondent Government ( 26-29) -- B The Position of the Grand Chamber ( 30-34).

v What Lies Ahead for the Convention System? ( 35-47) -- A The Seismic Consequences of the Present Judgment for Europe ( 35-40) -- B Argentoratum Locutum, Iudicium Finitum ( 41-47) -- vi Conclusion ( 48-50) -- 1.3 The Existential Risk Put by Illiberal Democracies (Baka v. Hungary) -- Unconstitutional Constitutional Norms -- Ad Hominem Legislation -- The Direct, Supra-Constitutional Effect of the Convention -- The Court as the European Constitutional Court -- Conclusion -- Chapter 2 TheRelationship between the Convention and International Law -- 2.1 Evolutive Interpretation, European Consensus and Soft Law (Muršić v. Croatia) -- i Introduction ( 1-2) -- ii Soft Law in International Law ( 3-9) -- A The Sources of International Law in Article 38  1 of the icj Statute ( 3-7) -- B Soft Law Where There Is Codification ( 8) -- C Soft Law Where There Is Little or No Codification ( 9) -- iii Soft Law in European Human Rights Law ( 10-22) -- A The Constitutional Principle of Evolutive Interpretation ( 10-13) -- B Deformalisation of Sources of Law ( 14-20) -- C European Consensus as the Conceptual Framework of Normativity ( 21-22) -- iv Soft Law and the Council of Europe's Rule of Recognition ( 23-33) -- A The Rule of Recognition of a Democratic International Community ( 23-26) -- B The Deep-Seated Commitment to Hardening Soft Law ( 27-30) -- C The Constitutional Prohibition on Softening Hard Law ( 31-33) -- v The Hardening of Prison Law ( 34-42) -- A Worldwide ( 34-38) -- B In the Council of Europe ( 39-42) -- vi The Fight against Prison Overcrowding ( 43-47) -- A The Minimum Living Space in the icrc Standards ( 43-45) -- B The Minimum Living Space in the epr Standards ( 46-47) -- vii The Application of Convention Standards to the Present Case ( 48-59).

A The Majority's Contradictory Cumulative Approach ( 48-53) -- B A Coherent, Pro Persona Cumulative Approach ( 54-59) -- viii Conclusion ( 60-63) -- 2.2 The Clash between Strasbourg and the United Nations Security Council (Al-Dulimi and Montana Management Inc. v. Switzerland) -- i Introduction ( 1) -- ii The United Nations Legal Framework ( 2-27) -- A The Interpretation of Article 103 of the Charter ( 2-8) -- (i) The Nature of the Rule ( 2) -- (ii) The Scope of the Rule ( 3-4) -- (iii) Intrinsic and Extrinsic Limitations to the Applicability of the Rule ( 5-6) -- (iv) The Constitutionalisation of the Charter? ( 7-8) -- B The Interpretation of Resolution 1483 ( 9-24) -- (i) The Textual Interpretation ( 9-12) -- (ii) The Teleological Interpretation ( 13) -- (iii) The Contextual Interpretation ( 14-16) -- (iv) The Systematic Interpretation ( 17-24) -- C Preliminary Conclusion ( 25-27) -- iii The Right of Access to a Court in International Law ( 28-37) -- A The Nature of the Right of Access to a Court ( 28-32) -- (i) In International Humanitarian and Criminal Law ( 28-29) -- (ii) In International Human Rights Law ( 30-31) -- (iii) In European Human Rights Law ( 32) -- B A Norm of Jus Cogens? ( 33-35) -- (i) In Civil Proceedings ( 33-34) -- (ii) In Criminal Proceedings ( 35) -- C Preliminary Conclusion ( 36-37) -- iv The Conflict between Charter Obligations and Human Rights Treaty Obligations ( 38-50) -- A The Possible Solutions ( 38-44) -- (i) Primacy of Charter Obligations ( 38-39) -- (ii) Primacy of Human Rights Treaty Obligations ( 40-41) -- (iii) Harmonisation of Charter and Human Rights Treaty Obligations ( 42-44) -- B Critique of the Majority's Reasoning ( 45-56) -- (i) The Unfulfilled Promise of an Interpretation of Resolution 1483 ( 45-46).

(ii) The Implicit "constitutional nature" of the Right of Access to a Court ( 47-53) -- (iii) The Disguised Bosphorus Solution ( 54-56) -- C Preliminary Conclusion ( 57-58) -- v Taking the Convention Seriously ( 59-70) -- A The Constitutional Nature of the Convention ( 56-60) -- B The Applicability of Bosphorus to UN Charter Obligations ( 61-64) -- (i) The Material Scope of Bosphorus ( 61-62) -- (ii) The Temporal Scope of Bosphorus ( 63) -- (iii) The Personal Scope of Bosphorus ( 64) -- C The Application of Bosphorus to the Present Case ( 65-67) -- D Preliminary Conclusion ( 68-70) -- vi Final Conclusion ( 71-73) -- 2.3 The Confrontation between Strasbourg and the United Nations Human Rights Committee (Correia de Matos v. Portugal) -- i Introduction ( 1-3) -- ii The Groundless Margin of Appreciation ( 4-12) -- A The "better placed" Argument ( 4-9) -- B The Self-Restrained Court ( 10-12) -- iii The Factors That Delimit the Margin of Appreciation ( 13-32) -- A Distorting the European Consensus ( 13-20) -- B Fragmenting International Law ( 21-32) -- iv The Perversion of the Margin of Appreciation ( 33-54) -- A The Review of the General Blanket Prohibition ( 33-45) -- B The Review of the Decision Taken in the Present Case ( 46-54) -- v The Court's Relevant Case-Law ( 55-61) -- A The Unclear Legacy of Croissant ( 55-59) -- B The "necessary in the interests of justice" Test ( 60-61) -- vi A Self-Standing Right under the Convention ( 62-67) -- A The Textual Element of Interpretation ( 62-64) -- B The Teleological Element of Interpretation ( 65-67) -- vii A Non-Absolute Right under the Convention ( 68-80) -- A The Systematic Element of Interpretation ( 68-76) -- B The Application of the Convention Standard to the Case ( 77-80) -- viii Conclusion ( 81-82) -- Part 2 The Human Rights Challenges.

Chapter 3 Succumbing to Penal Populism.

For the first time, an English-written book collects the most salient opinions of Judge Paulo Pinto de Albuquerque (European Court of Human Rights).

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Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, Michigan : ProQuest Ebook Central, 2024. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest Ebook Central affiliated libraries.