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Corporate Power in Australia : Do the 1% Rule?

By: Material type: TextTextPublisher: Melbourne : Monash University Publishing, 2020Copyright date: ©2020Edition: 1st edDescription: 1 online resource (240 pages)Content type:
  • text
Media type:
  • computer
Carrier type:
  • online resource
ISBN:
  • 9781925835441
Subject(s): Genre/Form: Additional physical formats: Print version:: Corporate Power in AustraliaDDC classification:
  • 338.60151949999999
LOC classification:
  • HD2930 .E393 2020
Online resources:
Contents:
Front Cover -- Title Page -- About the Author -- About this Book -- Imprint and Copyright Information -- Contents -- List of Figures and Tables -- Table 1.1: Proportion of Big Three Miners' Preferences Achieved -- Table 1.2: Public-interest Case for Big Three Miners' Preferences Achieved -- Table 1.3: Democratic Momentum Miners' Preferences Achieved -- Table 1.4: Evidence of Instrumental Power -- Table 2.1: Proportion of Banks' Preferences Achieved -- Table 2.2: Public-interest Case for Bank Preferences Achieved -- Table 2.3: Democratic Momentum for Banks' Preferences Achieved -- Table 2.4: Evidence of Instrumental Power -- Table 3.1: Proportion of Telstra's Preferences Achieved -- Table 3.2: Public-interest Case for Telstra's Preferences Achieved -- Table 3.3: Democratic Momentum for Telstra's Preferences Achieved -- Table 3.4: Evidence of Instrumental Power -- Table 4.1: Proportion of News Corp Australia's Preferences Achieved -- Table 4.2: Public-interest Case for News Corp Australia' Preferences Achieved -- Table 4.3: Democratic Momentum for News Corp Preferences Achieved -- Table 4.4: Evidence of Instrumental Power -- Table 5.1: Proportion of Coles and Woolworths Preferences Achieved -- Table 5.2: Public-interest Case for Coles and Woolworths Preferences Achieved -- Table 5.3: Democratic Momentum for Coles and Woolworths Preferences Achieved -- Table 5.4: Evidence of Instrumental Power -- Table 6.1: Proportion of Big Business Preferences Achieved -- Table 6.2: Public-interest Case for Big Business Preferences Achieved -- Table 6.3: Democratic Momentum for Big Business Preferences Achieved -- Table 6.4: Evidence of Instrumental Power -- Table 7.1: Proportion of Big Business Preferences Achieved -- Table 7.2: Public-interest Case for Big Business Preferences Achieved -- Table 7.3: Democratic Momentum for Big Business Preferences Achieved.
Table 7.4: Evidence of Instrumental Power -- Figure 2.1: Indicative Map of Future of Financial Advice Stakeholders -- Figure 4.1: Indicative Map of Media Stakeholders -- Acknowledgements -- Introduction -- Part 1: A Fiercely Contested Battleground -- Chapter 1. The Big Miners and the Mining Tax: The Benchmark Case -- Chapter 2. Banks and the Financial Advice Reforms -- Chapter 3. Telstra and the National Broadband Network -- Chapter 4. News Corp and Media Reform -- Part 2: An Unexpected Turn -- Chapter 5. Supermarkets versus the Farmers -- Chapter 6. Unfair Contracts -- Chapter 7. Abuse of Market Power and the Culpability of Neoliberalism -- Conclusion.
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Front Cover -- Title Page -- About the Author -- About this Book -- Imprint and Copyright Information -- Contents -- List of Figures and Tables -- Table 1.1: Proportion of Big Three Miners' Preferences Achieved -- Table 1.2: Public-interest Case for Big Three Miners' Preferences Achieved -- Table 1.3: Democratic Momentum Miners' Preferences Achieved -- Table 1.4: Evidence of Instrumental Power -- Table 2.1: Proportion of Banks' Preferences Achieved -- Table 2.2: Public-interest Case for Bank Preferences Achieved -- Table 2.3: Democratic Momentum for Banks' Preferences Achieved -- Table 2.4: Evidence of Instrumental Power -- Table 3.1: Proportion of Telstra's Preferences Achieved -- Table 3.2: Public-interest Case for Telstra's Preferences Achieved -- Table 3.3: Democratic Momentum for Telstra's Preferences Achieved -- Table 3.4: Evidence of Instrumental Power -- Table 4.1: Proportion of News Corp Australia's Preferences Achieved -- Table 4.2: Public-interest Case for News Corp Australia' Preferences Achieved -- Table 4.3: Democratic Momentum for News Corp Preferences Achieved -- Table 4.4: Evidence of Instrumental Power -- Table 5.1: Proportion of Coles and Woolworths Preferences Achieved -- Table 5.2: Public-interest Case for Coles and Woolworths Preferences Achieved -- Table 5.3: Democratic Momentum for Coles and Woolworths Preferences Achieved -- Table 5.4: Evidence of Instrumental Power -- Table 6.1: Proportion of Big Business Preferences Achieved -- Table 6.2: Public-interest Case for Big Business Preferences Achieved -- Table 6.3: Democratic Momentum for Big Business Preferences Achieved -- Table 6.4: Evidence of Instrumental Power -- Table 7.1: Proportion of Big Business Preferences Achieved -- Table 7.2: Public-interest Case for Big Business Preferences Achieved -- Table 7.3: Democratic Momentum for Big Business Preferences Achieved.

Table 7.4: Evidence of Instrumental Power -- Figure 2.1: Indicative Map of Future of Financial Advice Stakeholders -- Figure 4.1: Indicative Map of Media Stakeholders -- Acknowledgements -- Introduction -- Part 1: A Fiercely Contested Battleground -- Chapter 1. The Big Miners and the Mining Tax: The Benchmark Case -- Chapter 2. Banks and the Financial Advice Reforms -- Chapter 3. Telstra and the National Broadband Network -- Chapter 4. News Corp and Media Reform -- Part 2: An Unexpected Turn -- Chapter 5. Supermarkets versus the Farmers -- Chapter 6. Unfair Contracts -- Chapter 7. Abuse of Market Power and the Culpability of Neoliberalism -- Conclusion.

Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources.

Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, Michigan : ProQuest Ebook Central, 2024. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest Ebook Central affiliated libraries.

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